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ABSTRACT  
 
Informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze and the ‘new materialisms’, the thesis is a 
post-representational, post-human response to contemporary conceptualisations and 
practices associated with 'anorexia nervosa'. The thesis puts these ideas to work 
through a mobile, or connective, ethnographic methodology which blends life on-line 
and off-line, without giving priority to one or the other. By holding in paradoxical 
tension both anorexia as an “aspirational lifestyle choice” (as it is often conceived in 
pro anorexic spaces on-line) and as a “biologically based serious mental illness” (as 
it is conceived through medical and psychiatric sense off-line), the thesis disrupts 
orthodox notions of what actual ‘anorexia nervosa’ is, and who actual ‘anorexics’ are.  
 
By ‘promiscuously’ engaging with texts which consider choice, determinism and 
materiality in ways which are rarely put to work in more traditionally bounded 
‘disordered eating’ research, the thesis attempts to destroy ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic 
image of thought and provide an alternative to individualised, cognised, spatio-
temporalised representations. As one of the few sustained works which engages 
with the concept of ‘wannarexia’, the thesis attempts to produce an account which 
takes seriously the enchanting intra-action of entities and matter. More specifically it 
reconsiders interpellation in terms of captivating, expansive, yet unspecific promises 
which are produced and ignite desire.  
 
By engaging with the possibilities of what it is to eat and to speak, the thesis cleaves 
a space in which to consider the actual and the virtual of consuming-producing 
relationships. By drawing attention to non-human actants, the materiality of language 
and the abstractness of matter, the thesis attempts to provide a robust yet 
empirically transcendental account of a difficult relationship to feeding the body.  
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CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING 
‘ANOREXIA’ THROUGH THE 
DELEUZIAN EVENT 
 
“What is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words? [..] If we then 
speak of food, how can we avoid speaking in front of the one who is to be 
served as food?” (Deleuze, 2004, 29). 
 
“The distinction is not between two sorts of events; rather, it is between 
the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatio-temporal realisation in 
the state of affairs. The distinction between the event and accident” 
(Deleuze, 2004, 64). 
 
Introduction  
 
The thesis develops from a critique of contemporary perspectives on ‘anorexia’ 
which view it either as a serious mental health problem, or as a lifestyle choice. It 
also departs from feminist, sociological or psychoanalytic views of anorexia which 
conceive it as a symptom of wider cultural malaise – such as negative images of 
femininity or failures of family dynamics. I argue that such perspectives, and the 
practices that they commend, have severe implications for those who experience a 
difficult relationship to feeding the body. These perspectives, I will suggest, 
frequently mis-identify causes, mis-attribute agency, misconstrue choice, fail to 
address the materiality of bodies, offer unproductive visions of ‘recovery’, and limit 
more expansive and ethical possibilities of what ‘eating’ might become. I argue that 
as a result, such contemporary conceptualisations and categorisations fail to 
encounter that which is mobile, singular, shifting and unfinished in the experience of 
so-called ‘anorexia’. Using a theoretical framework informed by the work of Gilles 
Deleuze, the thesis attempts to free anorexia from the fetters of such categorical 
thought (which Deleuze conceptualised as ‘good sense’ and ‘common sense’ 
(Deleuze, 2004a)) to open up possibilities for living differently and making sense 
differently. 
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The empirical materials for the research are taken from a study of on-line ‘pro-
anorexia’ (pro-ana) forums, and an off-line interview study involving ‘Joanne’, an 
active participant in pro-ana sites. Pro-ana sites offer alternatives to medical and 
feminist conceptualisations, in asserting and debating anorexia as a lifestyle choice. 
Yet as I show in later chapters, the notion of choice is itself contested and 
ambivalent. The ethnographic sites, which cannot all be explored in detail, included 
both on-line and off-line spaces, and as such, on-line life, and off-line life (Markham, 
1998) have both been engaged with in a bid to give a different account of living with, 
and through, a difficult and complex relationship to feeding the body. 
 
My desire has been to unfix good and common sense notions of what actual 
‘Anorexia Nervosa’ is and who actual ‘Anorexics’ are - while never becoming 
forgetful of the lived and everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body. This task becomes possible by engaging with theories pertaining 
to the event, affect, virtuality and incorporeality, as these are perhaps abstract 
enough to get into, and under, the conceptual skin of what is presumed concrete 
about matter (Massumi, 2002, 5). These theories are combined in the thesis with 
ideas drawn from new, or feminist, materialisms and post-humanism to engage with 
the visceral, vital, materiality of relationships to feeding the body. Together, these 
literatures work towards the possibility of destroying ‘Anorexia’ as a dogmatic image 
of thought (Deleuze, 2004b), and refusing to take for granted pre-defined, or a priori, 
borders of materiality, causality, and agency.  
 
The Event in the Context of Anorexia Nervosa and Pro-anorexia 
 
The Deleuzian event is central to the conceptual framework of the thesis. It is 
connected to the embodied becoming of my thinking connections. The particular 
value of Deleuze’s concept of the event is that it is of both bodies and language, and 
therefore avoids unhelpful binary distinctions that have hampered previous research 
on anorexia, unhelpfully forcing choices between matter and ideas, bodies and 
words, concepts and experience, nature and culture. As Deleuze notes, “[t]he event 
[..] has an essential relationship to language. But language is what is said of things” 
(Deleuze, 2004, 25). For my work, the event, its concepts and conceptual 
connections - in collision and process - were experienced as both affective - sensed 
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as significant before my thoughtfulness had caught up - and also as the biting point 
of engagement.  
 
The entanglement of bodies and language, of affect and thought, has been central to 
my research throughout. It is ‘there’ in the research question which led me to the 
field: what is the ‘everyday experience’ of living with a ‘difficult relationship to feeding 
the body? This entanglement is invoked in a question which Deleuze poses in Logic 
of Sense (2004)1, “[w]hat is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words?” (ibid. 
29). This provocative question has stimulated and challenged me throughout the 
thesis. As such my engagement has been with speaking and eating. Speaking of 
food and eating words. With lived concepts and the 'abstractness’ of embodied 
experience (Massumi, 2011). This engagement with lived concepts has allowed into 
the frame of my engagement with ‘anorexia’ and ‘pro-anorexia’ that which is of the 
body, “Of it, but not it. Real, material, but incorporeal” (Massumi, 2002, 5).  
 
Within the thesis ‘anorexia’ will often be referred to as ‘a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body’, as already indicated above. Although this is a mouthful, it feels 
important to work which seeks to disrupt good and common sense and contests the 
“assignation of fixed identities” (Deleuze, 2004, 5). A ‘difficult relationship to feeding 
the body’ does not pathologise. It highlights embodied struggle and movement – 
activity and process. It foregrounds the relational aspect of the doer and the done, 
without individualising the subject on ascription. It engenders a space in which to 
consider the innumerable human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010) that are 
enfolded in the digestive relation. 
 
‘A difficult relationship to feeding the body’ looks towards what a body does – not 
what it appears to be, and not what it represents. It implies process, activity and 
movement, but not towards a fixed or individualising identity. It de-territorialises the 
striated spatiality, or fixed terrain, of ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ and acknowledges 
becoming rather than being. In doing so, this conceptual disruption engenders a 
schism between ‘accidental’ appearance, consumables, and the fixed metaphysics 
                                            
1
 Following James Williams (2008a) throughout the thesis there will be reference to Logic of Sense, 
rather than ‘The Logic of Sense’. To prefix the text with the determiner ‘the’, would evoke the idea that 
there is one definitive logic of sense that we might be concerned with, that it is easily understood, or 
that it is clearly or succinctly defined. 
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of being. Becoming disrespectful of the ‘proper name’ of ‘Anorexia’ moves 
possibilities of thought away from ‘authenticity’ towards a more attuned engagement 
with bodies, matter, and bodies that matter (Butler, 1993). Although the notion of the 
proper name, ‘Anorexia’, will be unpicked throughout the body of the text, what is 
important to note at this early juncture is the critical stance that both Deleuze, and 
through him, the thesis, take in relation to the colonising potentials of ‘fixed identities’ 
and ‘proper names’. The thesis will argue that common sense processes which 
create categories with proper names, which enable recognition, and good sense 
processes which ascribe bodies to these categories, and enable prediction, 
obfuscate the real abstractness of matter. They produce only the same difference, as 
opposed to intense or singular difference, and, particularly important for the concerns 
of the thesis, buttress ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ as a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 
2004b). 
 
Common sense abstractions 
 
“Research on eating disorders is often grounded on a dichotomous way of 
conceptualising their personal implications, such as false consciousness 
versus emancipation, and their political dimensions, such as dominance 
versus freedom. This type of reasoning mimics and fuels anorexic thinking 
in terms of one-dimensional absolutes” (Sauokko, 2008, 2. Emphasis 
added). 
 
Although the thesis takes a decidedly different track to the one laid out by Saukko, 
particularly her concern with the anorexic self and identity, in the above quote we 
have the beginnings of the idea that neither logic, or sense, are isolated. Rather, 
they flow into other series of ‘reasoning’ (ibid) thereby producing a nuanced variation 
of what is sensible and what is nonsense. As such, rather than being a bizarre 
pathology, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and the sense which informs 
this relation, is connected to bifurcations and simplified abstractions which circulate 
in discourses which are every-day and unremarkable.  
 
Although the thesis stakes its claim to abstractness, in terms of the concepts and 
theories it puts to work, this abstraction is obscure and distinct, as opposed to clear 
and distinct (Deleuze, 2004b). The association of ‘obscurity’ and ‘distinction’ is 
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important in Deleuzian thought. The entangled relationship between the two informs 
his critique of demands for ‘clearness’ in conventional notions of abstraction. For 
Deleuze, as for Massumi, whose textual methods are explicated more fully in the 
second chapter, abstractions can never be obviously and succinctly represented. 
Words never coincide exactly with their referents. To paraphrase Deleuze, I cannot 
literally say the sense of what I am trying to say: that would be nonsense (2004a). I 
cannot make clear, in propositions, what I feel to be important and relevant. Williams 
explains further:  
 
“This is why Deleuze repeats an odd comment about chariots passing 
through mouths, in Logic of Sense, in order to explain how word and thing 
retain a difference that cannot be resolved by mapping the words onto 
what they truthfully correspond to, since the chariot does not pass through 
your mouth” (Williams, 2008a, 48).  
 
In keeping with the paradoxical imperative of obscure abstraction, I imprudently 
produce an at times ‘fleshy’ text. Here intervals and folds abound, producing crevices 
from which potentially different ways of encountering the eating order might emerge. 
The impetus to operate in this manner is quite contrary to the idea that ‘the devil is in 
the detail’. It is not a question of finding unitary icons, such as God or Devil, and it is 
certainly not a question of finding them where we might expect to locate them. The 
‘detail’ is not straightforwardly something which avails itself to vision, which can then 
be pointed to with excitable digits. To de-territorialise the obviousness of ‘detail’, we 
might say instead that it is about availing ourselves to the reverberations produced 
through collisions between invisible entities (Deleuze, 2013). By ceasing to look for a 
God, and giving up our search for a Devil, we might begin to think and feel with 
mischievous sprites. Those luminous entities who wait and invite thought to 
encounter spaces in-between actual details and ‘facts’. Spaces where words and 
things, in their mixtures and muddles, begin to glow (MacLure, 2013a).  
 
Here I am not suggesting that engaging with the world abstractly, in and of itself, 
produces thoughts worth encountering. The abstract alone, when conventionally 
conceived of as separate from, and superior to the messiness of empirical 
appearances, does not produce real difference.  We can note this production of 
banal distinction or ‘same-difference’ in the empirical abstractions of good and 
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common sense which categorise and border bodies, divide subject from object, body 
from mind, and so on. The point being made here is that such orthodox abstractions 
are obfuscated in and by their predictability and recognisability (Deleuze, 2004b). 
They are not obdurate; in a sense, they are palatable.  
 
The sense that orthodox abstractions produce is too good and too common to 
produce anything outside of what I am calling ‘same-difference’, or difference which 
is immediately undone or resolved by operations that render it stable, recognisable 
and predictable. These operations, according to Deleuze are resemblance, identity, 
analogy or opposition. As Deleuze notes: 
 
“Good and common sense each refer to the other, each reflect the other 
and constitute one half of the orthodoxy. In view of this reciprocity and 
double reflection, we can define common sense by the process of 
recognition and good sense by the process of prediction” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 285).  
 
As such, disrupting good and common sense engenders the possibility of 
encountering the ‘subject-object’ of inquiry differently. As a set of practices it 
dislocates the powerful restraints of the dogmatic image of thought, powerful due to 
its status as something which “[e]verybody knows [and] no-one can deny” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 165).  
 
The experimental task taken up by the thesis is the creation of an appropriate dose 
(Tynan, 2010; Mann O’ Donnell, 2010) of distinction and obscurity. A dose which 
would produce a subject-object that is unrecognisable and unpredictable. And while 
this takes up what Patti Lather notes as the “ethical imperative to risk not being 
understood” (Lather, 2007), the task is not to suffer obscurity and “scratch sores of 
ressentiment” (Deleuze, 2004a, 173). It is, as noted, a question of dosage. This 
activity involves creating concoctions of sense and nonsense that paradoxically 
produce knotty mixtures that deserve attention. By becoming idiotic and forfeiting our 
geometry set (Deleuze, 2004b), our predictable circles can become elliptical. We can 
conceive of different problems and different problems of difference.  
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The Diagnostic Statistical Manual – speaking through good and common 
sense  
 
In the case of ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, moving matter is abstracted into the demanding 
category of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) (APA, 2000; 2013). The new 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) is used by clinicians and researchers to diagnose and 
classify ‘mental disorders’. It has been produced by hundreds of ‘international 
experts’ in all aspects of mental health. The fifth edition, as with preceding others, 
defines and classifies ‘mental disorders’. It attempts to produce concise and specific 
criteria intended to facilitate an objective assessment of symptom presentations in a 
variety of clinical settings - inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, 
clinical, private practice, and primary care. In other words it attempts to make ‘mental 
illness’, such as ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, recognisable and predictable through a clear 
and distinct representation which includes the ascription of a ‘proper name'. 
 
The DSM, for the purposes of the thesis, is an empirical example of the way in which 
the authentic and deserving body can be weighed, literally, against the guilty copy 
(the not-yet ‘proper’ anorexic) who has yet to prove they are ill enough to be 
recognised as having a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Yet, the DSM’s 
place within the state of affairs, the everyday and the clinical, is, to a certain extent, 
one of the ‘accidents’ which the project engages with. Here the accident can be 
considered in terms of the actual, as it is what occurs, and the event, as the inside of 
what occurs, can be considered in terms of the virtual. This apparent separation is 
no separation at all, for traces of one are always already in the other. They are 
separated not to bifurcate or border, or suggest that they are collapsible, but rather 
to highlight the mutual and processual connection between both the virtual and 
actual and the event and accident.  
 
It is important to note in this opening chapter that engaging with ‘the accident’ is 
connected to the thesis’ attempt to engage with post-representational theory 
(MacLure, 2013b). The accident, or what occurs, is manifest in what Deleuze refers 
to as ‘the state of affairs’. The state of affairs, the domain of denotation, 
manifestation and signification, is what conservative, as opposed to transcendental, 
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empiricism works with. It is amenable to vision and has a “perceptual thereness” 
(Ahmed, quoted in Lenz Taguchi, 2013, 711), which can be availed to evidence 
‘something in particular’. The thesis will suggest that although the accident's 
discernibility to vision allows empirical boxes to be ticked, it misses the point, or the 
sense of the event. To return to the way in which the thesis works with the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual, what is of particular interest is the way in which the 
good and common sense of this accidental artefact feeds into incorporeal events and 
produces paradoxes which “reveal philosophy” (Deleuze, 2004b, 286). Put 
differently, the clear and distinct logic that would make ‘things’ such as ‘eating 
disorder recognisable and predictable, is implicated in producing new unknowable 
territories and rebel elements. But more of this later.  
 
Virtuality and movement  
 
Massumi notes that virtuality is a pivotal Deleuzian concept, yet the least understood 
(Massumi, 1992, 34). In terms of the thesis’ engagement with the body as corporeal 
and incorporeal, I draw on this ‘pivotal’ concept for what it offers in terms of 
disrupting predictability and causality. It engages with “that which is in a process of 
coming about and never ceases coming about” (Deleuze, 2004, 242). In other words, 
thinking with virtuality helps the thesis disrupt linear notions of temporality and the 
accordant causes and effects which are plotted along it. Here, in making reference to 
the virtual, it is necessary to make distinct the idea that the virtual and actual are in 
disjointed tandem. They are not separate, and to give one precedence over the other 
is to miss the point. Williams notes that many theorists: 
 
“want to pretend that the virtual wants to flee the actual. It can’t. It does 
not want to. In Logic of Sense, priority – if we want to keep the term - 
accounts for what Deleuze calls the neutrality of sense or its impassibility 
(2008, 98). 
 
The emphasis on virtual and actual processes, activities and movements is 
significant throughout the thesis at numerous levels. Perhaps most significantly in 
terms of movement and process and theories pertaining to them, as they inform the 
task of refusing to freeze ‘Anorexia’ as a proper name or final point of identity.  
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What is the thesis doing?  
 
By seeking a space for intensity and difference to flicker, the thesis will show the 
working out and working through of conceptual aspects of the Deleuzian event. For 
instance: sense, the dual and quasi cause, the accident, actualisation and counter-
actualisation. The empirical materials, or data, that these concepts are then plugged 
into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) produce an account whereby the lived implications 
of separating out the actual from the virtual, the corporeal from the incorporeal, is 
scrutable to further inquiry. Here, what can then be highlighted as problematic is the 
way in which medical accounts of the eating order, and their reinvestment in actual, 
or proper ‘anorexia’, serve to reproduce the aborescent logic of the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual. The thesis draws attention to the strangle-hold of this ‘good and 
common sense’ by noting that even where medical expertise is apparently subverted 
by ‘experience based expertise’ (Conrad and Stults, 2010), and ‘anorexia’ is posited 
as a ‘lifestyle choice’ by members of the pro-ana community, bodies are still named 
and organised according to a discourse which produces only the same and the 
similar. For those who are not already familiar with pro-anorexia sites, Giles (2006) 
defines them as on-line spaces constructed by and for young people with ‘eating 
disorders’. 
 
“Typically, pro-ana sites contain archived journals or diaries written by 
people with eating disorders (EDs), large amounts of information, ‘tips’ 
and advice, emotional support, photo galleries, usually of thin models but 
occasionally of users’ own bodies, poetry and song lyrics reflecting the 
experience of anorexia and related conditions” (Giles, 2006, 464). 
 
It is the contention of the thesis that good and common sense inevitably undercuts 
the revolutionary and resistant ambitions of the pro-anorexia, or ‘pro-ana’ discourse 
and community. Here, ambitions to have difference acknowledged are always 
already being directed, hostage, to a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b). 
As captives their relationship to food and feeding the body is always already being 
represented in a ‘cultural freeze frame’ (Massumi, 2002). Here, this ‘freeze frame’, 
which will eventually be developed through the notion of ‘the accident’, reduces that 
which is both the body, corporeal, and of it, incorporeal, to a respectful and 
conservative adherence to a set of diagnostic criteria (DSM-IV, APA, 2001, DSM-V, 
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APA, 2013). Here we can think of this ‘logic’ in terms of what Deleuze posits as the 
empiricist's confusion between accident and event (Deleuze, 2004a).  
 
The accident, or what occurs, is manifest, as noted above, in what Deleuze refers to 
as ‘the state of affairs’. It is what orthodox empiricism prioritises as it is apparent to 
human vision. This misses the point, or the sense of the event. As Williams notes, 
“events are much more than an actual thing ‘happening’ in a limited space and time” 
(2008, 31). While that which is available to vision is significant in terms of social 
research, indeed, from a traditionally empirical point of view it may strike common 
sense chords of being the most important thing. However, what will be explored 
within the thesis is that this propensity to see in vision is implicated in the production 
of, what are conceived of in good and common sense as, ‘eating disordered 
behaviours’. In other words, representationalism (the appearance of an emaciated 
body, numerical figures represented on weighing scales, a particular Body Mass 
Index (BMI)) informs embodied and linguistic practices which are slavish to palatable 
abstractions noted in a previous sub-section. “Like a good magician, 
representationalism would have us focus on what seems to be evidently given” [it is 
a] game of smoke and mirrors” (Barad, 2007, 360). Put crudely for the purposes of 
my argument, representationalism facilitates the belief that we know who has an 
eating disorder because it is “evidently given”.  
 
By putting to work Deleuze’s writing from Difference and Repetition (2004b) we 
might take virtuality a little further at this point by looking towards Deleuze’s writing 
on extensity and intensity. Deleuze notes that “intensity is the uncancellable in 
difference of quantity, but this difference of quantity is cancelled by extension, 
extension being precisely the process by which intensive difference is turned inside 
out and distributed in such a way as to be dispelled, compensated, equalised and 
suppressed in the extensity which creates it” (Deleuze, 2004b, 295, emphasis 
added).  As such, we might think of the DSM as an apparatus of extensity which 
turns difference inside out and distributes it in such a way as to suppress it and 
replace it with the denotative logic of this or that, true or false. Either having a real 
illness or being healthy. This latter point, the relationship between health and illness 
will be developed further in the fourth chapter of the thesis.  
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The abstract of everyday embodied experience  
 
“Deleuze’s philosophy is perhaps the most important non-reductive 
contemporary work opposed to the modern foundations of free choices 
and their judgement through actual or predicted consequences.[........] 
Deleuzian selection is not free choice, it is a two-way individuating path 
running through series” (Williams, 2008, 5, emphasis added). 
 
My movement towards a particular understanding of the abstract, in relation to the 
event and that which is of the body, is to engage with the “change synonymous with 
life” (Massumi, 2011, 1). Working this way is at least in part to show that there is 
already much abstracting going on. However, the abstractions which name, order 
and freeze, in their fit with bifurcations which ‘haunt metaphysics’ (Massumi, 2011), 
have become good and common sense. They are no longer questionable as 
anything other than the way things are done – and done to. This doing and doing to 
becomes especially significant in the context of ‘saving’ or normalising individuals 
and groups of individuals deemed vulnerable or ‘mentally ill’. There will be more 
about this later in the thesis as Deleuze’s notion of the ‘proud verb’ is put to work and 
my own conceptualisation of the ashamed adjective is introduced. 
 
It is the contention of the thesis, in its recourse to the abstract as lived, of bodies and 
intimately connected to the change, process, activity and becoming of life, that gains 
can be made by engaging with a different kind of empiricism. Those put forward by 
Deleuze and other philosopher-physicist-mathematicians, including William James 
and Alfred North Whitehead. Here incremental nudges can help inquiry to move 
away from representing ‘the anorexic body’, or any other body for that matter, as a 
fixed entity by becoming radically empirical and activist in its philosophising 
(Whitehead,1968; Massumi, 2011). Radical empiricism holds to the idea that 
“everything that is experienced is real in some way and that everything real is in 
some way experienced. [...] the radical empiricist must hold that ‘change itself is 
immediately experienced” (Massumi, 2011, 4). This experience is felt in its coming 
about in the ‘something stirring’ of activity (Massumi, 2011). However, ‘something 
stirring’ does not yet know how or why it will be drawn into activities and 
actualisations. The event is pre individual, creative and unpredictable. Additionally, 
this ‘something stirring’ might also be thought of in relation to the way in which 
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Deleuze writes about the being of the sensible as “something which simultaneously 
cannot be sensed (from the point of view of the empirical exercise) and can only be 
sensed (from the point of view of the transcendental exercise”) (2004b, 296). 
 
In moving away from entities which can only be seen in vision, the thesis does not 
turn only towards ideas or language. Instead It is in both directions at once, after all, 
“language is what is said of things” (Deleuze, 2004, 25). To add clarity, without 
pinning down, what will become apparent as the thesis develops is that working 
away from that which can only be seen in vision is part of the political work of the 
project. Working with sense, the sense of the event, opens up divisions between 
body and mind, matter and ideas, sense and nonsense. In working away from 
common sense, what must be understood is that sense is not only cognitive. It is at a 
border between the activities of language and bodies. So, returning to the idea of the 
empirical, often conceived as that which is observed, we see in the following quote 
from Deleuze that the event is not merely an esoteric assemblage of complex ideas 
far removed from the ‘real world’, on the contrary: 
 
“The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only 
empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the 
visible without falling into Ideas, and how to track down, invoke, and 
perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded 
experience” (2004, 23, emphasis added).  
 
The abstract, yet embodied task becomes to feel, think and move with that which is 
not “in vision [but] as with vision or through vision: as a vision effect” (Massumi, 
2012, 17). Activity and process is experienced, it makes itself known, both in the 
bare activity of the world, and as this activity transmutes, through series, becoming 
the special activity of the mixtures of bodies which bring it about. Events: actualised.  
 
“We can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most 
unexpected, most insignificant of things. You don’t deviate from the 
majority unless there is a little detail that starts to swell and carries you 
off” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 322). 
 
In the quote above we can note the relevance that activity has to the notion of 
becoming. As will become clearer later on in the thesis, as I engage more fully with 
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notions of enchantment and proud verbs, the “little detail”, that Deleuze and Guattari 
note, “that starts to swell and carries you off” (ibid), is not a detail that the devil 
resides in. Here, by returning to points made earlier in the chapter, regarding the 
tension of obscurity and distinction, I am able to colour, rather than clarify, the points 
I am trying to make. Detail ceases to be a scrutable state and becomes an 
insensible, yet sensed activity. A ‘detail’ creates changes in the possibilities of 
‘sense’ and as the proud verb rubs two series together things begin to glow 
(MacLure, 2013a). But as mentioned, these ideas will be developed at a later point in 
the thesis where they become important and relevant again.  
 
The event of working with, and through the event, is the process of becoming 
sensitive, but not soft, to lived concepts. Becoming sensitive to the endless and 
multiple, the endlessly and multiply connected abstract concepts which lives are 
lived through. Processes, ideas and connections always already subsist in the real 
and abstract of the body, its virtual or incorporeal dimension. Not waiting to be 
unveiled, but waiting to be brought about through activities and processes. The 
previous activities of events passing out engender the necessary momentum for 
events becoming. Events are carried off through proud verbs into other event 
actualisations and counter actualisations. As series brush up against one another, 
leaving an affective trace or tonality, past and future are freed from the linear 
ordering of good and common sense. Every event may be singular, in the sense that 
it is novel and creative, yet this singularity is not isolated, unitary, or once and for all. 
Jets of singularity: multiplicities of potential. 
 
Here what I am attempting to articulate is the way in which the event draws on a 
past, but not the past of the actualising individual’s life. This past is not biographically 
‘theirs’, it was not played out in the state of affairs of their life. For instance, ‘the fact’ 
that they were told by their grand-parent that they were “a big girl” is not the past of 
the event actualised. The possibility, the affective virtuality, not actuality, of this 
gendered and gendering annunciation is. The impersonal momentum of the event 
which provides the force necessary to swell and carr[y] you off” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a, 322) is a past: dry and incorporeal. It is “free of the limitations of a 
state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular, 
eventum tantum” (Deleuze, 2004a, 172). 
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As I noted previously, the thesis engages with speaking and eating. Speaking of food 
and eating words. What this seemingly abstract couplet speaks of is the consumable 
nature of things and the inconsumable nature of sense (Deleuze, 2004a). 
“Everything denoted or capable of denotation is, in principle, consumable and 
penetrable” (Deleuze, 2004a, 31). Following this different way of thinking with and 
about the eating order that Deleuze facilitates, it follows that the affective serial 
circulation of words which are available to speak function as barbarous entities, 
which are available to eat. They are consumable, and further to this they are 
metabolised. In different ways, in different bodies, and at different times in the same 
body. They are in a process of transmutation and materialisation.  
 
Returning to the issue of event-temporality, the future of the event is not girl A’s 
imagined future, dreamed of in the state of affairs. Nor is it the denoted future that 
this or that type of girl might be expected to have, for instance, as a success or a 
failure, a Doctor or a Sex Worker. No, the futurity of the event is the mobius strip of a 
sanguine serpent eating its own tail, the manifold potentialities of a life. Here, the 
‘reason’ we might be so tempted to think of an actual person’s past and present, 
aside from the fact that humanism takes things so personally, is the way that we are 
accustomed to think past-present-future as a linear and individualised progression. It 
so neatly accords the organising good and organised common sense which 
“everybody knows [and] no-one can deny” Deleuze, 2004b, 165).  
 
Deleuze’s dissection of the event is detailed, yet the implications of the duplicity, or 
two-sidedness, of the event are immense. As Williams (2008a) notes, for Deleuze, 
life is depth and surface. Causes are dual, explored in their actual and quasi 
dimensions. Events are actualised but must also be counter actualised: replayed 
through verbs and different series which produce a different sense of the event. The 
event is inside what occurs, sense; while the accident is what occurs, at the level of 
manifestation. In speaking of sense we are not talking about meaning, we are 
speaking of breaking the circular stronghold of the propositions that make anorexia 
make sense. In other words, the logic of good and common sense that represents 
‘anorexia’ as a problem, and medical treatment or recovery as a solution, fails to 
acknowledge the way in which a problem produces the solution it deserves 
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(Deleuze, 2004b). Following on from this, the thesis would like to introduce, or 
encounter, the problem differently. Not as one of pathology, but one of philosophy – 
ontology and epistemology, or onto-epistemolgy (Barad, 2007).  
 
The work here is not to rescue those deemed ‘vulnerable’, or protect them from the 
sense of the event. There is much to learn from its activities and processes 
(Deleuze, 2004a). Rather, the continual work to be done is to allow sense to emerge 
without reducing it only to that which is manifest in the state of affairs. While the 
thesis is interested in the abstract, the interest is by virtue of its capacity to work 
differently with that which is presumed concrete about matter. Although the 
theoretical influences which flow into and out of the thesis are away from the fixity of 
common sense, the thinking is towards how those with a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body may have more liveable lives. In other words, one of the 
implications of working with the event is the political hopefulness encountered in the 
other side of actualisation: counter actualisation. One of the questions which then 
emerges is how this idea, which Deleuze refers to as our greatest freedom (2004a, 
243), might be considered as a means to open possibilities. How might we encounter 
relationships to feeding the body away from what good sense says anorexia ‘is’, and 
what common sense says anorexics ‘are’. 
 
Movements of the body - moving with sense and questioning ‘choice’  
 
The thesis is primarily about movement and sense, particularly movement away from 
the fixity of good or common sense. For Deleuze the event is sense, not meaning or 
inference, but in relation to them. Sense is not in the proposition – denotation, 
manifestation, signification - it is of the proposition, its fourth dimension. My use of 
‘of’ here helps to re-join sense to the incorporeal dimension of the body, its virtual or 
incorporeal dimension. This idea will be developed in subsequent chapters which 
use data gathered on-line and off-line, to make luminous a different account of 
choice or choosing which disrupts the intentional cognitive selection of an 
autonomous individual. While chapter four engages with discussions occurring on-
line; chapter five engages with, but is not limited to, the empirical materials which 
emerged off-line. In chapter five the thesis works further towards the possibility of 
disrupting proper names and fixed identities. Here, although what ‘Joanne’ makes 
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available to the project evokes the lived and every day of life on, and off-line, the 
work of the thesis, in its refusal to be satiated with good and common sense, does 
not simply represent ‘what occurred’. It also attempts to engage with the inside of 
what occurs –which is both more and less than what ‘Joanne’ and I produced 
together in the state of affairs. Put differently, more and less than that which could be 
made manifest, denoted or signified – summed up in propositions alone. 
 
Disrupting the self-contained individual  
 
In working both with and through the Deleuzian event, and particular notions of affect 
(Brennan, 2004; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Massumi, 2002; 2011), the thesis does 
not subsume matter under language, or vice versa. Neither does it take for granted 
an actual embodied subject split from embodied potential, or virtuality. Here, and by 
working with Massumi’s figuration of the virtual as ‘of the body’ – real and abstract, 
my work seeks to negotiate the necessary task of engaging with the depth of bodies 
and the surface of language. In taking into account affect, as that which is 
transmissible between bodies, spaces and entities and as a substrate of potential 
bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness (Clough, 
2007), I have a useful way of troubling the self-contained, cognitively driven subject 
and the intentionality of their choices. As Brennan notes:  
 
“[O]ur self-contained individual believes he acts of his own accord, and 
that his impulses and desires come from nowhere other than the history 
embodied in his genes. He is wrong. The self-contained individual driven 
by a genetic motor has antecedents of his own. His origins appear to lie in 
a complex of Platonic and Aristotelian views on form and matter, activity 
and passivity, subject and object, views that merge with seventeenth-
century Cartesianism to give birth to the self-contained individual whose 
mind and body are separate” (2004, 77). 
 
The thesis neither starts nor stops with the ‘object’ of ‘anorexia’ or ‘the anorexic’ 
subject. As Massumi notes, “[n]either object nor subject: event” (2011, 6). Within the 
thesis it becomes apparent that there are implications for ‘anorexia’, or more 
appropriately, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, being fixed and represented 
in terms of the ‘same difference’ produced by the DSM. It is the contention of the 
thesis that there is iconoclastic work to be done with regard to ‘Anorexia Nervosa’.  
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Put differently, it is necessary to destroy ‘it’ as a dogmatic image of thought, firstly so 
that real difference might be encountered, and secondly, so that the same 
differences, which are produced through good and common sense, cease to become 
aborescent structures from which real bodies dangle. Here, aborescent pertains to 
unitary and linear tree like structures, which Deleuze and Guattari are critical of when 
taken to be the “image of the world” (2004a, 5), particularly as these “plot[.] a point 
[and] fix[.] an order” (2004a,7). They oppose aborescent structures to the rhizome 
which “can be connected to anything other, and must be” (ibid). Their criticism of 
literature which adheres to tree like structures is “not that they are too abstract but, 
on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the 
abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents 
of a statement [the materiality of words]” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, 8). 
 
The reification of ‘anorexia’ and its iconic, elevated status has more than a little to do 
with what Brennan articulates above: The splitting of the subject from the object, 
activity from passivity. The thesis argues that those with a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body are compelled to fit the lived abstraction of embodied experience 
into the abstract and frozen certainty offered by the DSM and common sense. But in 
this logic of neat division there can be no winners – failure is imminent on all sides. 
 
“If you start by presupposing a subject-object divide, there is no way of 
preventing the separation from the deepening abyss. How can the subject 
cross the divide to re attach itself to the objectivity ‘out there’ on the other 
side?” (Massumi, 2012, 7).  
 
When essences and appearances collide, the Idea of true, real, or ‘proper anorexia’ 
is placed on a pedestal, like an angel aloft on a Christmas tree, erected as the 
dogmatic image of thought. Yet while our angel sits on high, those with a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body become the lived concept of impropriety: Subject to 
the neologism ‘wannarexic’. These ideas concerning authenticity and impropriety will 
be engaged with in more detail in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis.  
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How abstract Ideas have been put to work – introducing sense and the 
paradox 
 
“Philosophy is revealed not by good sense but by paradox” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 286). 
 
The thesis emerges, as noted earlier, through my affective sense of the Deleuzian 
event. In other words, the affective and conceptual biting point for my work emerges 
through a mutual and embodied reading of ‘anorexia’ through the Deleuzian event 
and of the Deleuzian event through my empirical work in on-line and off-line spaces. 
The sensations of both sought each other out to “wrestle” and to “form a combat of 
energies” (Deleuze, 2013, 48), to wrest sense from their match.  
 
The event, which is sense, is not cognitive or in thoughtful logic, nor is it something 
contained deeply within bodies and things. Sense is at the border between the 
proposition and things and this border might be most effectively considered, as I 
have suggested throughout this chapter, as of the body: virtual. This idea is given 
further weight in terms of the way in which Williams notes that “sense is akin to an 
affect or mood that can invest very distant and apparently distinct phenomena with a 
similar sense” (2008, 6), and as Massumi notes, “[a]ffective tonality is what we 
normally call a ‘mood’ (Massumi, 1992). Within the thesis I take these ideas of 
tonality and mood to draw attention to the pre-individuality of both sense and the 
event. As will become apparent later on, this practice reinforces the impetus in my 
work to challenge that which is individualised and individualising. In addition to these 
points the thesis makes use of ‘mood’ because of the way it connects to affective 
transmissions which circulate between bodies, social spaces (Brennan, 2004) and 
entities. It is also worth noting at this early stage the connection between ‘mood’ and 
grammar as this will be worked with later in the thesis through the notion of the 
‘proud verb’.  
 
To summarise what I have already set in motion, the thesis is an attempt to move 
away from considering ‘anorexia’ only as actual: individualised, categorised and 
fixed. It is a textual-material-affective production of an interrogation of anorexia which 
draws on and draws out virtuality in the context of the pre-individual, moving and 
unfixed event. The virtual mentioned here also pertains, at the level of common 
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usage, to the on-line pro-ana spaces I have worked with. However, this is distinct to, 
and by no means collapsible, to what Massumi or Deleuze imply by the term. Indeed: 
 
“The key is always to hold the virtual as a coincident dimension of every 
event’s occurrence [...E]very experience is an occasion of lived 
abstraction. As a limit concept, the virtual cannot be thought without 
paradox – and without working to make the paradox conceptually 
productive.[..] To make that limit-experience productive, the thinking must 
then turn back in the form of new concepts or new variations on old 
concepts. This must be done in a way that does not try to resolve or 
dismiss the paradox” (Massumi, 2011, 18-19, emphasis added). 
 
As Williams notes “[p]aradoxes matter because they reveal limits within systems and 
require passages beyond internal rules of validity and consistency” (2008, 25). The 
idea of ‘internal rules of validity’ can be seen as meaningful within the context of  
what was earlier conceptualised, by plugging Deleuze (2004a, 2004b) into Barad 
(2007), as an apparatus of extensity, the DSM (APA, 2000). Additionally the idea of 
‘consistency’ is interesting in the context of pro-ana spaces where contestation and 
ambivalence are not foreclosed in the inquiry as contradictory. Put differently, in on-
line spaces anorexia as a choice is by no means the only way in which sense 
circulates. There is often recourse, especially when it comes to proving authenticity 
or ‘properness’, that is it a mental illness. Real by virtue of the abstract category it 
adheres to. 
 
“Under what conditions does a difference become regarded as individual? 
The problem of classification was clearly always a problem of ordering 
differences” (Deleuze, 2004b, 309). 
 
The thesis will work with, and hold in paradoxical tension – both Anorexia as an 
“aspirational lifestyle choice”, as it is often conceived in pro-ana spaces on-line 
(Dias, 2003; Pollack, 2003; Fox et al, 2005), and as a “biologically based serious 
mental illness”, as it is conceived through medical and psychiatric sense off-line 
(APA, 2000, 2013; Klump et al., 2009). It will also highlight how this paradox is 
implicated in producing a ‘new variation on an old concept’ (Massumi, 2011) in the 
form of an esoteric, portmanteau or ‘nonsense’ word: the ‘wannarexic’.  
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Here ‘nonsense’ is not how common sense conceives it. Nonsense is in relation to 
sense. Indeed it is always already implicated in the production of sense and is not 
false or pertaining to falsity: “sense and nonsense have a specific relation which 
cannot occupy that of the true and false” (Deleuze, 2004, 79). However, and as 
testament to the way in which common sense ideas of the ‘proper’ or ‘actual’ play out 
on-line in pro-ana spaces, ‘wannarexia’ and the ‘wannarexic’ are usually considered 
as false pretenders. This can be noted in the way in which it is mobilised as a 
pejorative term. The significance of this will become apparent later as the thesis 
develops, particularly within chapters four and five. Here, as empirical materials are 
worked with, the problem which emerges is that when bordering and fixing the ‘true’ 
or ‘actual anorexic’, other bodies are materially, ontologically and epistemologically 
produced as not mattering.  
 
Returning to the aforementioned paradox, ‘both’, ‘and’, are not separate. Rather 
‘both-and’ implies that each element of the paradox is conceived as part of 
disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses. As Williams notes, “it is not ‘both’ as separate 
entities, but as series of transforming asymmetric relations” (2008a, 53). Both 
elements change and inform the other, they intra-act (Barad, 2007). Framed in this 
manner, a framing which both emerged from the field as it unfolded, and informed 
the task of ‘bordering the field’, it ceases to be a question of whether or not ‘anorexia’ 
is a lifestyle choice or a mental illness. We cease to operate at the level of the 
denotative intuition alone which “is then expressed by the form: ‘it is that’ or ‘it is not 
that’ (Deleuze, 2004, 16).  
 
This drive towards fixity and denotation - it is that; it is not that - does not suffice. It is 
connected to the conservatism of common sense which betrays the ontological 
conviction of being, rather than becoming. To trouble this conservatism it is 
necessary to become critical of inquiries emerging from a diverse range of 
disciplines, which reinvest in ideas of the self-contained, autonomous, cognitively 
driven subject. To buttress the point that I am attempting to make I would like to 
return to Paula Saukko’s assertion noted in an earlier sub-section of this chapter. 
Saukko noted that the ‘reasoning’ mobilised in studies of ‘eating disorders’ mimics 
and fuels anorexic thinking in terms of “one-dimensional absolutes” (Sauokko, 2008, 
2). Here I would suggest that one of the most insidious and pernicious ‘absolutes’, to 
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borrow a term from her, is the actuality of a bordered autonomous and intentional 
subject. It “mimics and fuels anorexic thinking” (ibid). Or rather, to work within a 
series of material and linguistic assemblages that feel more apposite, it becomes 
part of a digestive assemblage which bodies must eat before they can leave the 
table. It is the fuel which sustains a commitment to being a proper anorexic.  
 
To summarise this idea I would suggest that to disrupt ‘anorexia’, destroy it as a 
dogmatic image of thought, it is necessary to un-pick certain abstract consumables: 
those taken for granted ideas pertaining to the body, what it can do and what it is 
called. 
 
Sites and Spaces, Texts and Ideas 
 
As will be developed later in further chapters, the mutuality of my reading of the 
event through ‘anorexia’, and vice versa, collides in the mutual crossings of my 
mobile or connective method (Hine, 2000) and Deleuze’s own philosophy of ‘radical 
connection’ (Williams, 2008). For Deleuze radical philosophical connection is not 
necessarily well ordered or defined according to external rules or laws. For my 
methodology the connections which were made between entities, ideas, people, 
groups and places were not well defined or fixed at the outset according to 
repeatable methodological ‘rules’ or ‘laws’. Rather, my methodology unfolded in 
ways which could not have been predicted as I entered the field. For both my 
methodology and Deleuze’s philosophy, things and ideas come about not as ‘a 
follows b’ but as ‘b beckons c, and a waits for both’. 
 
The ideas which have been developed through the course of the project are in 
relation to the concepts which I put to work, and which worked through me as I 
engaged with on-line (a youth support network, pro-anorexia sites, you-tube, 
facebook) and off-line settings (an eating disorder prevention project, an 
intergenerational feminist project, and face to face meetings with a member of the 
pro-anorexia community). Within my connective or mobile ethnography on-line and 
off-line life (Markham, 1998) were both experienced, and therefore both part of ‘real’ 
life. Only in relation to ‘both-and’ has it become possible to move away from fixing 
anorexia as a mental illness or a choice. In turn, both-and, as conjunctive synthesis, 
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has enabled the production of a different account of living with, and through, a 
difficult and complex relationship to feeding the body. In later chapters, particularly 
the fourth and fifth, these ideas will be developed further by drawing on the notion of 
the ‘experiment’ to give a post-human account of eating relations. Here I will be 
considering the ‘vibrancy of matter’ as having “a not-quite-human capaciousness” 
(Bennett, 2010, 3). 
 
Having just introduced the post-human (Bennett, 2010; Braidotti, 2011), and the 
experiment (Arsic, 2008; Mann O’Donnell, 2010), it is possible to return, differently, 
to the temporalisation of ‘anorexia’ in the state of affairs and the ‘problem with 
solutions’. Or rather, the problem with problems as they are posed in good and 
common sense (Deleuze, 2004b; Durie, 2006; Massumi, 1992). Here, what is at 
stake is the notion of ‘recovery’ as pertaining to ‘health’, and ‘anorexia’ as pertaining 
to ‘lllness’, or more precisely, the blunt separation of each particular from its co-
producing other. It is the contention of the thesis that neither ‘anorexia’ nor ‘recovery’ 
can be chosen in thoughtfulness alone. They cannot be subject to a disembodied 
will, which, paradoxically, in common sense, is always the true property of the 
bordered individual subject. Within the thesis, the separation of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ 
will be disrupted through the notions of ‘quasi causality’, possibilities of ‘dosages’, 
auto-immune self-immunisation (Mann O’Donnell, 2010) and counter actualisation. In 
terms of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, matter can no more cease to 
embody the affective trace of the event, than it can to bring it about by cognitive 
intentionality alone.  
 
It is worth clarifying at this point that common sense is inflected by scientific and 
philosophical series which inform the propositions we mobilise and which mobilise 
us. As Deleuze notes, with such elegant precision: 
 
“Every time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is 
inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a 
philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs) ” 
(Deleuze, 2004b, 282).  
 
One way in which to avoid this coming together “at all costs” (ibid) is by working 
through the paradox which:  
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“displays the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, 
along with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the 
direction of good sense” (Deleuze, 2004b, 286).  
 
Put differently, by engaging with paradoxes, we can resist the striated pathways 
which lead to good and common sense evaluations, we can notice the rebel 
becomings (Deleuze, 2004a, 4; MacLure, 2013a) which, as noted above, cannot be 
totalised by giving them a proper name, nor can they be equalised or cancelled by 
being locked within a category. 
 
Paradoxes are away from contradictions which dead end possibilities by presenting 
either one thing or the other. Instead, paradoxes take the form both-and. Yet refusing 
to say it is that or it is not that, is not without political intent, on the contrary. It is the 
contention of the thesis that recourse to calmly composed common sense, which 
says ‘it is that’ and is made possible through the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an 
apparatus of extensity, does not accommodate sense as that which is a pre-
individual and in mixtures of bodies. It borders corporeality but cannot conceive of 
dimensions of the body. This calm common sense is itself implicated in the 
individualisation of ‘problems’, the production of problematic individuals, and the 
collusion of said individuals with the idea that it is indeed with them that both 
pathology and choice rests. Or rather, it is indeed in them that pathology and choice 
gnaw and antagonise. 
 
“The active/ passive dichotomy, as consciousness understands it, is thus 
a product of the sense of self that divides itself off from the rest of the 
world on the grounds of its difference. Its understanding of activity is 
synonymous with the idea of individual intentionality” (Brennan, 2004; 93).  
 
Instead of looking to common sense which would “distinguish pretenders” on 
“essences and appearances” alone (Deleuze, 2004, 292), the thesis works with the 
creativity of the event to explore the way in which bodies are compelled to move 
towards entities as they become enchanted (Bennett, 2010). Here, and by refusing 
the active/passive dichotomy that Brennan cautions us against, the choices that 
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bodies make are not cognitive or intentional choices. They are both real and quasi, 
visceral and virtual.  
 
This brings us to the dual cause of the event, an idea which will be put to work later 
as I draw on ideas of affect as prior to the experiencing body and transmissible 
through bodies and the environment. This will become clearer as I work in more 
depth with the paradox of ‘anorexia’ as a lifestyle choice and a mental illness, and 
draw on empirical materials I gathered during eighteen months ‘in the field’. As I 
mentioned a moment ago, the nature of the cause, as it is explicated in Logic of 
Sense (2004a), is dual .In one direction it pertains to the pre individual and 
incorporeal of the body, its potential, which Massimi notes as being “fundamental for 
the understanding of existence” (Massumi, 2011, 1). While in the other direction it 
depends, for its actual causes, upon mixtures of bodies. In other words, the virtual 
and the actual are no more separate than the individual from that which is pre-
individual and in a process of becoming amongst bodies.  
 
In its dry incorporeality sense moves between the surface of language and the 
depths of bodies, it is “the boundary between propositions and things” (Deleuze, 
2004, 25). Yet because it cannot be denoted, and therefore cannot be consumed, it 
is neither a ‘thing’ nor a general or a particular idea. Sense does not stay still long 
enough to be eaten or denoted. It is the fragrant steam which rises from a plate, it 
informs how, why and who we do eat, or denote, and rises to our mouths with the 
consumable, only to escape before it can be digested. The fragrant steam of sense 
subsists within the food from which it rises, but it is always already receding, 
returning differently to a plane between words and things. We cannot say that sense 
exists either ‘in’ things or ‘in’ the mind. It has neither a physical nor mental existence 
(Deleuze, 2004, 23). Sense does not merge with the proposition (denotation, 
manifestation, signification), yet it does not exist without it. Sense is not the property 
of individuals, but it cannot come about without their corporeality and incorporeality, 
without their vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010). However, this boundary is not a 
boundary as common sense thinks it, by virtue of the fact that it is neither a ‘thing’, 
nor a general or a particular idea. This boundary must, by virtue of the relationship 
sense has to both bodies and language, be conceived as a boundary which is of 
both, yet in neither.  
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“How is it possible to speak of the anorexic as subject when s/he is doubly 
silenced: first by being positioned as the object of a gaze [...] and, second, 
through a mental health discourse that positions [their] words as the mere 
ramblings of hysteria?” (Ferreday; 2012, 142). 
 
Alongside the paradox of mental illness and lifestyle choice I also work with one of 
Deleuze’s own paradoxes which concerns speaking and eating. Often expressed by 
the infinities to eat, to speak, the series of speaking and the series of eating, bought 
together by infinitives, produce novel and unpredictable events which enable my 
inquiry to produce an alternative account of both (st)uttering and consuming . This is 
taken up later in the thesis through what Deleuze refers to as the ‘proud verb’ and 
can be seen being put to work in chapters four and five.  
 
I work with the possibilities of to eat/to speak for a number of reasons: firstly to 
engage with contemporary ideas in feminism and body studies which attempt to 
move away from representations of the body, of denoting it and what it means, 
towards an acknowledgement of what bodies can do (Ferreday, 2012; Warin, 2012). 
Secondly, to eat/ to speak will be explored as a means to unpick, disrupt, and 
analyse empirical materials gathered from on-line and off-line spaces, and thirdly, to 
indicate how questions pertaining to speaking and eating, particularly how “speaking 
in front of the one who is to be served as food” (Deleuze, 2004) may illuminate the 
task of generating ethically diffractive research (Barad, 2007). In other words, 
engage with the issue of how, why and who is denoted or represented: How, why 
and who we eat. This mixture of ethics, speaking and silence can be noted in 
Ferreday’s question above, and segues to the final paradox which has already 
begun to be put to work: the ‘paradox of the virtual’.  
 
This idea is central to the thesis’ emphasis on movement which remains inscrutable 
to vision alone, “full of both oneness and manyness, in respects that don’t appear” 
(James quoted in Massumi, 2012, 2; also see Blackman and Venn, 2010). Here, this 
idea of non-appearance is connected to incorporeality and virtuality. It is also 
important to Deleuze’s method of transcendental empiricism which does not confuse 
accident and event.  
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“Events are the only idealities. To reverse Platonism is first and foremost 
to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets of 
singularities. A double battle has the objective to thwart all dogmatic 
confusion between event and essence, and also every empiricist 
confusion between event and accident” (Deleuze, 2004a, 64). 
 
Within the thesis the task becomes to disrupt the borders and lines drawn by 
Humanism which serve to limit the territory in which a difficult relationship to feeding 
the body is lived out, both virtually and actually. This, in a sense, returns me to the 
points that I attributed earlier to Saukko, and which I in turn developed. Here I am 
referring to the points she makes about ‘reasoning’, ‘mimicry’, ‘one-dimensional 
absolutes’, and what she terms ‘anorexic thinking’ (Sauokko, 2008, 2). Before I note 
the significance of platonic thought, noted above in the quote taken from Logic of 
Sense (2004a), I would like to detour slightly to unpick the notion of ‘anorexic 
thinking’. Having done this I will be more able to return to the point I am trying to 
articulate with regard to flows, folds and division.  
 
The notion of ‘anorexic thinking’ is somewhat problematic, particularly if we attribute 
it only to individuals who have been defined, recognised or diagnosed as ‘anorexic’. 
However, its status as problematic does not stop it from being productive. It has 
potential. If we cease to consider ‘anorexic thinking’ “representationally, as grounded 
in a double identity: of the thinking subject and the concepts it creates” (Massumi, 
1992, 4), we are closer to articulating the sense of ‘anorexia’, without attributing it to 
a particular individual or category of individuals. This, of course, would be good 
sense.  
 
Here, as I am positing it, ‘anorexic thinking’ ceases to be a cognitive activity carried 
out by an individual. It does not result from the occurrences that have taken place in 
their lives. It is not a product of a particular bio-chemical malfunction. Rather, I would 
suggest that we consider ‘anorexic thinking’ as unlimited. Not just as actual in the 
sense that it refers to a humanist orthodox eating order, but Instead, as I have 
already set out above, in terms of the way in which Deleuze encourages us to 
consider consumables and sense. As such it becomes possible to suggest that 
‘anorexic thinking’ is pre-individual and affective. It is transmissible, but not itself 
edible.  
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While it is concerned with ‘eating’, what is eaten, or not as the case may be, is not 
restricted to protein, carbohydrates, fat, vitamins and minerals etcetera. Instead, it 
feeds off what I previously referred to as ‘barbarous entities’ and gluttonously 
devours the logic of platonic division. Both of which fuel the contorted acrobatic 
displays which are demanded by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, what I termed 
earlier as an apparatus of extensity.   
 
Having set these ideas up I would now like to highlight the implications of a diet of 
good and common sense and platonic thought, and an exercise regimen conducted 
on an apparatus which can only ever produce the same difference. Here it is the 
logic of platonic division that I would like to engage with a little further by plugging it 
into (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) Saukko’s observations regarding mimicry and 
absolutes and the way in which I have developed the notion of ‘anorexic thinking’ 
above. I would like to clarify that although good and common sense circulate 
throughout all discourses and series, they forge a particularly ruthless cocktail when 
mixed with state philosophy and science, disciplines which are “striated or gridded” 
(Massumi, 1992, 6).  
 
When striated disciplines, or orthodox medical and psychiatric perspectives, divide 
the experiencing subject, ‘the anorexic’, from the paradoxically abhorrent and 
spectacular (Ferreday, 2012) object ‘anorexia’, there is a cutting apart of bodies who 
do not matter, and a cutting together of bodies who do. Yet these cuts, and the 
ethics of the cuts, are rarely questioned. The power of these incisions produce 
common popular reason, which “everybody knows [and] no-one can deny” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 165). In these divisions, or cuts, bodies are not only produced as ‘ashamed 
adjectives’2, a point I will take time to develop later, they are also, and perhaps more 
importantly at this point, the matter which enfolds the sense of division. In other 
words, the cuts which divide and create hierarchies, cut together other flows and 
                                            
2
 “Humpty Dumpty forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They’ve a temper some of them – 
particularly the verb: they’re the proudest, adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs” (Deleuze, 2004a, 
30 -31. Emphasis added) Here Deleuze’s working of grammatical forms and materiality offers a way in which to 
draw attention to the material implication of becoming-adjective. In other words, when ‘medical experts’ describe 
someone as ‘an anorexic’, through good and common sense and an institutionally powerful discourse, the body 
they produce is one which anything can be done with. This production of a body, which can be done to, can be 
seen to produce a desiring-machine that does, that becomes  proud, and does the choosing (of anorexia) as a 
lifestyle choice.  
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logics. These cuts are repeated, with difference, in discourses which attempt to resist 
the dominant way in which mixtures of bodies are understood. Put differently we 
return to the idea noted earlier whereby the aborescent model of what anorexia is, 
and who anorexics are, remains a force (Massumi, 1992) within the context of a 
resistant community, namely the pro-ana’s my work engaged with.  
 
This abstract simplification or division of what is lived and in process, does not allow 
for an engagement with sense, which is the boundary between propositions and 
things. The only sort of ‘anorexic thinking’ that could be recognised would be limited 
to a concern with accidents such as weight, appearance and actual foodstuffs. What 
is acknowledged, or recognised, is the proposition (denotation, manifestation, and 
signification) free of this fourth element. This becomes apparent in the way in which 
anorexia is temporalised in the state of affairs (manifestation). Here it starts with a 
Body Mass Index (BMI) of 17.5 (the accident) and stops in recovery and weight gain 
(also the accident). As such, that which is of bodies and in movement is reduced to 
the abstract taxonomic grid of the DSM. What cannot be acknowledged here is the 
becomings and the multiplicity of events, the manyness of activities, strivings and 
unfoldings in vibrant processes of a life (Bennett, 2010). While ‘actual anorexia’ may 
be actualised in the state of affairs, this present is not without its incorporeal past 
and future events. All of which leave excess traces to be carried off into novel 
events. Life, running through series and events, coming into and passing out of one 
another. 
 
Moving Further from the Self-Contained, Autonomous, Intentional Subject 
Towards Mixtures of Bodies and the Pre-Individuality of the Event  
 
Elizabeth Grosz notes “[c]onceptions of the subject are projected onto the world as 
its objective features; in turn, scientific notions are internalised, if only indirectly, 
through their absorption into popular culture” (1999; 134). Here, this notion of 
‘internalisation’ is far more complex than external cause bringing about internal 
affect. This reflects the ideas that I have already begun to introduce through the 
notion of quasi causality in the Deleuzian event. We have here, through Grosz’s 
insight, the idea that within popular culture, a spatiality where good and common 
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sense affectively flows and circulates, scientific conceptions of the corporeal and 
cognitive subject are tantamount to the ‘objective reality of the world’. 
 
Yet these ‘scientific notions’, in good and common sense, have no recourse to the 
abstract of the moving, feeling, sensing and sensuous body, its relationship to 
consumables and ‘sense’. However, as I have already asserted, scientific notions 
are always already abstract. Yet due to the way in which they resonate with common 
popular reason this abstraction simply becomes the way things are done, and done 
to. As Whitehead notes “[t]he notion of the self-contained particle of matter, self-
sufficient within its local habitation, is an abstraction [...] There is, in bare matter of 
fact, “no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence” (quoted in 
Massumi, 2012, 27, emphasis added). This idea gathers further momentum through 
Brennan (2004), a quote which has already been presented in this chapter but will 
now be reworked. 
 
“Because of this fantasy, our self-contained individual believes he acts of 
his own accord, and that his impulses and desires come from nowhere 
other than the history embodied in his genes. He is wrong. The self-
contained individual driven by a genetic motor has antecedents of his 
own. His origins appear to lie in a complex of Platonic and Aristotelian 
views on form and matter, activity and passivity, subject and object, views 
that merge with seventeenth-century Cartesianism to give birth to the self-
contained individual whose mind and body are separate” (Brennan, 2004, 
77, emphasis added).  
 
In the above quote we work with the notion that ideas ‘merge’. Here Brennan notes 
that the implications of the coming together of multiple series of philosophical 
thought produces the “the self-contained individual whose mind and body are 
separate” (ibid). Yet, the ‘self-contained subject’ is both vulnerable and responsible 
(Rose, 1999) in the state of affairs which has been stripped of ‘the sense of the 
event’. Particularly as those affective flows which move between bodies and social 
spaces must be ‘owned’ by the affected individual.  
 
This returns the thesis to the idea that the focus only on the ‘what occurs’, the 
accident, is unhelpful to both understanding and relating to those with a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body. What occurs must be traceable to a ‘cause’, either 
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in genes - anorexia as a biologically based serious mental illness (Klump et al, 
2009), or amongst the stuff of their own lives. Both these ideas of ‘cause’ relate only 
to that which can be seen, whether this is through tests on the body or in the 
recounted stories which emerge through therapeutic treatment. What is not 
accounted for is that which is pre-individual and affective – can be sensed, and is 
sensed, although in a manner so fleeting that it cannot be swallowed.  
 
Having noted the way in which ‘scientific’ notions of the body enter popular culture, 
its practices and ideas and which in turn become common sense, we will now work 
with the way in which platonic ideas also circulate in good and common sense. Here 
particular attention will be drawn to the way in which in on-line pro-ana spaces the 
idea of ‘being a proper anorexic’ is in relation to another figure: the ‘wannarexic’. 
 
“The purpose of division then is not at all to divide a genus into species, 
but, more profoundly, to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to 
distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic. 
[...] Platonic dialectic is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of 
contrariety, but a dialectic of rivalry (amphisbetesis), a dialectic of rivals 
and suitors [..] and to distinguish the true pretender from the false one” 
(Deleuze, 2004 292). 
 
This idea of rivalry, the true and false pretender, will become pertinent as the thesis 
works with the notion of the pedestal which I link to the dogmatic image of thought 
and the figure of the ‘wannarexic’. This latter esoteric word, which contracts anorexia 
with a desire to be so, describes a ‘figure’ which emerges in on-line spaces at a 
particular point in socio-historical time: a manifestation in the state of affairs. 
However, I would suggest that this pejorative term was always already in a process 
of becoming. That it was produced at the same time as, and immanent to, ‘Anorexia 
Nervosa’ as a bordered, particularised and individualised ‘real illness’. The 
‘wannarexic’, the entity, could be said to haunt ‘actual anorexia’, moving in affective 
flows and series of guilt, shame and pride: hovering over bodies and waiting for 
something of them to turn. What is interesting here is that the production of this ‘bad 
copy’ (Deleuze, 2004a) is always already in the processes Brennan previously drew 
our attention to. The subject split from object, the knower split from the known. The 
‘wannarexic’ also serves to draw attention to the way in which abstract processes of 
Page 37 of 229 
 
reification are often common sense by virtue of their ‘fit’ to powerful ways of 
organising the world. Here, processes and activities which insist on splitting ideas 
from matter, only to then make ideas matter more than matter, are part of common 
sense ‘anorexic thinking’.  
 
Dual causes: the of the body and mixtures of bodies  
 
There exists a plentiful source of socio-cultural, psycho-social and feminist work 
(Grosz, 1994; Hepworth, 1999; Lawrence, 1984; Lupton; 1996; MacLeod, 1981; 
Malson, 1998; McSween, 1986; Orbach, 1982, 1986; Probyn, 2000) which, in 
moving away from the medical model, brings to bear issues of gender, power, 
knowledge, resistance, and which troubles anorexia as a “bizarre’ pathology” (Brook, 
1999; 73). However, it is the contention of the thesis that there remains a scarcity of 
literature which either attempts to engage with the virtuality of consumables and non-
consumables or which attempts to dislodge ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ as a dogmatic image 
of thought.  
 
Among the authors noted above it is only Elizabeth Grosz who taps into the notion of 
the incorporeal by describing anorexia as a ‘phantom limb’. This phantom limb is 
said to keep the ‘anorexic’ in relation to, or perhaps more appropriately in a relation 
of the mother’s body: A connection which must be abandoned in patriarchy (1994; 
40). It is my contention, in light of the event and the lever provided by Grosz, that 
there is still work to be done to create a space for thinking through relationships to 
feeding the body with that which is both pre-individual and incorporeal (Massumi, 
2002). In other words, produce work which explores the virtual as of the body and 
‘sense’ as something other than common or cognitive.  
 
“There are no private or collective events, no more than there are 
individuals and universals, particularities and generalities. Everything is 
singular, and thus both collective and private, particular and general, 
neither individual nor universal. Which war, for example, is not a private 
affair? Conversely, which wound is not inflicted by war and derived from 
society as a whole?” (Deleuze, 2004, 173). 
 
The nature of the cause, as it is explicated in the logic of sense, is a dual cause. In 
one direction it pertains to the pre individual and incorporeal of the body: its potential 
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– the quasi cause. In the other direction it depends for its real or actual causes upon 
mixtures of bodies. In other words, the virtual and actual are no more separate than 
the individual from that which is pre individual, in a process of becoming and in 
contact with affects which exceed definitions of ‘choice’ as an operation of 
thoughtfulness alone. This idea of ‘mixtures of bodies’ also connects to Ferreday’s 
recent assertion: 
 
“such is the contemporary preoccupation with the relation between bodies 
and images, that the relation between bodies themselves is almost 
entirely under theorised, nor is there any meaningful account of the lived 
experience of anorexia that does not conform to the overcoming/ journey 
narrative of the misery memoir” (Ferreday, 2012, 153).  
 
Sense is implicated in what might be referred to as agency, but not agency as 
common sense has it. These are ideas which are developed further in the fourth 
chapter of the thesis. However, for the time being it is perhaps enough to say that 
these processes do not act on and cause a predictable effect. These processes 
require a certain leaping of the body towards some other entity which has an “open-
ended promissory quality” (Bennett, 2010, 32). This pseudo-collusion is how the 
thesis puts to work the quasi3 dimension of the dual cause.  
 
As will become clearer as empirical materials are engaged with and as the thesis’ 
methodology is explicated, the account of a difficult relationship to feeding the body 
which I am putting forward refuses the imposition of a taxonomic grid of anorexic - 
recovered. It does this not only theoretically (Massumi, 2002, 2011; Deleuze, 2004a) 
but empirically, through the ambivalent utterances which emerged throughout 
fieldwork. Although the thesis may be read as attempting to ‘speak of the anorexic’ 
(Ferreday, 2012), this is not the case, particularly as it draws on post-human theories 
which do not ‘centre’ the subject (Mazzei, 2013). My desire is to disrupt the proper 
name and also the bodies which it organises, particularly as that which is 
individualised would be better engaged with away from individualising common 
sense. As I have already repeated numerous times, there is work to be done which 
engages with that which is pre-individual and also in mixtures of bodies. By working 
                                            
3
 There is an interesting collision in relation to the thesis’ engagement with the notion of ‘wannarexia’, 
as a pejorative term used to refer to ‘wannabe anorexic’, and an etymological connection to the word 
‘quasi’ which has as synonyms: would be; mock, and virtual.  
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with anorexia in the context of the event speaking of is an act which is beyond both 
the general and the particular but is aware of its politics. 
 
The politics of bodies waiting, leaping, becoming 
 
“To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite 
us in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was born to 
embody it.” It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in 
us; of becoming the quasi cause of what is produced within us, the 
Operator. […] The event […] manifests in us the neutral splendour which it 
possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre individual nature, beyond the 
general and the particular, the collective and the private” (Delueze, 2004, 
169).  
 
The above quote is particularly important to the thesis and is taken from Logic of 
Sense (2004a). This idea will be put to work throughout the thesis but drawing 
attention to it early on is important. Noting the significance of this quote is necessary 
to establish that it was this particular assemblage of words which moved my body 
towards the event in a manner which might be considered through ‘the arc of felt 
becoming’ (Massumi, 2011). This ‘arc’ is the something stirring of bare activity which 
Massumi connects to the political dimension of the event. However, the political is 
not divisible from the aesthetic (see Whitehead, 1964, 1967a, 1967b, 1968, 1978, 
1985; James, 1978, 1996a, 1996b). Politics and aesthetics are both always already 
implicated in elsewhere, other series and semblances. As noted previously through 
Whitehead, “[t]here is, in bare matter of fact, “no possibility of a detached, self-
contained local existence” (quoted in Massumi, 2012, 27, emphasis added). 
 
In the language detailed above (Deleuze, 2004, 169) my engagement with lived 
concepts was actualised. I was invited to turn away from good and common sense 
while becoming more compelled than ever to figure the politics of the work I wished 
to carry out. What was the quasi-cause – or rather what was the quasi cause in the 
context of what I set out to engage with? How would the quasi cause link to those 
ideas I had found so valuable in Butler (1997) regarding collusion and interpellation? 
How did quasi-causality connect to other concepts Deleuze works with in his 
affective register (DeLanda, 2002)? 
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However, here I would here like to raise a point of caution which arises as I plug into 
(Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) the idea that “my wound existed before me, I was born 
to embody it” (Deleuze, 2004, 169). This assemblage raised questions: how would 
such an idea move the thesis away from free will or determinism? Would working 
with such an idea be dangerously close to biological determinism or destiny? Would 
using these ideas be tantamount to reinforcing ‘anorexia’ as iconic? Although these 
points will be returned to in the closing chapter as I consider the notion of counter-
actualisation, it remains relevant to note the hesitancy and excitement that I felt 
towards the assemblage of word and things that Deleuze served up (ibid). However, 
after much consideration, which involved allowing the empirical materials of the 
study to encounter the sense of Deleuze’s utterance, I felt a shift, a turning point.  I 
became increasingly affected by the quote as I felt myself decreasingly affected by 
humanism. As I took the event less personally, I took it more pre-personally.  
 
The movements of the event were sensed as potent and significant in advance of 
their detours, mergers and crossings. Logic of Sense shifted my engagement with 
anorexia from that which occurs, the accident, to the potential of the inside of what 
occurs, the event. In feeling both the politics of the project, and the lived concepts, I 
had to look further. In looking further, in unexpected and unpredictable places within 
the text, I found that the actualisation of the event is never the final point. Deleuzian 
metaphysics are of becoming not being. Instead of a fixed state we find that counter-
actualisation, in repetition and difference, is “the freedom by which we develop and 
lead the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters of 
actualisations and causes” (2004, 243). In other words, the representation of 
anorexia, as actualised, is not where our interest and engagement should either start 
or stop.  
 
Anorexia to Pro Anorexic – The Series of Mental Illness and Lifestyle Choice 
 
 “The moment that the series are traversed by the paradoxical agent, 
singularities are displaced, redistributed, transformed into one another, 
and change sets. If the singularities are veritable events, they 
communicate in one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes 
them, while their transformations form a history” [...]. The mode of the 
event is the problematic. One must not say that there are problematic 
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events. But that events bear exclusively upon problems and define their 
conditions” (Deleuze 2004, 64, emphasis added). 
 
While many of the texts previously mentioned (Brook, 1999; Grosz, 1994; Hepworth, 
1999; Lawrence, 1984; Lupton; 1996; MacLeod, 1981; Malson, 1998; McSween, 
1986; Orbach, 1982, 1986; Probyn, 2000) have made significant contributions to the 
understanding of eating disorders as more than mental illness, most are published 
prior to the development of virtual pro-ana communities. In line with all social 
networking activities, pro-ana sites have increased during the last decade. Optenet 
(2008), an international IT security company, reported that between 2006 and 2008 
the number of pro-ana websites increased globally by 470%. Whether or not this 
figure is disproportionately large in relation to other social networking sites is 
debatable, however what this does highlight is that ‘anorexia’ is an issue which is 
being engaged with in a significant way. Indeed, in a study of 13 – 17 year old school 
children, 12.6% of girls and 5.9% of boys claimed to have visited such sites (Custers 
and Van den Bulck, 2009). While these figures are of course amenable to 
interpretation, what is interesting is that it creates an opening to contest the power of 
the medical and psychiatric sense to fully engage with what they consider 
“biologically based serious mental disorders” (Klump et al., 2009). The figures given 
for those who are at the very least compelled to inquire into anorexia, how to do or 
become it (Dias, 2003) are higher than the seven in a thousand females (0.7%) or 
the one in one thousand males (0.1%), which the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
state ‘get’ eating disorders. (Royal College of Psychiatry, 2009). Without drawing any 
unnecessary conclusions, this taps into the idea that anorexia is not an individual 
pathology, a cause and effect relation, but rather an assemblage of wider social, 
cultural and philosophical series enacted by, and enacting, matter – the human and 
the non-human. 
 
Rather than considering pro-ana and anorexia as distinct discursive objects (Giles, 
2006) we see that in the challenge that ‘Ana’ makes to the ‘proper name’ of 1874, 
Anorexia Nervosa, things are not fixed. They are already implicated in the activity of 
series brushing against one another and leaving an affective trace. Below Deleuze is 
quoted at length. This engenders a return to concepts mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, the idea of the ‘proud verb’ and the conceptualisation I asserted as the 
‘ashamed adjective’. This reinforces the special relationship which the event has to 
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language and bodies. Also, the activity of annunciation and the matter of bodies 
returns us to Deleuze’s question – what is more serious – to speak of food or to eat 
words? 
 
“But this second duality - body/ language, to eat/ to speak – is not 
sufficient. The event subsists in language but it happens to things. [...] As 
a result, the duality is reflected from both sides and in each of the two 
terms. [..] On one hand there are singular proper names, substantives, 
and general adjectives [...]; on the other, there are verbs carrying off with 
them becomings and its train of reversible events and infinitely dividing 
their present into past and future. Humpty Dumpty forcefully distinguished 
between two sorts of words: They’ve a temper some of them – particularly 
the verb: they’re the proudest, adjectives you can do anything with, but 
not verbs  - however, I can manage the whole lot of them[...] the non-
consumable nature of sense to the edible nature of things, the 
impenetrability of incorporeal entities without thickness to the mixtures 
and reciprocal penetrations of substances, and the resistance of the 
surface to the softness of the depths- in short, the ‘pride’ of verbs to the 
complacency of substantives and adjectives” (Deleuze, 2004, 30 – 31). 
 
In the above quote we meet Humpty Dumpty and note his interest in verbs and his 
derision of adjectives. Adjectives, in their complacency, are unaware of potential 
dangers, they do not strive or reach beyond themselves. They are content to remain 
as they are, and this comfort and obliviousness to danger means that anything can 
be done to them. Humpty, as noted above, contrasts the pliability of adjectives to the 
pride of verbs. The conceit of the infinitive implies that it does not change for time or 
(wo)man, tense or subject. This pride, or sense of superiority, arises from the way 
they conduct themselves, their capacity for change, for difference, which exceeds 
the actual instance of denotation. Verbs are proud because they communicate 
across series, their reverberations effect future potential activities. It is not that 
infinitives are changed in the proposition, in their expression (Williams, 2008a). For 
instance, to eat is not changed in the expression, or denotation, but it is changed, 
and produces changes in the series when it is in relation to other infinitives, for 
instance, to speak.  
 
Duplicity is in causes, paradoxes and potentials. They are always already coming 
about multiply. To fix or to freeze the object, divided from the subject, makes its 
actuality more significant than the lives which it then organises. Petrifying anorexia 
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serves only to mount it on a pedestal and concretise it as a dogmatic image of 
thought. It leaves those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body looking 
up to ‘it’ – attempting to be ‘it’, authentic and proper. The thesis will argue that 
anorexia as an individual, diagnosable, treatable mental illness is a problematic 
starting place or resting point for inquiry. It will also suggest that this serves to 
engage with representation rather than the processes and activities of matter, the 
verbs which bring about events and the impersonal affects which are the “connecting 
thread of experience […] the invisible glue that holds the world together” (Massumi, 
2002, 217). 
 
For the thesis, important and relevant questions are not about accidents alone. What 
is in the process of becoming important is the provision of an account of embodiment 
and matter that is abstract enough to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete” 
(Massumi, 2002, 5). For this task I put to work, as I am put to work by, processes, 
empirical materials, becomings, movements, shifts, affects, series and events. 
 
As this chapter come to a close I would like to give a brief overview of the chapters 
which unfold from this preliminary text. In chapter two I promiscuously engage with 
literature (Childers, et al, 2013) to draw attention to why it is important to move 
towards a more abstract philosophical literature to engage with relationships to 
feeding the body. Here the thesis becomes critical of those theories which ‘centre the 
subject’ (Mazzei, 2013). While time is spent presenting key points from traditional 
literatures which engage with ‘eating disorders’, the second part of the chapter offers 
a review of post-humanism and new materialism. This draws attention to what might 
become possible when the onto-epistemological focus of inquiry moves away from 
the bifurcation of determinism and free will. From this review of discussions relevant 
to ‘Anorexia’, which include literature from psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural, 
and feminist perspectives, it is important to note that it is not scientific or medical 
discourses per se which the thesis is critical of, but the good and common sense 
which operate within each of these discourses and which reinforce ‘anorexia’ as a 
dogmatic image of thought. This chapter engages with texts which consider choice, 
determinism and materiality in ways which are rarely put to work in orthodox 
‘disordered eating’ research. In this second chapter I will also begin to talk a little 
more about the ethics of the doctoral project. In chapter three method and 
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methodology are discussed. The first part of the chapter is spent introducing the 
places, people and ideas which afforded me empirical materials. The second part of 
the chapter considers how I then worked with, and was put to work by, these same-
yet-becoming-different materials. This second part of the chapter develops further 
some of the literature introduced in chapter two. Here I consider the possibilities of 
becoming-bovine and the limitations and possibilities of coding and representation. 
These activities are taken further in chapter four. In this chapter I introduce the ideas 
of trickery and experimentation and explore the question of what a body can do. By 
exploring notions of temporality, metabolism and the infinitives to eat/ to speak I 
explore the way in which matter attempts to ‘have the last word’ in the case of a 
difficult relationship to feeding the body. In this fourth chapter I engage with ‘my own’ 
writing which was provoked by my first meeting with Deleuze, before moving towards 
an analysis of a particularly interesting discussion which took place on one of the 
early pro-anorexia sites I observed in my mobile ethnography.  
 
The engagement with empirical materials carried out in chapter four is continued in 
the fifth chapter. In this section of the thesis I am interested in disrupting the 
humanist supposition that data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the 
‘breath of life’ that is the autonomous, cognitively intentional, human acts of analysis 
and interpretation: In short, qualitative research. Here the concepts of accident and 
event are put to work to produce a different kind of empiricism, one which is 
concerned with what occurs and also the inside of what occurs. As such this chapter 
articulates a methodological and textual departure from traditional humanist case 
studies. In the final chapter of the thesis I argue for the contribution that the thesis 
makes to knowledge, being as clear as possible about what that contribution is and 
what its implications are. Within this concluding chapter I draw together the ideas 
which have been engaged with in preceding chapters drawing attention to the 
possibilities which arose from a burgeoning desire to write about ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ 
in a manner which sought to produce it as unrecognisable.  
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CHAPTER 2: IN PLACE OF A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Introduction  
 
“Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, 
but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of 
fixed identities”(Deleuze, 2004a, 5). 
 
“There is some evidence to suggest that applying a psychiatric diagnosis 
and the theoretical models associated with them […] leads to a worse 
outcome for some” (CAPSID, 2011). 
 
In the previous chapter the central concerns of the thesis were introduced and 
developed alongside theories which convey, and conceptualise, the real 
abstractness of matter (Deleuze, 2004a, 2004b; Massumi, 2002, 2011). This was 
undertaken to provide an alternative way of engaging with ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, which 
did not sever the actual from the virtual (Williams, 2008b) nor take for granted the 
autonomy, or agency, of ‘the human’ in relationships to feeding the body. Here, to 
make a connection between theory and methodology, the first quote presented 
above draws attention to the way in which fixed identities and proper names can be 
disrupted – through the paradox. It is the contention of the thesis that the dogmatic 
aspect of both pro-anorexia and medical discourses, which can by no means be 
reduced as they are produced within different bodies and power relations, are what 
deserve attention.  
 
The previous chapter introduced a move away from the proper name, and concept, 
‘Anorexia Nervosa’, or ‘Anorexia’, towards the importance of considering instead a 
difficult relationship to feeding the body. However, and as indicated when the new 
conceptualisation was introduced, this is not simply a linguistic shift, the movement 
has material and affective implications. Here, the conceptual shift, in and of itself 
(which it never really is), is not sufficient to meet the task of producing a different 
territory in which relationships to feeding the body can be enacted, encountered and 
inquired into. As Durie notes, paraphrasing Deleuze, the way in which concepts 
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function within “fields of thought” [are] “defined by internal variables , but also subject 
to the effects of external variables” (Durie, 2006, 169). 
 
“This means that a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but 
only when new functions in new fields discharge it. This is also why it is 
never very interesting to criticise a concept: it is better to build the new 
function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate” 
(Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169). 
 
Here it is suggested that the new function, of a relationship to feeding the body, finds 
in the literary-theoretical fields of new-materialism and post-humanism ways to make 
the proper name, ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, useless and inadequate. Yet because the ‘new 
function’ of choice4, which is evident in pro-ana discussions, remains within the field 
of humanism it also remains stuck in a trench that the Idea of bordered, 
individualised human agency dug. Inquiry cannot stop here.  
 
It is acknowledged that the second chapter of a thesis is traditionally a ‘Literature 
Review’. However, due to the way in which this thesis engages with, analyses and 
puts to work theoretical literature throughout, bordering this engagement to the 
confines of one chapter would, methodologically, be counter to the connective and 
creative impetus of the work being carried out. It would limit the mutually creative 
flows which become possible as abstract theory and abstract matter enfold one 
another. As such, this chapter will attempt to promiscuously (Childers, et al, 2013) 
set the scene as to why this move towards a more abstract philosophical literature 
was both necessary and important in the context of the points of engagement set out 
in the previous chapter. Why it was necessary that this inquiry into relationships to 
feeding the body, paradoxes and proper names moved away from literatures which 
‘centre the subject’ (Mazzei, 2013) to encounter Deleuze’s continental philosophy, 
post-humanism and new-materialism. 
 
In relation to the above point, this second chapter will highlight that what may be 
termed ‘progressive’ literatures, i.e. those collections which have for some time 
contested the power of the medical discourse and patriarchal structures, and which 
engage with ‘anorexia’ as an identity or resistance, remain within the conservative 
                                            
4
 ‘New’ because up until the emergence of pro-ana forums the notion of ‘choosing anorexia’, or feeling chosen by 
it, may have been privately sensed, but it would not have been communally discussed.  
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confines of the dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b). In other words, the 
straight lines and circles which “conventional humanist qualitative methodology” (St 
Pierre, 2013) pre-supposes does little to produce a different space, or space of 
difference, whereby relationships to feeding the body can be considered to involve 
human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010). 
 
Additionally within this chapter the ethics of the doctoral project will be introduced 
through mobilising Deleuze’s enigmatic paradox: 
 
 “what is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words? [..] If we then 
speak of food, how can we avoid speaking in front of the one who is to be 
served as food?” (Deleuze, 2004a, 29).  
 
This idea will be put to work to consider the way in which particular literatures serve 
‘the anorexic’ to the reader-eater. Ethically and methodologically, this can be seen to 
be in relation to a concept coined and introduced in the previous chapter; the notion 
of the ‘ashamed adjective’. The idea of the ‘ashamed adjective’ is not simply a lazy 
bifurcation of pride and shame; it is instead a way of theorising the material-political-
affective capacity of being-described. It is connected to ideas which were introduced 
in the first chapter in relation to the ‘proud verb’ and the way in which the relation 
between infinitives produce change in series. Humpty Dumpty, the elliptical 
conceptual persona Deleuze writes with: 
 
 “forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: They’ve a temper 
some of them – particularly the verb: they’re the proudest, adjectives you 
can do anything with, but not verbs” (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 -31, emphasis 
added).  
 
Here Deleuze’s working of grammatical forms and materiality offers a way in which 
to draw attention to the material implication of becoming-adjective. In other words, 
when powerful bodies, medical practitioners, parents or teachers describe someone 
as ‘an anorexic’, through good and common sense and an institutionally powerful 
discourse, the body they produce is one which anything can be done with. This 
production of a body, which can be done to, can be seen to produce a desiring-
machine that becomes-proud, and feels compelled to choose anorexia, to make a 
lifestyle choice.  
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Although, as noted above, this is not a traditional literature review, per se, the 
chapter comprises two parts: a selection of texts which discuss ‘anorexia and ‘pro-
Anorexia’ explicitly (the medical, psychological, psycho-social and feminist) and 
those which speak of its movements tacitly (Deleuze’s continental philosophy, post-
humanism and new-materialism). Here the idea of the tacit and the explicit returns us 
to a point raised during the opening chapter, the notion of the ‘biting point’. Here, the 
literature which is referred to as explicit could be said to denote, make manifest and 
represent ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ through good and common sense; while the literature 
referred to as tacit produced something leaping and moving, something of the body. 
In other words, if the sense of that which is usually closed down as a pathology or 
mental illness, gathers momentum, vibrancy and luminosity when it is plugged into 
(Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) theories concerned with the abstractness, complexity 
and movements of matter (Barad, 2007; Massumi, 2002, 2011), it becomes clear 
that neither the traditional object ‘anorexia’, or the traditional subject, ‘anorexic’, are 
as distinct as good and common sense thinks. We can find the sense of ‘it’ 
everywhere and nowhere. The thesis contends that it is at the obscure interplay 
between the depth of the body and the surface of language (Deleuze, 2004a) that 
there is the possibility of encountering real difference, rather than the same 
difference which the DSM and representational methods insist upon. 
 
Do Models Contribute to the Problem of ‘Anorexia Nervosa’? 
 
This has indubitably been the most difficult section of the thesis to compose: 
Perhaps primarily as it requires, momentarily undercutting the methodological desire 
to destroy proper names and fixed identities. However, by openly operating through 
the logic of good and common sense, the former of which produces categories, the 
latter of which assigns ‘things’ to them, I am able to map the territory I feel it is 
necessary to deterritorialise (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a). Although within each of 
the discourses which are separated out for the purposes of clarity and discussion 
there are innumerable connections, there is neither time nor space within this 
chapter to draw out all of the possibilities that this vast literature presents. As such, a 
select few will be drawn out further for the purposes of developing the arguments the 
thesis seeks to make. 
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As Fox et al concisely note “Anorexia has been variously theorised by medical, 
social science and feminist scholarship. While the biomedical model evaluates 
anorexia as a disease with an underlying organic cause to be treated and cured 
(Urwin et al. 2002), other models have emerged that have concluded that the 
condition has psychological, social or cultural roots” (2006, 948). Fox et al identify 
several alternative models, all of which are explicated within the section of this 
chapter referred to as an explicit literature. To crudely paraphrase the overview they 
provide they note that psychological theories conceive of anorexia as an identity 
problem, cultural theories of disordered eating tend to focus on the ‘thin ideal’ and 
feminist models suggest that anorexia is either a resistance to, or an inscription of,  
gendering forces and practices. 
 
Alongside other eating disorders, ‘anorexia’ is considered as “one of the most 
prevalent forms of pychopathology amongst women” (Wonderlich, Tierney and 
Vanderwal, 2010; Klein and Walsh, 2003). It is often referred to as epidemic 
(Gordon, 1990; Rich, 2006) “marked by chronicity and relapse” (Stice & Shaw, 2004, 
206), and the ‘recovery’ rate is as low as 9% (Levenkron, 2000). Anorexia is often 
represented within visually shocking terms (Ferreday, 2012), both in relation to its 
fatality rate (Lask and Bryant-Waugh 2000) and also in terms of the images (B-eat, 
2011; Ferreday, 2012) which common sense recognises as what ‘anorexia’ is and 
who ‘anorexics’ are. 
 
From this review of discussions relevant to ‘anorexia’, which includes literature from 
psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural, and feminist perspectives, it is important to 
note that it is not scientific or medical discourses per se which the thesis is critical of, 
but rather, the good and common sense which operate within each of these 
discourses and which reinforce ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought. This 
becomes particularly nefarious as these ideas come into contact with philosophical 
ideas such as the autonomous thinking being of Descartes. Here we are reminded of 
a quote from Deleuze which was used earlier: 
“[E]very time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is 
inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a 
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philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs)” 
(Deleuze, 2004b, 282). 
 
Within this section of the chapter each significant discourse will be elaborated in 
terms of: how it conceives of ‘the problem’ of ‘anorexia’; the way in which it posits the 
notion of causality; a little about how it pre-supposes the subject and object, knower 
and known; an indication of how it presupposes a particular notion of ontology; and 
perhaps most significantly, how it takes for granted the agency of the human subject 
as opposed to the agentic assemblages which comprise both human and non-
human actants (Bennett, 2010). In summary, what will be drawn out is the way in 
which each of these discourses on ‘anorexia’ pre-suppose metaphysical 
underpinnings that keep inquiry going around in circles and do little but represent a 
particular unshifting image of thought. This image of thought is limited to 
recognisable problems, the same and the similar. Here I would like to return to the 
thoughts of Saukko and a quote which was engage with in the opening chapter. 
Saukko notes that:  
“Research on eating disorders is often grounded on a dichotomous way of 
conceptualising their personal implications, such as false consciousness 
versus emancipation, and their political dimensions, such as dominance 
versus freedom. This type of reasoning mimics and fuels anorexic thinking 
in terms of one-dimensional absolutes” (2008, 2, emphasis added). 
 
Although the thesis takes a decidedly different track to the one laid out by Sauokko, 
particularly her concern with the anorexic self and identity, we return the idea that 
rather than being a bizarre pathology a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and 
the sense which informs this relation, is connected to bifurcations and simplified 
abstractions which circulate in discourses which are every-day and unremarkable.  
 
Here, in the idea of ‘versus’, which Sauokko puts forward as an indicator of 
dichotomous thinking, “false consciousness versus emancipation”, “dominance 
versus freedom”, we are reminded of the either-or form which engenders dead ends 
and contradictions. To this emergent list we could easily add choice versus mental 
illness. To paraphrase Saukko, and cut her assertion together (Barad, 2007) with 
ideas from Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, what she terms reasoning the thesis would 
identify even more distinctly as good and common sense. These can be found in any 
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discourse but finds particularly fruitful dwellings at the intersection of philosophy and 
science, an idea we can note from the earlier quote from Deleuze (2004b, 282). 
 
However, as noted in the opening chapter, perhaps what is most interesting is the 
way Saukko identifies ‘anorexic thinking’ as informed by commonplace logics, or in 
her words, reasoning, that are “one dimensional absolutes” (2008, 2). Here, although 
It is not suggested that the thesis and Saukko’s identification of the problem with 
particular discourses is conflatable, it is worth noting that her conceptualisation of 
one dimensional absolutes as problematic produces a similar sense to the way in 
which the thesis works with the idea of the dogmatic image of thought. Put 
differently, two very different accounts of ‘anorexia’ still identify the fixity of obdurate 
logics as productive of the way in which a particular relationship to food and feeding 
doesn’t just make sense, but the way in which it becomes sense. 
 
In noting this commonality it is perhaps necessary to highlight what is profoundly 
different in the way in which each takes up the challenge posed by inflexibility. One, 
Saukko, works at the level of the personal and the experiential and adheres to the 
proper name. She mobilises the notion of autonomy and identity to challenge the 
suppositions that “diagnose anorexic women as having an insufficient self, lack 
autonomy and self-determination and [,] are vulnerable to outside influences” (2008, 
1). The other, the thesis, works at the level of mixtures of bodies, language and 
entities, that which is felt and yet pre-personal. It contests the proper name, thinks 
through notions of experimentation and dosages and challenges ideas about human 
autonomy, agency and impenetrability. In other words, the thesis subverts terms 
which humanism, Sauokko and her objects of critique, can’t seem to help but 
conceptualise in terms of lack and excess.  
 
An explicit Literature  
 
I will now engage with what I termed at the beginning of the chapter as an explicit 
literature. This will include bio-medical, psychiatric, psychological, socio-cultural and 
feminist perspectives. It will also include texts which engage with ‘pro-anorexia’ and 
‘wannarexia’.  
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The Bio-medical position  
 
‘Anorexia Nervosa’ first appears in clinical records during 1874 and immediately 
occupies a peculiar space as a mental illness which is caused by biological 
dysfunction. Here we can see that once again the body and mind are split and 
sutured as befits the ‘problem’. Within this powerful discourse we can note that 
‘anorexia’ is spatialised within the borders of the individuals mind, but the cause for 
this malfunction is neurological. Here we might suggest that although human agency 
is presumed, it is the agency of the medical expert-subject which is paramount, and 
the patient-object which is determined.  
“Many descriptions of anorexia take a medical standpoint, detailing the 
effects that the disease’s progress has on the body. Medically, anorexia is 
characterised by weight loss, followed by lowered body temperature, 
lowered blood pressure, slowed heart rate, loss of menses, thinning of 
hair, fatigue, and other signs of malnutrition. As the anorexic continues to 
lose weight, new symptoms develop and intensify. The last, lethal stage 
for anorexic patients is failure of the liver, kidneys, and finally, the heart” 
(Levenkron, 2000, 33). 
 
Within this discourse, notable above in the quote from Levenkron, is an emphasis on 
the manifestation of physical symptoms: What the thesis conceptualises as serious 
yet accidental to the event. It is also worth noting that the attention which the bio-
medical discourse draws to ‘symptoms’ is reflected in the ‘pro-ana’ exchanges which 
feature in chapter four of the thesis. Although ‘symptoms’ are put to work differently 
within the context of these pro-ana exchanges, what is important to note is the way 
in which the ‘ill body’ serves as an indicator of deserving the proper name: Being 
indubitably a ‘real anorexic’ and having ‘gone far enough’.  
 
The Psychiatric position  
 
There is a vast clinical literature on the etiology and treatment of anorexia from the 
nineteenth century to the present day. This discourse promotes a particular kind of 
objectivity that does not take account of the way in which the apparatus and object, 
in their intra-activity, produce what does and does not matter (Barad, 2007). 
Psychiatry cannot think through, or with, the performativity of bodies as they come 
into contact with other entities. Psychiatric theories, and their corresponding 
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methods, actively separate out the body and the mind. Here the body becomes the 
object which is subject to rational, or irrational control. In the case of the former, 
control and discipline are normative and indicative of a certain respectable and 
enlightened care of the self, while in the case of the latter, the body object which is 
controlled unreasonably becomes a pathological object for psychiatric scrutiny and 
normalising procedures. ‘Anorexia’, of course, falls under the latter understanding. 
 
Within this discourse there is little or no agency attributed to the presenting subject, 
and recovery is instituted as accepting the status quo and returning to ‘normal 
healthy functioning’. In other words the subject must atone for the abnormality they 
contain by becoming ‘normalised’ according to the demands of the state of affairs. 
The must denote, manifest and signify health as objects which speak on behalf of 
the care they have received. As Gremillion notes: 
“An ‘objective’ psychiatry not only reproduces and institutionalizes a 
mind/body dualism, with all of its attending socio-political levels of power; 
the division is explicitly articulated as a ‘naturally given’ structure that is 
said to ‘reveal’ rational truths” (1992, 59). 
 
Although it is only a fairly recent development in psychology and psychiatry, Stice 
and Shaw (2010) note that there is a growing interest, particularly in terms of 
developing preventative programmes, in what they refer to as prodromes. This term 
refers to early symptoms or clusters of symptoms which are connected to, but 
distinct from, ‘risk factors’. Stice and Shaw note prodromal stages of the 
development of eating disorders as body dissatisfaction and self-reported dieting, 
adding that “both involve a high rate of false positives” (2010, 522). In other words, 
both indicators include a large amount of bodies that will not be identified as meeting 
the threshold of the DSM definition of ‘Anorexia’. They are ‘issues’ which affect far 
more than the seven in a thousand females (0. 7%) or one in one thousand males 
(0.1%) which the Royal College of Psychiatrists states ‘get’ eating disorders (Royal 
College of Psychiatry, 2009). 
 
We see in the language of symptoms and abnormality that although there may be a 
movement away from recognising only fixed and actual ‘anorexia’ according to the 
demands of the DSM, this movement still betrays the linearity of Zeno’s arrow 
(Massumi, 2002). In other words the ‘starting point’ of pathology is nudged 
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backwards while ‘the problem’ is individualised to the one who manifests symptoms, 
or more specifically, prodromes. We also see in this division between symptom and 
risk factor, an investment in the divisibility of inside and outside, subject and object. 
Conceived as a symptom, or prodrome, what is being spoken of is internal, while as 
a risk factor, for instance ‘the thin ideal’, it remains, as yet, external. Conceiving of 
Anorexia in this manner is towards predictability and proper names, and this re-joins 
us to an idea noted in the previous chapter:  
 
“Good and common sense each refer to the other, each reflect the other 
and constitute one half of the orthodoxy. In view of this reciprocity and 
double reflection, we can define common sense by the process of 
recognition and good sense by the process of prediction” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 285).  
 
Here, with the notion of the prodrome, potentiality or ‘something stirring’ is reduced 
to the actual in a manner which reduces the lived abstraction of the body to the 
taxonomic grid which orders the world and its contents according to denotative 
intuition: ‘It is that; it is not that’ (Deleuze, 2004a). In other words, what this implies is 
that earlier, rather than later, the individual can be pathologised and normalised.  
 
The Psychological position  
 
In 1978 Hilde Bruch was the first psychologist to put forward the idea that ‘anorexia’ 
had a social cause, and as such put forward the idea that it was a psycho-social 
illness. This idea has been taken up by many theorists, including Brumberg (1988) 
who presents a two stage model in which the second stage is connected to 
significant changes to both body and mind. However, Bruch is criticised by Morag 
McSween (1993) who argues that she mobilises a biological argument to complete 
her psychological account of ‘anorexia’. Here the biological argument being criticised 
is that ‘the anorexic’ does not recognise hunger. McSween argues further still that 
Bruch misrecognises the over receptiveness or docility she points out in patients as 
a personal lack stemming from family dynamics: Rather than as the effect of doing 
femininity in general.  
 
Between 1930 and 1950 psychoanalysis emerged as a particularly popular way of 
understanding ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ and it remains a therapeutic model. However, due 
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to the length of open ended treatment and its costly nature it is not often presented 
as an option within the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS). If it is 
offered there are extensive waiting times which exceed that of other ‘treatments’ 
such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2012; 
B-eat, 2013). Relatedly, during the 1960’s a behavioural approach to ‘eating 
disorders’ became more popular, owing to the fact that the lengthy nature of 
treatment still produced unsatisfactory results. Simply put, within this discourse ‘A 
anorexia’ is conceptualised as a neurosis which is located within the borders of the 
individual’s psyche. It is limited to the subject-patient’s own personal experiences, 
which include disturbances within the conscious and the unconscious mind. Within 
this framing there is an emphasis on the abnormality and deficiency of presenting 
individuals, and it is a model which focusses on lack and has a compensatory view 
of desire. This can be noted, perhaps most clearly, in the notion of penis envy 
(Lawrence, 2008) whereby the libidinal economy which values the one, the phallus, 
and stands in for the Law, produces a sense of lack in young women who have the 
possibility of producing their own phallic hipbones through emaciation. Due to the 
way in which relationships to feeding the body are considered as a neurosis there is 
a presumption of the agency of the human mind to both cause and solve its own 
problems. Here the subject which presents as ‘eating disordered’ engages in therapy 
not to seek to change or challenge their environment, politically or socially, or to 
become different, but to fit into and reshape themselves according to the demands of 
the current social and political milieu.  
 
Steve Levenkron notes that his text Anatomy of Anorexia (2000) is based on twenty 
five years of clinical experience. However, the overwhelmingly heteronormative 
position he takes with regard to ‘anorexia’ is particularly reductive and problematic. 
His assertion, that “it is naturally inherent in femininity to try and be alluring to men” 
(2000, 14) implies an unproblematic connection between sex and gender and a very 
crude understanding of desire. Levenkron, as with many psychological accounts, 
suggests a linear stage model. Within his theory there are four stages. Stage one is 
characterised by achievement, but might not lead to anorexia per se. This ‘stage’ is 
said by Levenkron to give rise to a feeling of success in terms of weight loss and a 
sensation of mastery which may be commended by others. The second phase he 
terms security. The focus to lose weight, even at the expense of relationships and 
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social life, is the source of safety. As Levenkron notes, rather than being about 
security per se, it is actually about avoiding insecurity. Stage three is the assertive 
stage where previously nice, amenable, compliant young women are said to become 
tyrannical within their own family unit. 
 
“She finds a new voice within herself, a voice that she has longed for, an 
assertive voice. She is aware that this voice can only be used in defence 
of her anorexic behaviour and defying opinions about her appearance as 
expressed by others” (2000, 38).  
 
Stage four, the pseudo identity stage, concerns the thesis engagement with the 
interrelation of the proud verb and the ashamed adjective. Levenkron notes that 
“while friends and neighbours view the ‘vanishing girl’ with frustration and worry, 
others are antagonized by the pathological competitiveness [..] but all are referring to 
her as the anorexic” (2000, 39, emphasis added). Levenkron links this ‘notoriety’ to a 
perception of the self as ‘special’: Defined in the mind of self and other. He goes on 
to suggest that: 
“[t]his pseudo-identity fills in the emptiness she has secretly felt about 
herself for some time […S]he now feels that her personality has an effect 
and is clearly defined by others. She prizes this new found 
definition.”(ibid). 
 
Here we can see the way in which it is the mind which is conceptualised as the seat 
of agency and vulnerability while the body is posited as dumb matter to be 
remodelled by the mind’s will. An acknowledgment of the agentic capacities of matter 
is nowhere to be found.  
 
What is interesting in this account is that although it is not developed, due to the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the discourse and the individualisation of ‘the 
problem’, the idea of the other, noted as “friends and neighbours”, highlights the 
point that relationships to feeding the body are always already relational. And here 
the thesis would not stop at human relations, suggesting instead that relations to 
non-human and human consumables (noted in the opening chapter as bodies which 
are denoted) should be explored in the analysis of feeding relations, It was 
suggested that this method would engage more fully with the materiality of words 
Page 57 of 229 
 
and the incorporeality, or virtuality, of matter. Levenkron’s notion of pseudo-identity 
as “fill[ing] in the emptiness she has secretly felt about herself for some time” is not 
only overwhelmingly gendered, it also accords the model of lack which was noted 
earlier. Here, rather than engaging with the way in which the production of a different 
body engenders singular difference, the pseudo-identity is reduced to the same 
difference for all ‘anorexics’.  
 
“The result of anorexic behaviour produces a sense of assertiveness and 
identity. To recover from anorexia nervosa would mean to temporarily lose 
one’s self, to achieve everything achieved by the illness” (Levenkron, 
2000, 40). 
 
The above quote is interesting for a number of reasons. It has been cut apart (Barad, 
2007) from the rest of Levenkron’s text to draw attention to the way in which this 
particular theory takes for granted the authentic human subject, and the abhorrent 
maleficent object ‘anorexia’. We can see here, in the way in which Levenkron 
separates out anorexic behaviour as the object, from the authentic subject with a 
real, rather than pseudo identity. Here, recovering is posited as a further loss of self, 
rather than potential becoming. Recovery is posed as a return to a previous and true 
self, which can then make the same gains as ‘the illness’. It is as though the subject 
were somehow not really present during the period defined as ‘anorexic’. In other 
words, this logic enables the convenient separation of good girl from bad anorexia. 
This conveniently allows this powerful discourse to suggest that assertions uttered 
from ‘the anorexic’ can really be recognised as ‘anorexia speaking’, the reified form 
that Gremillion (1992) draws our attention to.  
The Socio-cultural position  
 
Sociologist Bryan Turner (1984) writes: 
 
“From a sociological perspective, what appears to be significant about 
anorexia is that it is impossible to detach it from a social aetiology and 
social symbolism” (1984, 184). 
 
This discourse tends to argue that there is no psychiatric theory about anorexia that 
adequately accounts for its dramatic rise in incidence. Instead, the socio-cultural 
position suggests that ‘anorexia’ is best conceptualised as a symptom of problematic 
beliefs regarding contemporary expectations on the social roles of women. As Helen 
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Gremillion notes, this becomes particularly salient when entering into competitive, 
public and individualistic arenas that are increasingly characteristic of many aspects 
of social life. Gremillion, in her frequently cited article ‘Psychiatry as social ordering: 
Anorexia Nervosa, a Paradigm’ notes that: 
 
“to the extent that psychiatric theory and method reify the anorectic 
condition as separate from culture, the discipline of psychiatry participates 
in the cultural scapegoating of the ‘deviant’ female” (1992, 57).  
 
Importantly, being affected by the milieu, be that social, political, cultural or historical, 
is identified as a problem which resides within the individual, not within complex 
social mixtures, and certainly not within the psychiatric discourse itself. Further to 
this point Gremillion argues that: 
 
“psychiatry exercises power by labelling, organizing, and constructing 
anorexia as a reified and bounded condition that is removed from cultural 
ideologies and processes, as an illness entity which can be grasped and 
‘fixed’” (ibid, 59, emphasis added). 
 
As such, she sets about to challenge psychiatric assumptions about anorexia, noting 
that they themselves are culturally informed:  
 
“Psychiatry is a cultural practice that tends unquestioningly to support the 
status quo […] both illness and explanation are embedded by reproducing 
certain core cultural values and meanings as illness” (Gremillion, 1992, 
57).  
 
Gremillion places anorexia within what Butler might term the crucible of social life 
(2004) and draws attention to the way in which psychiatry produces a problem it can 
solve, as opposed to engaging with historical and political complexity. Writing at a 
time before the advent of pro-anorexia sites Gremllion suggested that “it is important 
to stress the fact that anorexia does not entail a conscious cultural criticism” (1992, 
58). Here I would suggest that there is a desire within the pro-anorexia discourse to 
pose a cultural criticism. However, I would also suggest that by remaining fluent in 
the good and common sense of state science and philosophy the pro-ana discourse 
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more often than not buttresses ideas which might be challenged should we destroy 
‘Anorexia’as a dogmatic image of thought. 
 
Yet the point that Gremillion makes remains important. The cultural criticism that 
socio-cultural theories attribute to anorexia is, most often, carried out by individuals 
rather than collectives. Also, the extent to which pro-anorexia communities shift this 
cultural criticism towards a joint project is, and should remain, endlessly debatable. 
Here, I wish to add to Gremillion’s point, although it may already be implicit. The idea 
of a cultural criticism which is not necessarily ‘conscious’, or pragmatically focussed 
at any one target, does not entirely undercut the potential of such a micro-politics 
(Arsic, 2008). Also, to suggest that micro-political activities should become collective 
pursuits would imply that the parameters of ‘the problem’, and the agenda of the 
criticism, were universally felt and universally rectifiable. This of course, is not the 
case. 
 
Mara Selvini Palazolli was (1974) a psychoanalyst, who primarily used object 
relations theories. She began with the idea that anorexia is a disorder of body 
cognition. What this idea meant in practice was that those defined as ‘anorexic’ were 
assumed not to be able to think hunger. They were said to be unable to distinguish 
between inner states, impulses and desires. This is a position that Morag 
McSween’s (1999) feminist sociological account is critical of. Although Palazolli 
moves away from this idea of disordered body cognition as the primary cause of 
anorexia, suggesting later that the fear of the body-object itself causes anorexia. 
Here the body-object is not the literal body of ‘the anorexia’, but rather the bad-
object-mother. As McSween points out, for Palazolli, as with Bruch, it is maternal 
failing which is the cause of ‘eating disorder’, leading her to suggest that psychiatric 
and psychological discourses individualise ‘the problem’ of eating disorder. 
Additionally, by failing to acknowledge the complexity of femininity in general, these 
discourses posit the ambivalence that can be found in ‘the anorexic body’ as an 
individual abnormality or deviance. Yet, although the thesis would contest the idea 
that Palazolli’s ‘inner states’ are isolated to the confines of a particular body, seeing 
them instead as having the capacity to affect and be affected by entities outside the 
borders of ‘the subject’ (Clough, 2007), what is interesting is the notion of ‘thinking 
hunger’. Later, through an engagement with experimentation, the thesis will engage 
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with ‘thinking hunger’ differently. Not as an activity limited to cognition, but rather as 
an expansive play of trickery and ruse. 
 
Lee (2001), who has co-edited one of a few critical and cross-cultural accounts of 
‘disordered eating’, notes that ascetic eating practices, not dissimilar to what we now 
refer to as ‘anorexia’ can be traced back to the fifth century. However, it is not until 
much later, 1689, that the symptoms of ‘radical wasting’ and a ‘loss of appetite’ 
became an issue for good and common medical sense. At this point these 
‘symptoms’ of ‘radical wasting’ and a ‘loss of appetite’ were thought to be without 
somatic cause and were instead linked to “sadness and anxious cares” (Gordon, 
1990, 14). It is later still, nearly two hundred years in fact, in 1874, that these effects 
are given a proper name: Anorexia Nervosa, a name which translates as a ‘nervous 
loss of appetite’.  
 
Here, in this crude historical overview, contrary to the fixed representational logic of 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual we can note that ‘anorexia’ is neither timeless nor 
timelessly true. However, it is also necessary to draw attention to these dates for 
another reason. The first clear description of ‘anorexia nervosa’ emerges in the late 
17th century, the point at which Cartesian thought gains purchase and while notions 
of affect, as that which is transmissible and embodied without being owned by the 
individual, lose purchase (Brennan, 2004). We have in the seventeenth century 
physician’s account ‘radical wasting’ coupled with ‘sadness and anxious cares’, yet 
these are considered to be without somatic cause. However: without somatic cause 
implies a particular bordering of the body, a particular notion of causality and no 
recognition of the non-human. Here, while the body is isolated as the corporeal - the 
visible, the normatively bordered matter of the human individual, causality is linear 
and bound to the individual human subject. This notion of the body and causality 
does not take account of autonomic affective responses, which are in excess of 
consciousness. Nor does it account for an embodied relationship to the environment 
and other bodies. To follow the logic of good and common sense, which splits the 
body from the mind, if there is no somatic cause, the only place left is the subject’s 
mind. Additionally, because of the way the body is conceived, this ‘mind’ is 
invulnerable to the virtuality of pre-individual affects which move through, and 
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between, bodies, spaces and non-human entities. As such the human mind 
paradoxically becomes the seat of agency and vulnerability.  
 
It is also worth noting that ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, got its proper name at a point at which 
female maladies and hysterias proliferated in both the social imagination and 
therapeutic waiting rooms. Yet this nominal identity does a disservice to those who 
have a difficult relationship to feeding the body. The evocation of nervousness 
isolates the presenting individual, or patient, as the border of said nervousness. 
There is no redress to the permeability of bodies in relation to the environment or 
other bodies, nor any engagement with the idea, to quote Brennan, “that the origin 
for affects is independent of the individual experiencing them” (2004, 13). 
 
Emma Rich (2006) notes two things which are of interest to the thesis, firstly that 
there is a need for an ‘everyday’ account of anorexia, and secondly that among the 
voices which her work engaged with, there emerged a lived paradox: ‘Anorexia’ as 
both an illness and an identity. Although Rich does not refer to this explicitly as a 
paradox, conceiving it instead as a negotiated perspective which draws on 
discourses outside of medicine, the both-and form can be seen to mirror the interest 
of the thesis in both choice and mental illness. The negotiated perspective Rich puts 
forward is said to emerge from a bid to conceive of “a more positive self-
representation of anorexia or anorexic identities” (2006, 284).  
 
However, concerns with Rich’s account are significant to the development of the 
thesis’ line of critique, particularly the way in which it departs from inquiries which 
remain dutiful to the limited project of representational identity politics. It remains the 
contention of the thesis that ‘Anorexia’ is an iconic and proper name and can be 
considered as a dogmatic image of thought. As such by adhering to the proper name 
little room remains to consider the real difference engendered through particular 
relationships to feeding the body. In other words, it must be acknowledged that 
‘anorexia’ as a ‘fixed identity’ and ‘proper name’ is more powerful than the bodies it 
purports to describe and order. This of course is not least of all due to the powerful 
medical discourse which colonises potential and fixes good and common sense 
understandings. The point that I am trying to make here is that while ever we 
concern ourselves with rescuing identities and providing positive representation we 
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are failing to inquire into the material-discursive-ethical (Barad, 2007) limitations of 
categories which speak so poorly on our behalf.  
 
Although on one hand this move towards a more “positive self-representation of 
anorexia” (Rich, 2006, 284) may be a strike for difference, the adherence to medical 
notions of what anorexia actually is, in terms of the DSM and appearance, suggests 
that difference remains the same-difference. One can claim an ‘anorexic identity’, 
only when one’s physical presentation accords the category’s demands. Also, and 
further to the ontological convictions of the thesis, an ‘anorexic identity’ does not 
suffice if being anorexic is tied to being a ‘proper anorexic’ – adhering to the fixed 
and unmoving demands of the DSM-IV and V (APA, 2000, 2013). This faithful 
citation, which grants identity, also subsumes the ambivalence and complexity of 
becoming under the costly and illusory authenticity of being. 
“Woman is a contradictory, confusing identity, which the anorexic is fully 
aware of”. (Orbach; quoted in Hepworth, 1999; 57). 
 
As can be noted in the above quote, sociologically focussed work on ‘eating 
disorders’ often makes links to transitions and contradictions. These observations 
have been made with regard to cultures (Nasser et al, 2001; Gordon, 2001), gender 
(Lawrence, 1987, Orbach, 1986, Day, 2010) and education (Lawrence, 1987). 
Although these observations are significant and important, the special interest the 
thesis has in movement, time, and the productive capacity of paradoxes means it is 
necessary to go a little further. It is the contention of the thesis that there remains a 
need to move from exploring transitions between fixed points, which we can see, 
make manifest, denote and signify, towards an inquiry which is interested in 
potentiality and the interval, “the connecting thread of experience” and in Massumi’s 
words, “impersonal affect” (2002, 217). 
Feminist position  
 
Feminist research into ‘anorexia’ began to proliferate in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Paula 
Saukko suggests that Feminist analysis of eating disorders tend to: 
“Critically analyse normative discourses on the female body [and have 
recently] observed that psychiatric discourses that aim to treat women 
with eating disorders consolidate ideals of strength and fitness similar to 
those that guide women starving in the first place” (2008, 1).  
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Feminist analyses could be said to aim to explore ‘disordered eating’ against the 
grain of patriarchal structures and norms. However, Morag McSween is critical of 
some feminist writers, including Susie Orbach (1986). She suggests that rather than 
reading against the grain to produce a new or different feminist account, what is 
actually produced is an unsatisfactory supplement to conventional patriarchal 
accounts of the self, identity and the body. This reflects my own concerns with the 
influential work of Orbach, particularly the way in which she mobilises the notion of 
an authentic being. She writes: “it is not possible to change fundamental ways of 
being and of self-conception, before looking in the mirror and recognising who one 
is” (1986, 105). This positioning presents a bordered individual, the knower of the 
known. It raises both the issue of representationalism (Barad, 2007) and also 
recognition (Deluuze, 2004b). With regard to the latter point, recognition, the thesis 
follows Deleuze in considering this as reductive of potential difference (ibid). What 
Orbach implies is that everything is available to contemplation should we think or 
look hard enough, or, perhaps, engage in enough therapy. We might also think of 
this hail to recognise who one really is as an instance of bio-power or “soft tyranny” 
(Massumi, 2011, 48). Massumi notes, in Semblance and Event that 
 
“according to Foucault, among the most invidious of regimes of power are 
the ones that impose an imperative to participate, particularly when the 
imperative is to express yourself ‘truly’ or ‘authentically’ [...] under orders 
to be yourself” (2011, 48, emphasis added).  
 
This order to be oneself can be seen as connected to what Foucault refers to as 
‘postitive’ or ‘productive power’. Being yourself “for the system” (ibid) is being 
yourself the sake of good and common sense. It is making the experience of a 
difficult relationship to feeding the body a scrutable object in the state of affairs: a 
mental illness which can be prevented, cured and recovered from. 
 
Julie Hepworth’s key text The Social Construction of Anorexia (1999) notes that it 
was feminist scholarship which posed the first real challenge to the medical model by 
forwarding the position that ‘eating disorder’ was in fact a social and gendered form 
of protest. In the text she challenges the pathologisation of ‘anorexia’. The core aim 
of the work seeks to draw out the way in which ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ is constructed as 
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a discursive object, or more particularly, as an object of medical discourse. 
Throughout the various chapters of the book she explores the intersection of 
scientific knowledge and knowledge pertaining to women’s bodies. Put crudely, what 
Hepworth suggests is that the way in which particular discourses, here medical and 
scientific, pose the problem of ‘eating disorder’, places them in a powerful position to 
produce the solution. An idea which resonates with the ideas put forwards earlier 
and credited to Helen Gremillion (1992).  
 
Hepworth draws attention to the way in which this production of knowledge and 
positioning of ‘the problem’ fails to account for, or work with, the voices of those who 
are diagnosed as containing the problem. Hepworth draws on the work of Foucault 
to suggest that ‘anorexia’ is a concept which appears at a particular point in history. 
From this assertion materialises the idea that the ‘lowly emergence’ of anorexia is, in 
her terminology, a social construction as opposed to something which is timelessly 
true and waiting to be unveiled. To draw out this point she explores early ideas about 
self-starvation as connected to religious asceticism and ecstasy. She also notes 
how, with the waning of religious dogma, or influence, asceticism and food restriction 
begin to be taken up by the increasingly powerful world view of medicine and 
science in the late nineteenth century. Towards the end of the text Hepworth draws 
attention to the way in which understandings of ‘anorexia’ have proliferated since the 
1980’s due to the inter-relationship between disciplinary fields. An issue that the 
thesis would suggest only continues to develop and bring forth nuanced ways of 
considering the complexity of relationships to feeding the body.  
 
In Anorexic Bodies: A Feminist and Sociological Perspective on Anorexia Nervosa 
(1993) Morag McSween moves away from psychological accounts of ‘anorexia’, 
seeing it as fundamentally about gender. McSween is very critical of the earlier work 
of Hilde Bruch and her position that eating disorders are caused early in childhood 
and function to resolve a desire for identity and selfhood. However, she still takes a 
similar position to Susie Orbach (1986) as she suggests that in self-starvation 
women try to synthesise contradictory elements in their social position through the 
creation of what she terms ‘the anorexic body’. She suggests that the desire for this 
body is synonymous with a desire for individuality, which as a feminine subject in 
contemporary western culture, requires the reconciliation of the hidden 
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incompatibility between femininity and individuality. She refers to the ‘anorexic 
symptom’, and in doing so she mobilises the powerful medical discourse to make her 
feminist argument. She suggests that the ‘anorexic body’ is gender neutral and 
resolves gendered contradictions. She does however make the important point that 
anorexia is an individual practice, or solution, to a social problem. She also does 
something interesting to the analysis of ‘eating disorder’ by suggesting that rather 
than harvesting meaning in anorexia as telling of some underlying psychological 
problem, inquiry should look at the practices associated with ‘the symptoms’. 
Although the idea of ‘symptoms’ is problematic as it remains respectful of the 
limitations of the medical model, it is my feeling that this refers to what becomes 
manifest in practice – what ‘the anorexic body’, to use McSweens terminology, does, 
or can do. 
 
Day and Keys (2008) note that the turn towards post-structural theorists to help 
understand ‘eating disorders’ was triggered by a desire, particularly for feminists, to 
move away from essentialist notions of the body and ‘bodily distress’. Here, in the 
context of the post-structural, and often the feminist, it has been Michel Foucault’s 
texts which have been frequently drawn upon to disrupt pernicious and normalising 
discourses. However, Foucault’s theoretical conceptualisations of docile bodies, the 
panoptican, bio-power, care for the self, and, of course, the relation between power 
and knowledge, could be said to now, as a result of the plentiful literature which has 
emerged through him, to have too much of a logical fit to what we take ‘anorexia’, 
and ‘anorexics’ to be. 
 
In other words it makes good and common sense to draw on Foucault as it is a 
recognisable and predictable methodological decision. As a method of inquiry which 
has become predictable and recognisable in the context of ‘disordered eating’, it is 
considered unlikely to make ‘anorexia’ unrecognisable (to itself) and therefore in 
danger of reinforcing ‘it’ as a dogmatic image of thought. Here it is not the contention 
of the thesis that a Foucauldian analysis (see St Pierre, 2013) can no longer offer 
anything to the matter of relationships to feeding the body. It is necessary however, 
due to the conceptual interests of the thesis, to make problematic this 
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methodological ‘common sense fit’: To refuse the Foucauldian hail and ‘wait’ for 
something else to invite thought in.  
 
Having discussed some of the vast literature pertinent to ‘Anorexia’, the thesis will 
now move toward discussions concerning ‘pro-anorexia’ and ‘wannarexia’. By 
comparison these are much smaller literatures, particularly the latter. However due 
to the problems which the thesis engages with they are by no means less important. 
Further still, because of the methodological decision to engage with life on-line and 
off-line, both are extremely important in helping inquiry to move away from static 
notions of what ‘anorexia is’ and who ‘anorexics are’.  
 
Pro-anorexia 
 
“If, currently, young people are perceived to articulate self-determination 
and identity through discourses of risk, danger, choice, and individual 
freedoms, it is young women in particular who are ‘choice biographers’ 
par excellence” (Harris, quoted in Pollack, 2003, 247).  
 
Ferreday notes that the pro-ana community has attracted more criticism and 
controversy than any other on-line community5. She contextualises this claim by 
noting the ‘notorious’ Yahoo case of 2001 where all pro-ana sites were removed. 
(2003, 283).This chimes with Dias (2003; also see Pollack, 2003) who notes that as 
early as 2001 an American eating disorder advocacy group, ANAD (Anorexia 
Nervosa and Associated Disorders) requested that internet servers remove pro-
anorexia sites from their domains. This desire to make pro-ana spaces vanish is also 
noted by Fox et al who state that: 
“the pro-ana movement is a largely socially-unacceptable approach to the 
management of anorexia, and has suffered a powerful media backlash, 
being characterised as encouraging ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ girls and 
women to adopt anorexia as a glorified diet (2005, 945).  
 
Here we can see that the mobilisation of normal and healthy, is always already in 
relation to the unhealthy, or pathological. We can also note that ‘the media’, where 
this backlash is said to come from, are always already implicated in perpetuating the 
visual terms in which anorexia, or a difficult relationship to feeding the body, is 
                                            
5
 Here it might be relevant to add ‘any other [non-criminal] on-line community’. 
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recognised (Warin, 2010). Below are quotes taken from a recent B-eat, previously 
known as the British Eating Disorder Association, publication (2011). These are the 
words of people whose everyday experience of feeding the body is difficult, 
regardless of whether or not they look like a ‘proper anorexic’.  
“They always show pictures of a person at their worst which can be very 
triggering for sufferers” (2011, 2). 
 
“I think it's disgusting that some magazines only run stories if they have 
pictures of peoples’ ‘lowest weights’ – that needs to change, weight is just 
a symptom” (2011, 2).  
 
As noted in the opening chapter, pro-ana sites have increased during the last 
decade (Optenet, 2008) and what this does highlight is that ‘anorexia’ is an issue 
which is being engaged with in a significant way (Custers and Van den Bulck, 2009). 
While figures of those accessing sites are of course amenable to interpretation, what 
is significant is the opening they create to contest the capacity of medical and 
psychiatric sense alone to fully engage with what they consider “biologically based 
serious mental disorders” (Klump et al., 2009). The figures given, for those who are 
at the very least curious about anorexia, compelled by the ‘tips and tricks sections’ 
(Dias, 2003), are considerably higher than the figures which the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists suggest actually ‘get’ actual anorexia (2009). 
 
The earlier research on eating disorders, particularly the paradox of feminine 
agency, resistance and conformity (Lawrence ,1987), is engaged with in the context 
of pro-ana sites by Day (2010). She suggests that the websites emphasise the 
benefits of ‘anorexia’ as a means of coping and providing support to those who 
engage in extreme and ascetic bodily practices (Dias, 2003; Ferreday, 2003; Fox 
and Ward, 2006; Fox et al., 2005). She concludes by suggesting that “what are often 
regarded as destructive health behaviours reproduce accounts of both ‘ideal 
femininity’ [and] ‘resistance to femininity’” (Day, 2010, 246). The paradox that Day 
engages with leads her to suggest that theorisations must be mindful of either 
“celebrating” (ibid) such resistance as pertaining to women’s power, or thinking only 
through what she terms “oppressive discourses” which tend towards determinism. 
The thesis shares this concern and acknowledges that to fall down on either side 
would be to neglect both the singularity of the event (Deleuze, 2004a; Massumi, 
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2011) and the inter-relation of both conjunctive and disjunctive synthesis (Olkowski, 
2008). 
 
The significance of academic attempts to engage with pro-ana spaces is noted by 
Ferreday who suggests that pro-ana spaces are used to communicate the ‘day to 
day experience of living with ED6 (2003, 284, emphasis added). Here the idea of 
living with might be reconsidered in light of the thesis’ interest in divisions between 
known and knower, subject and object. As well as the idea of living with, we might 
also consider both living with and through. Living with, alone, implies that the known 
(‘anorexia’) and knower (‘anorexic’) are separate and separable: Whereas living 
through brings to bear the productive collisions, eruption and tensions between 
series and event: The novelty of activity in relation to the bare activity of the world 
and the manifold potentials reverberating in mixtures of bodies and social spaces. 
‘Living-with’ is individualised, while living through emphasises processes and 
connects to the pre-individual aspect of the event. The way in which subject-object: 
event, affect one another and produce strange unpredictable mixtures.  
 
Picking up on the point Day makes with regard to theorisations which are too 
hopeful, or pessimistic, of what ‘anorexia’ and ‘pro-anorexia’ speak of, Pollack (2003) 
asks what a feminist response to such spaces should be. As one of the earlier 
articles to engage with the issue of pro-anorexia, Pollack makes the interesting point 
that rather than learning how to be anorexic, these social information forums are 
spaces which are used by those who already have a difficult relationship to feeding 
the body and wish to maintain ‘anorexia’. By drawing on Deleuze and Massumi’s 
ideas, it is possible to disrupt the idea that pro-ana sites can cause ‘anorexia’, it is 
also possible to suggest that the idea of ‘maintenance’ reflects some very important 
flows.  
 
Pollack (2003) operationalises Deleuze and Guattari to evoke the idea that the pro-
ana discourse of ‘lifestyle choice’ is an attempt to move away from the ‘disease 
model’. She suggests that this can be seen as an attempt to reterritorialize ‘Anorexia’ 
(2003, 247), adding that the pro-ana discourse can be seen as a ‘line of flight’ from 
                                            
6
 ED is often used as short hand for Eating Disorder. 
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what she refers to as the “stagnant discourses about patriarchal oppression and bio 
power” (ibid, 249). This reiterates, with difference, points made earlier in the chapter 
about the methodological decision to not respond to the Foucauldian hail. It also 
raises the point made at the outset of this chapter that although the thesis owes 
much to earlier sociological and feminist work there was still work to be done: not 
least of all to flush out “stagnant discourses”.  
 
However, ‘new ideas’, particularly those which pertain to matter, do not simply 
devour older ones. One way of theorising sense does not devour older ones only to 
‘flush them away’, once and for all. To recall one of the quotes which opened the 
chapter:  
“A concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new 
functions in new fields discharge it. […] it is better to build the new 
function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate” 
(Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169).  
 
Wannarexia  
 
During the introductory chapter the term ‘wannarexia’ was introduced as an improper 
name. It was also noted that in the context of the event and Logic of Sense (2004a) it 
could be considered as an esoteric, portmanteau or ‘nonsense’ word. While there is 
a good deal of literature on Anorexia, especially from the 1960’s onwards and a 
substantial amount on pro-anorexia since the early 2000’s, the amount of literature 
which explores in any depth the idea of wannarexia is much smaller. One key 
exception is Giles who notes that data found in pro-ana spaces “offers psychologists 
and other social scientists unique and privileged access to a ‘naturally occurring’ 
discourse (2006, 456) which he conceives as a “rich tapestry of identity work” (2006, 
463).  
 
While it has already been suggested that good and common sense sorts and orders 
bodies according to the demanding diagnostic categories of the DSM-IV and V (APA, 
2000, 2013), what Giles’ work further points to is the way in which this ordering logic 
can, in turn, be found in pro-ana spaces. In other words, although the pro-ana logic 
can on one hand be noted as refusing the boundaries of the medical discourse it can 
also, on the other hand, speak through it. As such it is not the medical discourse or 
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science, per se, but the merger between good and common sense, science and 
philosophy (Deleuze, 2004b) which contrives to produce only the same difference. 
Within pro-ana articulations on-line we can note the good sense, which produces 
categories, and the common sense, which ascribes bodies to categories, in terms 
such as ‘real anorexic’, ‘faker’ or ‘wannarexic’. We can see here that although there 
is resistance to the notion of being ‘mentally ill’ there remains conformity to the 
notion of the authentic or ‘proper anorexic’. Giles observes and notes this point 
stating that: 
 
“Ironically, for a community that actively resists social norms, medical 
diagnosis operates as a qualification – but this only serves to point up a 
critical ambivalence towards medicine in the pro-ana community, where 
site users debate endlessly whether ana is an ‘illness’ or a ‘choice’. 
Diagnosis serves as nothing more than a mark of authenticity” (Giles, 
2006, 475). 
 
In the above quote a good deal of the flows which inform the thesis can be felt, 
particularly the idea that in the last instance resistance appears to, perhaps fearing 
its own difference, be tied down to the notion of actual anorexia and ‘authenticity’. 
This point brings to bear the latter part of Logic of Sense – The Simulacrum and 
Ancient Philosophy where among other things ethics and foodstuffs are considered 
alongside Deleuze’s own reversal of Plato. Although these ideas will be put to work 
throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis what is important to note at this 
juncture is that this pertains to the dogmatic image of thought noted at the outset of 
the thesis. This reiterates, with difference, the way in which platonic Ideas can be 
seen to circulate in pro-ana articulations. Due to the fact that Deleuze’s theory of the 
event: surface and depth, body and language, does not give primacy to either matter 
or the idea, his work is a significant lever in terms of reversing the Platonism in pro-
ana.  
 
In the opening of the first Appendix Deleuze also notes irony; conceiving it as the 
superficial aspect of division “which confines singularity within the limits of the 
individual or the person” (2004a, 158). He adds to this that there is also rivalry which 
occurs in depth, in the “selection of lineages [..] to distinguish the pretender from the 
false one” (Deleuze, 2004a, 292). In other words, the irony that Giles is adept at 
pointing out can be developed by Deleuze. In the context of pro-ana discussions that 
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which is individualised, anorexia as a mental illness, is also individualising: A marker 
of (the same) difference. As such debates about who is, and who is not, a proper 
anorexic make recourse to the medical concept and proper name which carries the 
affective trace of authority (Massumi, 2002). As such, a ‘new’ function, in an old field, 
fails to grow. Here not being a faker or a ‘wannarexic’ necessities that individuals 
must recite the category’s demands in a fixed present in the state of affairs. To be 
worthy of the proper name the pro-ana must constantly acquit themselves of the guilt 
of being a fake or a wannarexic. Yet, to be worthy of the event is not an individual’s 
task, rather events are “occasions of communication rather than isolation” (William, 
2008a, 168).  
“In the very general terms, the motive of the theory of Ideas must be 
sought in a will to select and to choose. It is a question of ‘making a 
difference’ of distinguishing the ‘thing’ itself from its images, the original 
from the copy, the model from the simulacrum. (Deleuze, 2004a, 291). 
 
The above quote can be seen in relation to one of the most significant points which 
Giles (2006) raises with regard to the thesis, the theories it draws on and the 
empirical materials it works with. He suggests that wannarexics, or ‘wannabes’ are 
considered as ‘interlopers’ who are “bringing the community into disrepute” (Giles, 
2006, 471). They are the bad copies that Deleuze is talking about (2004a). We see 
here that what is at stake is dual, pre individual and in mixtures of bodies. Devaluing 
or denigrating the ‘proper’ or ‘good name’ implies that rather than being placed on a 
pedestal, alongside iconic anorexia, the good copy receives only the spoiled identity 
of ‘attention seeker’.  
 
Implicit Literature  
 
Having given a brief overview of pro-anorexia and wannarexia the thesis will now 
move towards an engagement with the literature noted at the beginning of the 
chapter as speaking of anorexia, pro-anorexia and wannarexia tacitly. Here I am 
referring to writing on affect and the event and the recent contributions of post-
humanism and material feminism. 
Affect and the Event  
 
“Th[e] event is never simply an occurrence for the mind of a conscious 
human being. It is rather a set of multiple interactions running though 
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bodies, ideal structures (such as languages or moral codes) and virtual 
structures (such as relations of emotional investment considered in 
abstraction from the bodies that carry them)” (Williams, 2008a, 1). 
 
Just as the ‘pure’ of raw experience in Massumi is not a return to a ‘pre-linguistic 
Eden’ (2011, 10), affect is not an atavistic return to an embodied space free of 
language and culture. Instead, affects are always already in the middle, both 
subjective and objective, but more than that, “virtually subjective and objective” 
(Massumi, 2011, 10). The notion of affect which Deleuze and Guattari evoke in What 
is Philosophy does not undertake a return to origins, as if “beneath civilisation we 
would rediscover, in terms of resemblance, the persistence of a bestial or primitive 
humanity”. (1994, 173). Here we see at least two things which are important, firstly, 
the way in which Deleuze and Guattari work with affect is away from the notion of 
linear progress. They do not reiterate the narrative of atavistic past which is never to 
be returned to; civilised future, which is to be invested in at all cost. Secondly, their 
evocation of affect does not under cut the important advances made through post-
structuralisms intra-actions with feminisms.  
 
Further still, through Deleuzo-Guattarian affect we do not take the ocular individual 
and bordered body as the starting point of inquiry. Instead we look at the interplays 
and movements between human and non-human bodies, which are unlimited by 
chronological time. Engaging with affect also offers inquiry the possibility of 
destabilising either or binaries. Massumi clarifies that pure experience is not naïve or 
at a remove from language. The purity he is referring to is perhaps best understood 
as being at the level of ‘something stirring’, ready to be numerous ‘whats’ 
retroactively. However, as noted previously, these moments of ‘stirring’ are not 
towards oneness, but manyness.  
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, one of the most significant contributions which 
Massumi (2002, 2011) and the abstract, activist and process philosophers he draws 
on make to a reconsideration of ‘anorexia’, is in relation to movement and the 
resistance they pose to splitting the subject and object. Through plugging into 
(Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) this literature the problem, as it is posited in common 
sense, was not the starting point of inquiry. Indeed, the way in which ‘the problem’ is 
conceived in good and common sense itself became a significant part of the 
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‘problem’ which the thesis engaged with. As a result of engaging with particular 
theories of movement, abstraction and affect, the thesis does not take as its point of 
departure ‘anorexia as a mental illness to be diagnosed, prevented or cured’. Yet 
neither does it swallow whole the idea that it could be chosen as a lifestyle. It is the 
contention of the thesis that ‘anorexia’ is a problem; but not as common sense would 
have it. It is problematic first and foremost as an iconic ‘proper name’ and ‘fixed 
identity’.  
 
Instead of starting at the beginning I have worked with ideas which unfix identities 
and proper names (Deleuze, 2004a), ideas which start from the middle. In working 
with literature which accommodates that which is of bodies and language, and insists 
that there is more to the social, embodied and political world than what occurs or can 
be seen in vision, the thesis is adept to tread further backwards and further forwards 
than good and common sense alone would allow. Through theories of affect, and the 
language of the event, expansive problems are encountered and secure solutions 
are dismissed. 
 
What the thesis contends is problematic, ethically, ontologically and 
epistemologically, are the intra-actions (Barad, 2007) of state science and 
philosophy (Massumi, 1992) which pre suppose an autonomous, intentional human 
subject. Dogmatic ideas which divide and (b)order bodies on the basis of common 
sense abstractions. The thesis contends that these are the stratified ricochets which 
cut apart the experiencing ‘anorexic’ body from the abstracted experience, or object, 
‘anorexia’. Produced as reified and mattering more than that which is potential and 
actual, real and abstract, ‘anorexia’ becomes powerful in a manner which eclipses 
the lived and everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to feeding the 
body. Indeed, in a recent press release the United Kingdom’s National Eating 
Disorder Association, now known as B-eat, noted that from research that had been 
carried out with service users 54% strongly agreed, and 20% agreed with the 
statement “[t]he length of time I spent on a waiting list caused me to feel that I 'wasn't 
sick enough'", while 40% were told by medical professionals that their BMI wasn’t 
low enough to access treatment quickly.  
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Returning to the event, Massumi notes that the event itself is subjective self-creation 
and the clarification of the subjective and the objective is key to understanding the 
knower/ known. The event, as that which is inside of what occurs, is actualised in the 
state of affairs, in bodies and mixtures of bodies. Yet there is always already the pre 
individual  or objective (Whitehead, Massumi, 2011, 8) residue of activity of previous 
events passing out in the something stirring of novel events coming about. Massumi 
suggests, in a manner which is close to passages in Logic of Sense (2004a) that “the 
end of the experience knows its beginning [..] it is a retroactive process” (2011, 9). 
This retroactivity is not back to front, end to start. Instead it is of processes which are 
both forwards and backward, in excess of the one dimensionality of lines on a grid 
and apparatuses of extensity. Things are always already becoming different.  
 
“Each phase of the event must in some way perceive the pertinence of the 
phases before it, in order to gather the prior phase’s momentum into its 
own unfolding. […] In the overlap and relay, they co-perceive their mutual 
inclusion in the same event” (Massumi, 2011, 3-4).   
 
Potential, as the momentum of the event, is taken up through the incorporeal 
dimension of the body to be carried off through infinitives – to cry, to wear, to laugh. 
As singular points these event activities cut together, and cut apart, series. They 
produce change. Yet these transformations, actualised by an enacting body, go 
much further than the events of a particular someone’s life. This is the creative self-
enjoyment of what is coming about, (Massumi, 2011) and never ceases to do so 
(Deleuze, 2004a). It is the aesthetic dimension of the event (Massumi, 2011).  
 
As noted at the start of this section, Massumi utilises the word ‘pure’ but does so in a 
manner which is mindful of the static and dust that have gathered around the term. 
He makes clear that the ‘pure’ he is talking about is not the common sense 
understandings of ‘pure’: this pure experience is not the purity of moral superiority, or 
racial purity. Rather, this pure is bare activity. It is “virtually both subjective and 
objective” (James quoted in Massumi, 2011). Here we might say, that this ‘pure’ is 
the dry incorporeality of the Deleuzian event. That which is real and abstract, and 
which bodies, as real and abstract themselves, have a sense of. Not in the object of 
the body, but at the border, or interval, between propositions and things.  
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Massumi goes on to say that ‘pure experience’ is overfull with potentiality and 
virtuality. In other words, pure experience might be said to have a sense of the pre-
individuality of the event and its connection to other events which are coming and 
receding. This is where Deleuze’s notion of Chronos and Aion become useful as 
opposed to linear theories of time which, even when they do connect to space, do 
not account for that which circulates in spaces and between bodies affectively. The 
creep between the porous border of sense, in relation to bodies and language, does 
not come to a final resting place. The proposition, stripped of sense, in the last 
instance fails to convey the over fullness of experience. To look only to ideas and 
only to matter, only to words or only to the speaker is, perhaps, both to expect too 
much and too little of inquiry, even making the empiricist’s confusion between 
accident and event (Deluze, 2004a). 
 
Massumi, as a theorist of affect, does not always explicitly use the word affect when 
he explicates ideas pertaining to it. This method of exposition engenders a particular 
aesthetic and political writing which is in line with the interests of the thesis. Affect is 
not pinned down to a particular definition once and for all. It is not domesticated for 
the purposes of good and common sense. It is, instead, bought to life through the 
many ways in which the reader comes of have a sense of it: A thinking-feeling in 
both theory and practice. It might also be said that through repetition and difference 
Massumi conveys the lived abstractness of affect. Rather than repeating the signifier 
‘affect’, as though the reader should by now know what this ‘means’, the artistry or 
aesthetics, of Massumi’s writing provides both an embodied and an intellectual 
sense of affect. As Deleuze and Guattari note: 
 
“Whether through words, colours, sounds, or stone, art is the language of 
sensations [...] The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes 
them pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, 
tremble, cry. [...] The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold 
of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perception the affect 
from affections, the sensation from opinion”(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 
176).  
 
For Deleuze the event runs through series, “transforming them and altering sense 
along the series” (Williams, 2008a, 1). The implications of this are that event activity, 
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which pertains to the corporeality and incorporality of entities and bodies, changes 
structures: Structures are moving not fixed. Seriality is the key concept for 
understanding the scope and function of Deleuze’s philosophical movements. 
Williams notes that:  
 
“[f]or Deleuze series are not essentially series of objects or substances, 
they are variations independent of objects, and not limited by them. The 
variation comes first, not the varied object or connected substance” 
(2008a, 25).  
 
This quote encapsulates the importance of thinking with movement as an ongoing 
process, rather than recognising its products, what Williams notes above as “the 
varied object or connected substance” (ibid). The conceptual ‘twitch’ of series and 
events, their refusal to become limited within freeze frames which enable us to say ‘it 
is that; it is not that’ is perhaps why both series and event provide such a worthwhile 
challenge to traditional empirical research. This refusal, or what I will phrase as 
conceptual agitation, returns me to the case that I made in the opening chapter 
regarding obscurity and distinction, as opposed to clarity and distinction. If the 
subject-object we are concerned with is the variation and not the varied, the 
language and concepts we must draw on to make language “stammer, tremble and 
cry” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176) cannot be clear and distinct. It cannot, and 
should not, always be clear and distinct because inquiry would then only be able to 
engage with objects and substances, as opposed to incorporeal entities and affects 
which do not reside in clear and distinct spaces, bodies or words. Put diffrently, 
series and events are not themes or category’s under which we can subsume ‘actual 
things’: “The varied object or connected substance” (Williams, 2008a, 25). 
 
Yet what remains important to note in relation to series in the context of the thesis is 
the way in which they produce paradoxes. Series are bought together through a 
process of disjunctive synthesis – difference and determination – structure and 
creativity. Disjunctive synthesis is a process which never realises equilibrium and 
transforms by creating difference, moving through empty places and elements 
without a place which are mobile factors running along signifying and signified 
series. 
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In the context of the arguments developed by the thesis ‘wannarexia’ is an empty 
place and an element without a place. It creates difference within the medical series 
just as it produces difference within the series of choice and desire. Although the 
heterogeneous pro-ana community is often marked by its resistance to the medical 
discourse, particularly the idea that anorexia is a mental illness, what became 
apparent from my empirical work is the way in which this powerful discourse is 
paradoxically colluded with and resisted. As I worked with the productive paradox of 
lifestyle choice and mental illness, which emerged from data analysis, what became 
significant were notions of ‘proper’ or ‘actual anorexia’ and improper anorexia or 
‘wannarexia’.  
 
While anorexia was reified and produced as iconic, the bodies which lived, acted, 
and did the doing of a difficult relationship to feeding the body were occupants 
without a place and placeless occupants (Deleuze, 2004a). Put differently, the 
bodies that mattered, and were permitted to choose anorexia as a lifestyle, had to 
firstly adhere to the demands of the Diagnostic Statistical Manuals definition of 
proper anorexia. To legitimately annunciate volition the pro-ana’s had to already be 
faithfully citing the demands of the actual category (Butler, 1993). Otherwise, 
regardless of the incremental difficulty they experience through their lived and 
everyday relationship to feeding the body, they risked being marked as a 
wannarexic.  
 
I would now like to return to the signifying and the signified series. I noted that the 
signifying series was always in excess and the signified series was always lacking 
but that this disjunction was not working its way towards equilibrium. Considering 
‘series’ helps me to convey a little more the idea of a moving structure and adds 
depth to the way in which ‘structure’ and ‘activity’ are conceived within the event. In 
What is Philosophy Deleuze and Guattari (1994) note that the event can be 
understood as a selection in series – two sided in relation to determinacy and chaos 
– it is a chaomos (ibid). For Deleuze agency is not the only ‘thing’ which we should 
think of as having the capacity to change. Indeed, referring back to ideas that were 
unpicked a moment ago in relation to variation and varied, ‘thing’ is perhaps a 
clumsy word to use. Deleuze’s ontology is not one of things per se. His ontology, the 
entities he assert’s actually exist (DeLanda, 2002) are neither containers, nor 
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contained. He believes in the activity and process of entities, to draw on Barad 
(2007), their intra-actions. This is why proud verbs and infinities are so central to 
evenful inquiry. For Deleuze, structures, which we can consider not as 
interchangeable with, but akin to series, are also always already moving. 
 
“The two heterogenous series converge toward a paradoxical element, 
which is their “differentiator”. This is the principle of the emission of 
singularities. The element belongs to no series [signifier or signified]; or 
rather, it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate 
throughout them. It has therefore the property of always being displaced 
in relation to itself, of “being absent from its own place” its own identity, its 
own resemblance and its own equilibrium. It appears in one of the series 
as an excess, but only on the condition that it would appear at the same 
time in the other as lack. But if it is in excess in the one, it is only as an 
empty square; and if it is lacking in the other, it is only as a supernumerary 
pawn or an occupant without a compartment. It is both word and object at 
once: esoteric word and exoteric object “(Deleuze, 2004a, 60).  
 
Above, in the extended quote from Logic of Sense (2004a), there comes together 
many of the ideas which I have attempted to explicate in this section of the chapter. 
To continue with a focus on ‘wannarexia’ I would suggest that as a paradoxical 
element it is the “differentiator” of the series of lifestyle choice (word and thing) and 
mental illness (word and thing). It belongs neither to the signifying or signified series, 
“or rather, it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate throughout 
them” (ibid). ‘Wannarexia’ circulates between the series as forces seize it (Massumi, 
1992), both virtuality and actually. Wannarexia, as differentiator, produces singular 
difference: It is a turning point that makes the things we think we know, through 
standard language, crack.  
 
As a portmanteau word it draws attention to the gap between word and thing in both 
‘lifestyle choice’ and ‘mental illness’. This reconnects to ideas that were noted in the 
opening chapter of the thesis through Deleuze’s figure of a chariot passing through a 
mouth. The word (signifying series) and thing (signified series) “retain a difference 
that cannot be resolved by mapping the words onto what they truthfully correspond 
to, since the chariot does not pass through your mouth” (Williams, 2008a, 48). The 
disjunction between the two creates not only a portmanteau word, it also creates a 
space of indecision where sense and nonsense subsist.   
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As both exoteric object and esoteric word wannarexia moves along a twisted cylinder 
as something that is neither inside nor outside words or things but in relation to both. 
It is a nonsense word but that does not preclude it from producing sense.  
 
As is well reported, one of the writers that Deleuze himself is influenced by is 
Friedrich Nietzsche. In the editor’s introduction to Genealogy of Morals Walter 
Kaufmann notes that: 
 
 “Nietzsche had an almost pathological weakness for one particular kind 
of ambiguity […] he loved words and phrases that mean one thing out of 
context and almost the opposite in the context he gives them. All of them 
involve a double meaning, one exoteric, and one esoteric […T]he former 
is bound to lead astray hasty readers” (1989, 6). 
 
This “almost pathological weakness” in Neitzsche (ibid) is also, paradoxically, a 
fortifying strength. Particularly as these ideas are put to work by Deleuze in Logic of 
Sense (2004a) and elsewhere. The interval between the exoteric and the esoteric, 
as Kauffman notes, can lead hasty readers7 astray. The exoteric, in some sense, is 
more closely associated with common sense. As exoteric object our understanding is 
not limited to personal experience, we have an understanding of wannarexia as an 
imitation, a pejorative. It refers to a suspicious and inauthentic object. However, if we 
do not read or engage hastily we also consider the esoteric aspect. As an esoteric 
word its abstruseness makes it impossible to say what that ‘really means’ but those 
who take time to chew it over cease to question what it means, in a very broad 
sense, and begin to consider how it makes selective sense.  
 
It is easy to say that ‘wannarexia’ is a nonsense, but as we know, this is an implicit 
part of the sense event. Here we return to the idea of denotation and consumables 
and that variation precedes the varied.  As esoteric word ‘wannarexia’ conjures a 
materiality which folds into itself infinitives such as to be and to desire and as such 
instigates a variation in the series of what it is to be and to desire. As to be is bought 
into contact with to choose the change along the series produces resonance and 
                                            
7
 Nietzsche was particularly critical of fast or non-readers and posited that their problem, of “galloping 
consumption [was] a disease” (Neitzsche, 1989, 6). 
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reverberations (Deleuze, 2013) affecting other words and things, namely: ‘Anorexia’. 
Here, the point that I am trying to make is that ‘wannarexia’ is not the only word (and 
thing) that is esoteric and exoteric. ‘Anorexia’, ‘Ana’ and ‘ED’ are too. Names 
proliferate, as notes Deleuze when he speaks of Frege’s, or rather, Carroll’s 
paradox. In the fifth series of Logic of Sense (2004a) he gives the example of the 
Knight’s song and an exchange between Alice and the knight. Through this example, 
something’s name is not identical to what it is called – and neither refer to what it 
really is (Deleuze, 2004a, 36).  
 
As the thesis focusses mainly on the terms ‘anorexia’ and ‘pro-ana’ I would like to cut 
into the exchange between the Knight and Alice. Not to confuse the argument, but 
rather to suggest that how we refer to a difficult relationship to feeding the body is 
not the same as its name and not identical to what it is called – and neither of these 
refer to what it really is.  
 
Although I have replaced ‘song’ for ‘illness’ to draw out the way in which ‘Anorexia’ 
also goes by other names, what is quite important is that illness also goes by 
different names – the name is not identical to what it is called – and neither refer to 
what it really is. 
 
“The name of the [illness] is called “[Anorexia]” – “Oh, that’s the name of 
the [illness] is it?” Alice said, trying to feel interested. – “No, you don’t 
understand,” the knight said, looking a little vexed. “That’s what the name 
of the [illness] is called. The name really is ‘[Anorexia Nervosa]’.” – “Then I 
ought to have said that’s what the [illness] is called’?” Alice corrected 
herself. – “No, you oughtn’t : that’s quite another thing! The [illness] is 
called ‘[Ana]’: but that’s only what it’s called, you know!” – “Well, what is 
the [illness] then?” said Alice who was by time completely bewildered. – “I 
was coming to that, the Knight said. The [illness] really is [‘a life-style’!] 
….” (Deleuze, 2004a, 36). 
 
Returning to transitions differently - moving towards the affective labour of 
being a ‘proper anorexic’ 
 
In the first chapter the scene was set for the way in which the thesis would attempt to 
disrupt what is acknowledged as ‘anorexia’ in both medical and pro-ana discourses. 
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Attention was drawn to the way in which the focus on that which occurs, adherence 
to a particular body mass index and the demands of the DSM, was accidental to the 
event. Also, the point was made that attention paid to the state of affairs, the space 
of denotation, manifestation and signification, stripped of sense, served to spatialise 
and temporalise a difficult relationship to feeding the body within frames that 
simultaneously gave no account of sense, and failed to account for the ways in 
which the moving, sensuous body incrementally, through processes of becoming, 
develop what may, or may not, be referred to as Anorexia Proper. This recalls 
Massumi’s idea:  
 
“[w]hen positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement 
comes a problematic second. After all is signified and sited, there is the 
nagging problem of how to add movement back into the picture” 
(Massumi, 2002, 3 – 4). 
 
Earlier in this chapter it was noted that the significance of transitions and 
contradictions, in relation to an existing literature on ‘disordered eating’ could more 
usefully be engaged with in terms of paradoxes. It is now relevant to add further to 
the notion of transition through ideas which are brought together in Massumi’s 
Semblance and Event (2011). Here particular attention will be paid to the way in 
which he refigures transition in relation to the subject and object. Before the thesis 
moves on to develop what Massumi offers transitional thinking it is necessary to 
reiterate that sense is not cognitive, it is of the body and of language. It is in 
nowhere, it is of here, there and everywhere: Circulating between bodies and social 
spaces, humans and non-humans. It is both vulnerable in the sense that it is in 
relation to what came before and what is about to become, but also, due to its dual 
structure, impassable and impenetrable, refusing to be pinned down to final 
definitions. Sense, for Deleuze is both-and, “it changes and does not [..] it is pure 
and yet it is in contact with actual things,[..] sense is everywhere yet also different 
from actual things” (Williams, 2008a, 4). 
 
In The Ether and Your Anger: Towards a Speculative Pragmatism Massumi 
develops the implications of radical empiricism which suggests that “change itself is 
immediately experienced” (Massumi, 2011, 4). That which is experienced is real, and 
contrariwise, that which is real will, in some way, be experienced. The thesis makes 
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use of these ideas as they allow for a meaningful way in which to engage with the 
subject and object in a manner which does not sever potential from actual through 
limiting operations of division. Massumi suggests that ‘classically’ objects are that 
which is in the world; while perceptions, feelings and sensations are in the subject. 
“What James is saying, by contrast, is that both are in the transition. Things and their 
experience are together in transition [...] “participation precedes cognition” (2011, 30-
32). In other words, before we decide to decide or choose to choose we are always 
already implicated in the general activity of the world: its changes and transitions. 
Movements and sensations which refuse ocular capture, while making themselves 
known, leave a residue of activity. That which is of the body is implicated in advance 
of the ‘autonomous agent’ or subject’s permission. In other words, these quasi 
causal effects might be thought of as in relation to what Clough describes as a 
“substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of 
consciousness ”(2007,2) and not limited to the human (Barad, 2007b). 
 
Both Clough (2007) and Blackman and Venn (2010) note that the ‘Affective Turn’, is 
an epistemological sea change which has been influenced by disciplines ranging 
from mathematics and neuroscience to physics and biology. While the thesis has 
already attempted to set in motion the idea of acquitting oneself of the guilt of being 
an improper anorexic or ‘wannarexic’, it seems timely to develop this a little further 
through the idea of ‘affective labour’ (Blackman and Venn, 2010).  
 
Both lifestyle choice and mental illness are inflected by neo-liberalism: excess, gain, 
deficit, production. Consumer choice and the healthy worker are capitalism’s pulse. 
However within the context of pro-anorexia further paradoxes are produced- getting 
bigger and getting smaller at the same time. (Deleuze, 2004a). To choose to be 
anorexic is both towards and conforming to capitalist priorities of choice and lifestyle, 
the purchase of the desired body through economic and affective flows, while it is 
also moving away from it in the choice to refuse the plentiful, resource-full body of 
the healthy productive citizen who can be put to work (Beradi, 2009, Rose, 1995). As 
such, the infinitive to choose produces a different sense depending on the other 
infinitives it is bought together with. Its denotation remains while its sense is changed 
through the conditions which produce its activity. Once again this brings to bear the 
point that what is at stake is not what a particular body represents, but rather, what a 
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body can do. As Blackman and Venn (2010) note, engaging with affect is a means to 
avoid reification and reducing matter to that which is lumpen and unthinking. As set 
out in the first chapter, and earlier in this, the process whereby ‘anorexia’ is reified is 
related to its iconic and desirable status. Reified and frozen does little to evoke the 
lived and everyday experience of a difficult relationship to feeding the body.  
 
In this final sub-section of the chapter writers who have been affected by theories of 
new materialism and post-humanism will be engaged with. As with the previous 
section, these ideas have been engaged with in this chapter for the way in which 
they tacitly, rather than explicitly, speak of ‘anorexia’. The texts engaged with raise 
new questions – is new materialism starting to consider what those with a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body sensed all along - that nature is a trickster, that 
matter self-organises and kicks back against human intentions? What are the 
implications of acknowledging the unpredictability of the body-organism in the 
context of difficult relationships to feeding the body? What new language and 
practices, material-discursive intra-actions (Barad, 2007) might be necessary to 
avoid absorbing these insights into the paranoid machine? (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994). 
 
As set out in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, it is perhaps this literature 
which has provoked the most unusual and enriching encounters for thought. Within 
this section of the chapter the possibilities of non-human actants intra-acting (Barad, 
2007) with vibrant matter will help the thesis to move further still away from common 
sense notions of the autonomous subject of enlightenment that chooses, or not as 
the case may be, to consume. Instead, the strange entanglements of matter will be 
explored to re consider what a body can do at the threshold of Deleuze’s paradox to 
eat/ to speak.  
 
Post-human and New Empiricisms  
 
“Protestations in favour of ‘human warmth’ betray an inability to feel an 
ardour of a different kind. Stirrings that are not just pre-personal, but 
impersonal, bodily but inhuman, outside intentionality, open irrevocably to 
chance” (Massumi, 1992, 47). 
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“To become a new body, an old body needs a new milieu through which 
to move” (Massumi, 1992, 98). 
 
It is the contention of the thesis that post-humanism is valuable to social inquiry, 
particularly in terms of the way in which it contests human privilege to engender a 
more thoroughgoing engagement with both matter and ethics. After all, as Jane 
Bennett notes “we are also non-human and [..] things, too, are vital players in the 
world” (2010, 4). 
The first quote given at the start of this sub-section could be said to be a point of 
singularity, or a turning point for the thesis in movement. This idea of “an ardour of a 
different kind” (Massumi, 1992, 47) provoked the inquiry towards affects which were 
expansive beyond the state of affairs in which empirical materials were gathered. It 
enabled the production of a different sort of engagement with ideas, people and 
places, and this can be seen being put to work within chapter five.  
Within the second quote there is an important reconnection to the way in which the 
thesis engages with new materialism and post-humanism and recalls an earlier 
quote from Deleuze: “a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only 
when new functions in new fields discharge it. This is also why it is never very 
interesting to criticise a concept” (Deleuze, quoted in Durie, 2006, 169). It is hoped 
that by engaging with these theories which provoke us to encounter the real 
abstractness of matter, that a new milieu will be created. Within and throughout this 
new milieu new functions will emerge which make staid ideas about bodies and what 
they can do, inadequate in the context of consuming and producing relationships.  
 
For those who are not familiar with theories of post-humanism, or are suspicious that 
the term is inter-changeable with an anti-humanism, the words below offer an ethical 
rationale for a move towards the post-human. Here the notion of becoming is 
expanded with regard to community. Ethics are not simply ‘at the heart’ but in its very 
cellular and multiple assemblages. 
 
“[T]o be post-human does not mean to be indifferent to the humans, or to 
be de-humanised. On the contrary, it rather implies a new way of 
combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of 
community, which includes one’s territorial or environmental 
interconnections (Braidotti, 2013, 190).  
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In her article on ‘Nature’s Queer Performativity’ Karen Barad considers the 
“materializing practices of differentiating, where one cannot take for granted that all 
the actors, actions, and effects are human” (2011, 124). This position on the human 
and non-human accords a particular ontological framing of course, the realism of 
Barad and Braidotti or ‘higher empiricism’ advocated by Deleuze. 
 
“To be more precise, the point is not merely to include nonhumans as well 
as humans as actors or agents of change but rather to find ways to think 
about the nature of causality, origin, relationality, and change without 
taking these distinctions to be foundational or holding them in place. What 
is needed then is a way of thinking about the nature of differentiating that 
is not derivative of some fixed notion of identity or even a fixed spacing. 
Indeed, what is the nature of difference if differentiating doesn’t happen in 
space and time but in the making of spacetimemattering? (Barad, 2011, 
124 emphasis added). 
 
The points which Barad makes above, in regard to differentiating are in keeping with 
some of the points I drew out from Logic of Sense (2004a) during my discussion of 
series and event, namely the way in which “series converge toward a paradoxical 
element, which is their “differentiator” (2004a, 60). Here, what is particularly 
important is the way in which she draws out the role of non-human entities as agents 
of change. Agents not in isolation: but in relation to other human and non-human 
entities. The point that Barad is making is that all matter, not just human bodies, are 
entities which have been produced rather than discovered. Further to this, the 
aforementioned production of difference is not made by space and time as 
themselves always already formed. Difference is not simply a historical product, it is 
a process which implicates, or enfolds ethics, ontology, epistemology space and 
time. She continues:  
 
“I have argued that what we commonly take to be individual entities are 
not separate determinately bounded and propertied objects, but rather are 
(entangled “parts of”) phenomena (materialdiscursive intra-actions) that 
extend across (what we commonly take to be separate places and 
moments in) space and time (where the notions of “material” and 
“discursive” and the relationship between them are unmoored from their 
(anti)humanist foundations and reworked) (Barad, 2011, 125) 
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Here Barad articulates succinctly points that were grasped at in the previous chapter. 
Rather than looking at individual human bodies being ill, being healthy, being 
agentic, or being determined, we see that they are instead “(entangled ‘parts of’) 
what our inquiries engage with. As with the affect of Deleuze’s strange paradoxical 
relation to eat/to speak, Barad does not separate out bodies and languages. The 
material and the discursive become materialdiscursive intra-actions; the significance 
of which is that in the intra-action, as opposed to the interaction, both are changed 
and produced differently.  
 
In her philosophical and political project, Jane Bennett inquires into causality and 
efficacy to produce a theory of “distributive agency” (2010, 31). As previously noted, 
although the thesis might be said to work primarily with Deleuze’s mathematically 
informed philosophical notion of dual causality, it is worthwhile within this sub-section 
to also draw on Barad and Bennett’s thoughts on cause and effect. In addition, by 
drawing on these two contemporary thinkers I will be able to engage a little further 
with ethics. This will both inform a more robust operationalising of causality and also 
situate the thesis within a trans-disciplinary framework. Put differently, the thesis will 
be drawing on philosophical notions of causality and agency which have the affective 
conceptual trace (see Massumi, 2002, 20 -21) of mathematics, physics and political 
theory. This of course also has significant implications for the way in which ontology 
and epistemology are then figured, and refigured. Bennett asks:  
 
"What method could possibly be appropriate for the task of speaking a 
word for vibrant matter? How to describe without thereby erasing the 
independence of things? How to acknowledge the obscure but ubiquitous 
intensity of impersonal affect? [...] This entails, in my case, a willingness 
to theorise events [..] as encounters between ontologically diverse 
actants, some human, some not, although all thoroughly material" 
(Bennett, 2010, xiii). 
 
In Vibrant Matter Bennett attempts to paint a positive ontology which stretches 
received concepts of agency, action and freedom sometimes to breaking point. She 
disputes the onto-theological binaries of life/matter, human/animal, 
will/determination, and organic/inorganic by using arguments and other theoretical 
means to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-affective openness to material vitality. 
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In sum she sketches a style of political-aesthetic analysis that can better account for 
the contributions of nonhuman actants.  
 
In the text’s preface she uses the notion of enchantment as an impersonal power 
which she gives as:  
 
"an affect intrinsic to forms that cannot be imagined (even ideally) by 
persons. [..T]he figure of enchantment points in two directions: the first 
towards humans who feel enchanted and whose agentic capacities 
maybe thereby be strengthened, and the second toward the agency of the 
things that produce (helpful, harmful) effects in human and other bodies" 
(xii).  
 
Here it is relevant to make a connection, not a conflation, between Bennett’s dual 
notion of enchantment and the quasi cause of the Deleuzian dual cause. Here 
enchantment might be thought of as an intensity or a singularity, a turning point 
which is towards no particular ends.  
 
Further to this connection I would like to take a momentary detour from ‘good 
materialists’ to a self-confessed ‘bad materialist’, (2004) Judith Butler. It could be 
suggested that the concept of enchantment, as used by Bennett through her reading 
of Derrida, was so enchanting and evocative in the context of the thesis because of 
ideas which Butler teased me with in The Psychic life of Power (1997). Two aspects 
of my reading of this text are relevant at this juncture. Firstly, although these are not 
Butler’s terms, there was the idea that something which is both corporeal, and 
incorporeal, such as power, can have a life – the possibility that it is an entity. And 
secondly, and most importantly at this point, I was struck by the way in which an 
entity can compel, or in Butler’s Althusserian term, interpellate a subject. Through 
this notion of ‘hailing’ I felt my agentic capacity to inquire strengthened.  
 
However, having plugged (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012) into my empirical materials 
the Butlerian concept of interpellation it did not seem to offer any way to think about 
the capacity of matter to turn, or to feel itself becoming compelled. Further still, there 
was no way to think about the ways in which the organs of the body could be hailed, 
an idea I briefly evoke in the fourth chapter as gastro-pellation. In summary, the 
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concept of interpellation, as explicated in The Psychic Life of Power was too 
cognised and premised on an original lack within the subject to provide a different 
way of thinking about difference and movement. By contrast, Bennett’s notion of 
enchantment, taken further in following chapters, provided the necessary wonder 
required to “allow some temporary point of indecision” (MacLure, 2013a, 181). It 
allowed me to fumble around and experiment with mixtures of ideas, “on the 
threshold of knowing” (ibid). In summary, Bennett’s enchantment (2010), as opposed 
to Butler’s interpellation (1997), enabled me to consider fleshly oscillations as an 
implicit part of ontological shifts.  
 
Bennett notes that the ethical turn moved political theorists away from canonical 
notions of will formation towards "a complex set of relays between moral contents, 
aesthetic-affective styles, and public moods" (xiii). For Bennett, within this distributive 
theory, agency “becomes distributed across an ontologically heterogenous field, 
rather than being the capacity localised in a human body or in a collective produced 
(only) by human efforts” (2010, 23). As such there is “not so much a doer (an agent) 
behind the deed [..] as a doing and an effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage” 
(ibid, 28). Bennett’s version of agency does not deny human intentionality, but it 
does trouble the autonomy of the Will and the possibility of what she terms “definitive 
outcomes” (2010, 32). For instance, speaking of Nietzsche’s critique of a uniform 
recipe for vitality, Bennett notes that he surmises that “[t]he effectivity of a foodstuff 
varies from body to body [and] the ‘same’ food in the ‘same’ body will vary over time 
as actants enter and leave the scene” (2010, 44). 
 
One of the central problems the thesis engages with is which bodies matter in good 
and common sense. Who and how bodies are produced as ‘occupants without a 
place’. (Deleuze, 2004a). As such the writing of Karen Barad, on matter, ethics, 
knowing and being, in Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007) has been a significant 
text for the thesis in development. She notes that  
 
“matter and meaning cannot be dissociated, not by chemical processing, 
or centrifuge, or nuclear blast. Mattering is simultaneously a matter of 
substance and significance (2007, 3).  
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Barad operationalises a diffractive methodology, which attends to patterns of 
difference and is “respectful of the entanglement of ideas and other materials in 
ways that reflective methodologies are not” (2007, 30). In practice, a diffractive 
method does not fix at the outset of the study, ‘what or who’ is the subject and ‘what 
or who’ is the object. It also draws attention to the way in which lines drawn between 
object and apparatus are soluble, or rather, constituted differently depending on the 
intra-action. Barad’s agential-realist account proposes that ethics, epistemology and 
ontology are inseparable. It is her contention that we are always already part of what 
we are inquiring into, and in this sense, there can be no absolute or objective 
position.  
 
“Do I dare disturb the universe?” is not a meaningful question, let alone a 
starting point for ethical considerations. Disturbance is not the issue, and 
‘dare’ is a perverse provocation. There is no such exterior position where 
the contemplation of this possibility makes any sense. We are of the 
universe – there is no inside, no outside. There is only intra-acting from 
within and as part of the world and its becoming” (Barad, 2007, 396). 
 
Barad considers ethics as the grounding source of human experience not vice versa. 
She notes:  
 
“the ethical subject is not the disembodied rational subject of traditional 
ethics but rather an embodied sensibility, which responds to its proximal 
relationship to the other through a mode of wonderment that is antecedent 
[or a pre cursor] to consciousness”. (2007, 391). 
 
What I take from this is that ethics are not something an individual ‘has’, in the sense 
that they have willed themselves to be ethical, as point 3.3 of the university’s ethical 
guidelines suppose: 
 
“The practice of ethics is about conducting one’s business in a disciplined 
manner within legal and other regulated constraints and with minimal 
impact on and detriment to others”. (MMU, Ethical Framework 3.3 
emphasis added)  
 
Ethics are more than can be cognitively thought by rational, autonomous individuals 
and ticked off on well thought out documents. What this implies in practice is that for 
all the effort and foresight in the world, all the thinking, reflecting and scenario 
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planning, the trying times of a research project when ethics materialise and matter, 
what is called for is in excess of what can be found in standard course textbooks or 
journal articles under the explicit heading of ‘ethics’. As an embodied sensibility we 
are always already doing ethics. Scrambling the deep physical yolk and the logical 
shell (Deleuze, 2004a, 162) into an unholy mixture (See Lecercle, quoted in 
MacLure, 2013b).  
 
An agential realist ontology disrupts representationalism and calls for a “new starting 
place”, which does not take for granted individually formed and functioning entities, 
or apparatuses. This ontology does away with the “Cartesian belief in the inherent 
distinction between subject and object, and knower and known” (Barad, 2007, 138). 
Here, with the notion of apparatus, there is a possible connection to be made to an 
idea introduced briefly within the previous chapter. Through Barad’s post-human 
reading of the physicist philosopher Bohr there is a way in which we can reconsider 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an ‘apparatus of extensity’. 
 
“[A]pparatuses are the material conditions of possibility and impossibility 
of mattering; they enact what matters and what is excluded from 
mattering. Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce determinate 
boundaries and properties of ‘entities’ within phenomena, where 
‘phenomena’ are the ontologically inseparability of agentially intra-acting 
components” (2007, 148, emphasis added). 
 
Here what is in the process of becoming interesting, or what becomes to ‘glow’ 
(MacLure, 2013a), is the idea and material practice, of “cuts that produce 
determinate boundaries and properties” (Barad, 2007, 148): How this can be noted 
as obfuscating the “ontological[..] inseparability of agentially intra-acting 
components” (ibid). The idea noted above and in the previous chapter of the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual  as an apparatus of extensity can be noted as cutting 
into intensity; separating out the multitude of human and nonhuman agents which 
intra-act in the phenomenal instance of relationships to feeding the body.  
 
In summary, within this chapter I have promiscuously (Childers, et al, 2013), yet 
critically, engaged with what I have termed an explicit and an implicit literature. In the 
case of the former I have considered scholarship emerging from a variety of 
disciplines including psychiatry, psychology, and social and cultural studies. In the 
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case of the latter, the implicit literature, I have put to work texts from new, or feminist 
materialism, affect theory and post-humanism. It is my feeling, as this Literature 
review of sorts comes to a close, that the interdisciplinary scholarship of this implicit 
literature enables a necessary force (Massumi, 1992). The force to push anorexia off 
its pedestal without supposing that the bodies which its dogmatic image was built 
from either want, or need, rescuing. 
 
In the next chapter there will be a renewed focus on methodological issues. 
Alongside the ‘doing’ of the research, the spaces, people, groups and Ideas the 
project came into contact with, there will also time spent engaging with the theory as 
method. For this there will be a continuation of some of the ideas which have just 
been engaged with in the final subsection of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY - 
MOVEMENT, MULTIPLICITY, SENSE 
AND THINKING FEELINGS  
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter two began to make the case as to why it became necessary to draw on 
theories of the post-human, new materialism and Deleuze to engage with difficult 
relationships to feeding the body. Crudely articulated, this was noted as helping the 
thesis to disrupt human intentionality whilst also providing a means to engage with 
structure as moving, as being affected by, and affecting, human and non-human 
matter. Within this chapter there will be an engagement with the procedural issues of 
field work and the collection of empirical materials, but there will also be a 
continuation of the theoretical work which emerged in the earlier chapters. In this 
sense there will be an account of what occurred in the state of affairs, those activities 
which can be signified and made manifest – ie ‘the field’. However, there will also be 
recourse to theory as method to engage with the inside of what occurs – the 
eventfulness of empirical research as it comes into contact with transcendental 
philosophy. 
 
Although more detail will be provided later in the chapter, it is worth noting that the 
‘neatness’ of the ideas which entered the field, their clarity and distinctness, including 
what ‘anorexia’ was, and who ‘anorexics’ were, became distinct and obscure through 
both abstract theories of materiality and the materiality of the ‘field’. Although social 
science and cultural studies training encouraged a troubling of axiomatic notions of 
‘common sense’, the understanding of ‘common sense’ proceeded with from said 
training was that it was counter to scientific rigour, rather than informed and affected 
by it. (Deleuze, 2004b; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Massumi, 2011). As such, it took 
a good deal of time for this inquiry to become freer of dogmatic presuppositions and 
to cease “bolstering” what science and psychiatry always thought it knew. Put 
differently, it took a great deal of emotional and intellectual labour to write with an 
ardour of a different kind (Massumi, 1993, 47) and to step outside of the shadow of 
Anorexia as a dogmatic image of thought. 
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“The practical point of transcendental philosophy is to unearth and rectify 
remnants of metaphysical pre-suppositions and beginnings of fixed 
images and restrictive laws and concepts of science and its methods […] 
seeking to be free of dogmatic pre-suppositions (including the bolstering 
of common sense and opinion by the sciences” (Williams, 2008, 110). 
 
Fieldwork and Data Collection - Connecting the Sites  
 
In the case of social research, particularly that which involves young people, the 
“circumstances which lead us to be telling this story about this object at this time and 
in this way” (Hine, 2000; 57) are increasingly informed by on-line activities, 
processes, communications and communities. As Hine notes, in relation to mobile 
and connective ethnographic work, although we may start from one place, perhaps 
somewhere off-line, like a youth work project or an after school club, as we engage 
sensitively with participants and their daily lives, on-line spaces, activities, practices 
and communities can become meaningful in the context of our inquiries. Hine notes 
that mobile or connective ethnographies respond to the ‘ethnographic crisis by 
“embracing ethnography as a textual practice and as a lived craft, [while] 
destabilis[ing] the ethnographic reliance on sustained presence in a found field site” 
(2000, 43). This call to mobility and critical stance towards the merits of sustained 
habitation in one particular place chimes with Markham’s (2008) observation, that 
contemporary ethnographic work is less about location, and more about what she 
conceptualises as locomotion. Put differently, mobile methods are particularly 
concerned with inquiry’s movements back and forth between people, places, ideas 
and organisations, as opposed to lengthy durations in a particular place.  
 
As such, and following the examples of Markham (1998, 2008) and Hine (2000) the 
thesis does not conceive of life on-line as outside the scope of ‘proper’ ethnographic 
interrogation, or disruptive to the boundaries of ‘the field’. Indeed, engaging with it 
and blending (Kozinet, 2010) it into field work, data collection, field notes, the 
research diary and emergent questions can produce new ways of making the familiar 
strange and the strange familiar (Geertz 1993).  
 
In the following sections of this chapter I will move forwards, backwards and to the 
side to introduce spaces, people and themes which became meaningful as the 
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doctoral project opened up. At the beginning of the research I was involved in a fairly 
wide range of on and off-line settings. Ultimately, only two of these emerged as key 
sites for the research. Although not all of the spaces and people included below will 
be engaged with substantially in the remainder of the thesis, all were significant in 
the generation of ‘the problem’ which the thesis engages with. Methodologically the 
list below – which will be discussed further later in the chapter - goes some way to 
note some of the most significant human and non-human actants which comprised 
the arrangement, or assemblage, that was the project in its becoming.  
 
 ‘Different Lines’, a youth work project commissioned by the Local Authority 
to carry out an Eating Disorder Prevention Project over 12 months. Here my 
role was as participant observer. Work was carried out with fifty eight young 
people in eight schools and youth projects. Here there was no 
acknowledgement of pro-anorexia sites in meetings or in youth work practice. 
‘Eating disorders’ were conceived as mental illnesses with social causes (thin 
ideal, patriarchy, and the media). As work with Young People began any 
engagement with eating and food diminished in favour of ‘self-esteem and 
body image’.  
 ‘The Waves’, an intergenerational feminist project which had links to Different 
Lines. This organisation circulated my doctoral projects invitation of 
participation to members of its network which included youth workers, young 
people and academics. I had no formal role within this project but they were 
generous enough to disseminate information about my research. 
 The b-eat Ambassador Network, co-ordinated by one of the Different Lines 
stakeholder organisations, b-eat, previously known as the National Eating 
Disorder Association. This network comprised young women advocating 
‘recovery’ who were given the politically loaded mantle of ‘Ambassador’ by b-
eat. My involvement with this setting was limited to on-line discussions with 
four Ambassadors.  
 Pro-ana sites, initially eight were observed, at the same time as being a 
participant observer at Different Lines. After meeting ‘Joanne’ her on-line 
community, or site, was also observed. The pro-ana sites and the interviews 
with Joanne eventually come to form the main empirical materials for the 
research, and comprise the major focus of chapters four and five respectively.  
 Oldfield House, an out-patient setting where clinicians worked therapeutically 
with the 18+ age group. Initially the organisation is contacted as stakeholders 
in the Different Lines project. Engagement with this site, alongside utterances 
from Joanne, Ella, and the b-eat Ambassadors lead to a critique of ‘recovery’ 
and the political possibilities of Deleuze’s notion of counter-actualisation. 
 Youtube, individually uploaded ‘pro-ana stories’. A resource used by Joanne 
and also where Ella is introduced to the project for the first time. Even prior to 
observing pro-ana sites I observe and analyse material on youtube. 
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 Facebook; here b-eat ambassadors are able to add me as ‘friends’, as well 
as conversing with me by email. Using the facebook name Ella gives on 
youtube information is sent regarding the aims of the project, which she 
responds to positively. Facebook is also significant later on the project in 
terms of community and communication, when the pro-ana site Joanne uses, 
and I observe, closes down. 
 
Design and Conduct of the Research:  
 
Central to the methodology, and related to mobility, movement and paradoxical 
connection, is a critique of ‘good’ and ‘common’ sense which Deleuze explicates in 
Logic of Sense (2004a). This critical engagement is responsive to the nuances of 
everyday life, and the empirical materials gathered throughout the course of the 
project. At the outset of the project there was a desire to present a different, 
unfamiliar, account of ‘anorexia’. A desire to find a way of acknowledging the 
mundane and every day management of a difficult relationship to feeding the body 
which conceived of emaciation, or what can be seen in vision, as the least, rather 
than the most, important point of engagement. Implicated in this, of course, is the 
‘shock’ impact of images used on pro-ana sites As Fereday notes  
 
“A major methodological and practical problem confronting any theorist 
working on eating disorders, and for body studies more generally, is that 
of how to avoid reproducing the spectacular regime of looking. Any 
theorist who has ever shown slides of pro-ana websites, for example, will 
have experienced the sharp intake of breath from the audience and will 
know the difficulty of overcoming the deeply ingrained cultural power of 
such images to inspire shock; this shock reaction is only enhanced by the 
imagery of pro-ana, which often sets out to beat the mainstream media at 
its own game by producing the most intense and confrontational images 
possible. Critique can feel powerless in the face of this apparently ‘natural’ 
reaction; there can be an uncanny sense that, for some spectators at 
least, the visual ‘evidence’ of starvation renders inaudible the voices of 
both theorist and subject (who might be precisely being critical of the very 
narratives of shock and concern that are being reproduced through the 
screening of the image) (Ferreday, 2013, 148. Emphasis added). 
 
Equally, alongside the issues of representation, articulated so well by Ferreday, was 
my aim not to spatio-temporalise ‘anorexia’ as only in the minds of individuals; either 
as the ‘cause’, or as the effect of external causes. Instead, and as noted previously, 
the intention was to engage with matter and the materiality of bodies and consider 
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causality through the dual cause of the event. What the dual, rather than mono 
cause allows is a means to disrupt the volunteerism of lifestyle choice, and the 
determinism of mental illness: While also engaging with that which is of the body; 
virtual or incorporeal (Massumi, 2002). As noted in the previous chapter, ideas 
concerning causality developed by new materialist thinkers Karen Barad and Jayne 
Bennett were also drawn on. 
 
Starting with two sites – but always already in the middle of things.  
 
Prevention Project - Different Lines  
 
Although the project and its methodology, following Deleuze, starts in the middle of 
things, seeking to “be free[r] of dogmatic pre-suppositions (including the bolstering of 
common sense and opinion by the sciences” (Williams, 2008, 110), the very practical 
matter of beginning to gather empirical materials began from two spaces initially. Off-
line I became involved as a participant observer in an eating disorder prevention 
project at ‘Different Lines’, while on-line I began to explore eight pro-anorexia sites 
for themes and ideas which would help me to refine the parameters of my 
engagement with the research subject-object and to ‘border the field’ (Markham, 
2008). As noted above, the remainder of the thesis seldom makes substantive 
reference to the prevention project. However as I outline below, the experience of 
engaging with this project was generative in surfacing many of the productive 
problems and conceptual dilemmas that the thesis addresses.  
 
The prevention project was commissioned to a youth work organisation based in the 
north of England and was in receipt of twelve months local authority funding. This 
amounted to just under £50,000. The scope of the project was to initially map Tier 18 
provision available in the locale, in a bid to reduce the number of children and young 
people who were being diagnosed and hospitalised at Tier 4 of the Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAHMS). This commission also involved 
developing and delivering a programme of activities focussed on raising self- esteem 
(McGee & Williams, 2000) and which challenged images of ‘the thin ideal’ in the 
                                            
8
 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services are structured in a four-tiered model, although the tiers 
are not neatly differentiated. Tier 1 is the primary care that is provided by professionals who are not 
mental health specialists, for instance school nurses, teachers and social workers (Spratt, Philip and 
Shucksmith et al 2010). 
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media (Chaote, 2005). As a participant observer I was able to attend team and 
project planning meetings and visit schools and youth projects with the lead youth 
worker. This enabled me to see how prevention was put into practice. 
 
As already noted, pro-ana sites have been emerging since the early 2000’s if not 
prior to this, and have increased during recent years by a sizable amount. As noted, 
in a study of 13 – 17 year old school children, 12.6% of girls and 5.9% of boys 
claimed to have visited such sites (Custers and Van den Bulck 2009). However, 
within the prevention project meetings and youth work practice ‘pro-anorexia’ was 
never engaged with. Neither websites, nor the advocacy of anorexia as a ‘lifestyle 
choice’, which the ‘pro’ implies, were either acknowledged or discussed. Given that 
the project engaged with a similar age range to the study mentioned above, 13 – 19 
year olds, this absence of on-line life as an aspect of ‘real life’ was at least in part 
due to the way the project conceived of its research problem. In contrast to a 
Deleuzian problem, which Williams suggests is a “series of tensions demanding 
transformations but always resisting resolution” (Williams, 2008a, 139). ‘Anorexia’ 
was considered as a mental illness, but one which young people could be resilient to 
if they had high levels of self- esteem. This way of engaging did not acknowledge 
complex and nuanced aspects of conformity and resistance within ‘disordered eating’ 
(Day, 2010), or what the thesis conceptualises as a difficult relationships to feeding 
the body. It should also be noted, in reference to the aforementioned individualised 
resilience, that the ascetic ‘self -controlled’ practices of ‘anorexia’ may themselves be 
a source of resilience and ‘self-esteem’ for some young people, particularly within 
the context of change and ‘transition’ (Gordon, 2001; Katzman & Lee, 1997; b-eat 
Transitions project, 2012 – 2015).  
 
Although ‘Different Lines’ adhered to, and was respectful of medical and psychiatric 
notions of anorexia, it also acknowledged socio-cultural ‘causes’ such as ‘the thin 
ideal’. This said however, social life was problematically conceived of as off-line ‘real 
life’. This notion of what is real and not real (Markham 1998) foreclosed the 
possibility of fully engaging with the socio-historical context in which ‘anorexia’ and 
its becomings now emerge. As such it could be argued that the project thus failed to 
fully put into practice its own ‘preventative’ logic.  
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Another significant observation made whilst at this setting was the way in which 
‘eating disorder’ was conflated with ‘image disorder’. Effectively, what this meant in 
practice was that the already narrow binds of the DSM were reduced further still to 
aspects of criterion C – “disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape 
is experienced, undue influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation” (APA, 
2000). The thesis suggests that criterion C is the point at which the proper name, 
‘Anorexia Nervosa’, gets a bad name. (Giles, 2006). Here, by reducing a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body to an ‘image disorder’ a huge amount of affective 
labour is invested in acquitting ‘Proper Anorexia’, the reified icon, of the charge of 
narcissism. Put differently, conceiving of ‘anorexia’ as ‘an image disorder’ gives it as 
category (good sense), and those who are ascribed to it (common sense) a ‘bad 
name’. It is here that anorexia is produced as heavier and lighter at the same time. 
To lighten a difficult relationship to feeding the body to no more than an example of 
feminine narcissism begins a process within other series. Here, to convey the 
seriousness, indeed the weight, of having a difficult relationship to feeding the body 
the heaviest discourses common sense can muster are drawn on. As Giles notes, 
“for a community that actively resists social norms medical diagnosis operates as a 
qualification […] a mark of authenticity” (2006, 475).  
 
The prevention project comprised three phases. Although I was involved in all three I 
took a leading role only during phase 1 (May 2010 – September 2010) where desk 
based research and stakeholder consultation took place. Here I mapped resources 
in the locale; produced a basic literature review and carried out semi-structured 
interviews with stakeholders. These included conversations with Oldfield House, an 
adult outpatient eating disorder service, The Waves, an intergenerational feminist 
archiving project, b-eat, the national eating disorder association and eight school 
schools and youth projects. From this mapping and consultation exercise relevant 
and clearly composed information was conveyed to the schools and youth projects 
where delivery would take place. Information was disseminated through telephone 
conversations, information packs, and in the case of one school, a face to face visit. 
The written information which was provided to external partners was designed to be 
fit for practitioner purposes, in other words, function as a tool by which they could 
inform young people as potential participants. These young people would then be 
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asked to give written consent via their parents if they wished to be involved with the 
‘Different Lines’ project.  
 
As phase two commenced (October 2010 – May 2011) an experienced Youth 
Worker, Caroline, was appointed to deliver activities. During this period my role 
became to ‘support’ Caroline, even though I had no prior youth work experience. I 
was also responsible for collecting evaluation data through Strength and Difficulty 
Questionnaires (SDQ forms). This data was then used by Different Lines to 
communicate to the funders, as part of an interim report, the progress which had 
been made. During the second phase, where work had begun with schools and 
youth projects both ethical and pedagogical issues became apparent which were 
beyond the control of either the prevention project, or myself as a participant 
observer. During the third phase (May 2011 – June 2011) my role was to work with 
the Assistant Director of Different Lines to produce a final report for the 
commissioning body, focussing on the impact of the work delivered.  
 
Early in the mapping phase two girls’ schools had been identified by multiple 
stakeholders as having issues with both ‘eating disorder’ and self-harm, these 
schools were Holloway Road and St Catherine. As such, along with other mixed and 
single sex schools, these schools were targeted by the project in line with its 
preventative aims. However, although the ethical imperative to opt in or opt out was 
given by Different Lines to the staff in all of the formal and informal educational 
settings who were approached to take part in the project, the teachers themselves 
did not always carry out this necessary and ethical task with the young people who 
they worked with.  
 
At Holloway Road, one of the single sex schools named by stakeholders, including a 
Consultant Psychiatrist acting as Head of the TaHMS Service (Targeted Mental 
Health in Schools Service), and the Head Psychologist at the CAMHS service (Child 
and Adolescent Mental Health Service), the group assembled were students from 
years 8 to 11 who had been removed from formal classes for conduct issues. At this 
setting ‘Different Lines’ delivered an hour long session each week for five weeks, 
each week the composition of the group varied, with only two of the original nine 
attendees being present each week. Others either did not turn up or were removed 
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part way through, without warning, by other members of school staff. This 
composition of students was mirrored at a mixed sex school, Elmwood Community. 
Here the large group who were assembled were hostile towards Different Lines 
practitioners, not least of all because they felt that their pedagogue had not 
explained fully the outline of the project or why they had been asked to become 
involved. 
 
St Catherine was the only school to request a face to face meeting with Different 
Lines and the only school approached who did not wish to participate. As a school 
with a reputation for success at both GCSE and A Level, the head of PSHE did not 
feel that the project could be delivered in school hours as young people could not be 
taken out of formal classes for between four and six weeks. As a school with 
numerous CV enhancing after school activities, it was also decided that it was not 
possible for the project to run after formal classes ended either. Young people 
themselves were not given the opportunity to opt in or out. They had no involvement 
in the process of choosing.  As a significant setting, due to the number of times the 
school had been noted during mapping, my field notes detail my sense of the school 
and the priority given to observable, returnable achievement. 
 
Diffractions on the practice of prevention 
 
At both Holloway Road and Elmwood Community School practitioners from Different 
Lines were used as a resource, primarily according to the agenda of individual 
teachers. In other words the resources of the eating disorder prevention project were 
used to occupy young people who had been removed from formal curriculum classes 
due to behavioural issues. While there was nothing inherently wrong in working with 
this group of young people, as the funding had been intended to work at tier 1 of the 
CAHMS service, what was of concern was the way in which many of the young 
people arrived to the project feeling themselves to be uninformed. This was markedly 
noticeable when at the end of the fifth week at Elmwood, a week before the 
intervention was about to withdraw, two young people, male and female, asked me 
why they were ‘here’ and no longer in their religious education classes. From these 
examples I would suggest that pedagogues made decisions relating to participation 
and resource based on who was and who was not likely to attain academically in the 
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formal curriculum, rather than who may or may not benefit through engagement. I 
would suggest therefore that although prevention appears to be a high priority in 
theory, it is a low priority in practice, especially given the demands that teachers 
have to negotiate at any given point. To refer this observation back to the 
possibilities of series and events noted in Logic of Sense (2004a), we might think of 
this as an example of the way in which series, or moving structures, are always 
coming into contact with other series as they are selected by events. In what might 
be termed the moving structure of formal education, the curriculum series, comes 
into contact with the movements of the ‘anorexic’ series and both are changed. The 
possibilities of both series are changed as they are selected by the human and non-
human entities which actualise events.  
 
In addition to this, the disengagement of some of the young people participating the 
project meant that the lead Youth Worker, Caroline, often drew on topics and 
practices she felt most comfortable and familiar with. However, these were arguably 
at some distance from any engagement with food or feeding. In other words, this 
conservative practice drew on the ‘familiar’ to such an extent as to obfuscate any 
productive disruption and disallowed any critical reflections or moderations of 
practice. In addition to this conservatism it must also be noted that the programme 
was based on ‘real-life’ bias (Markham, 2008) whereby only life off-line was 
considered sufficiently substantive as to be accounted for, and simplistic notions of 
self-esteem.  
 
The implications of this practice served to demarcate ‘the media’ and ‘celebrity’ as 
‘the cause’ of young women’s embodied abjection. The notion of singular causality, 
‘the media’ and the antidote of ‘loving yourself’, in the context of neo-liberal 
discourses of individuality and individual choice, reduces that which is both between 
bodies and social spaces, affective and pre-individual, to the borders of the 
cognitively intentional autonomous subject. Having been worked on by pastoral 
power (Golder, 2007), the utterable choice an individual makes to empower 
themselves, to say, ‘loud and proud’ in front of others, that they love themselves is 
both blind to the multiple and interweaving politics of conformity and resistance, and 
inconsiderate of the permeability of embodied life. It also overlooks the ways in 
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which other demanding categories, such as class, gender, sexuality and race remind 
us, to paraphrase Butler (2004) that our bodies are never entirely our own.  
 
Pro-ana Sites - ‘Fading Dreams’ and a ‘House of Addiction’ 
 
While the prevention project did not put me in direct contact with participants who 
might be able to give an ‘everyday account’ of difficult relationships to feeding the 
body, it did lead me to other sites, people and ideas. It also highlighted that the 
exclusion of on-line life, as an aspect of real life, was detrimental to both research 
and practice. During the same period that I was involved with ‘Different Lines’ I had 
also ‘arrived’ in the virtual field and begun to follow the discussion boards of eight 
pro-ana sites. Following the ethical guidelines produced by the Association of 
Internet Researchers (AOIR 2002), it was decided that only exchanges in publicly 
accessible forums and discussion boards would be engaged with. The Association 
of Internet Researchers is an academic association which is international in scope 
and works to advance the cross-disciplinary field of Internet studies. It is a member-
based support network promoting critical and scholarly Internet research which exist 
across academic borders. The Ethics Working Group has produced report to assist 
researchers in making ethical decisions in their research which was approved by 
voting members on November 27, 2002. 
 
A frequent theme of the initial entries that I saw was about ‘advice’ from other 
members of the community, pleas for help and a search for ‘purity’. They initially 
struck me as spaces of desire: a habitat for the infinitive to wish. I felt them to be 
time-spaces where embodied needs or appetite and the materiality of the body which 
produced appetite were derided. Talk seemed very much oriented toward an 
unveiling of a future self. Yet alongside this unveiling was a substantial amount of 
affective labour, processes and activities which were working for, working towards 
and earning excavation. At the initial stage of the research, each of the sites was 
conceived of as textual as the only aspect viewed were archives of the public-and-
private discussion boards. Kozinets suggests that for the purposes of research ethics 
we can “regard the use of some types and uses of computer-mediated cultural 
interactions as similar to the use of texts” (2010, 142). All of the sites that were 
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observed throughout the study had private inbox functions as well as public or 
communal discussion boards. 
 
Although I was treating the ‘data’ as textual, I remained mindful of issues of 
anonymity and confidentiality and as such carried out ‘heavy cloaking’ (Kozinets 
2010). In practice this meant that all of the data copied and pasted to Word 
documents for early and provisional analysis was changed immediately. Names of 
sites were changed, as were pseudonyms and all user profile pictures were deleted. 
At the time of writing the thesis all but two of the sites I had visited and collected 
empirical material from had disappeared (Dias, 2003). Of the two that remained, one 
had a very different home page lay-out and access to its discussion board was now 
limited to site members. The other site, which happened to be the first I encountered 
when I ‘entered the field’, remained as the screen shot I had saved. It appeared to be 
moderated by ‘someone’ of the same username as before. In the body of the thesis 
the actual names of sites I visited have not been included and this is in keeping with 
the practice of ‘heavy cloaking’ (Kozinet, 2010) I carried out with all on-line data. 
 
As with Day and Keys’ method, I ‘lurked’ (2008, 5). This meant that no attempts were 
made by me to deceive those visiting the sites by, for example, pretending to be 
someone who had an interest in seeking advice on weight loss or learning how to 
have a more ascetic relationship to feeding the body. Lurking is not an uncommon 
on-line practice, indeed, Conrad and Stults (2010) note that for every active member 
there are likely to be another twenty ‘lurking’. In research practice lurking meant 
being present but not actively representing myself. Although the practice of ‘lurking’ 
is contentious (AOIR, 2002; Denzin, 1999), my decision not to become an active 
member, or to make myself known, was weighed against the fact that I did not want 
to disturb the community interaction by potentially becoming another form of 
surveillance (Fox, Ward, K and O’ Rourke 2005) or disrupting what for some was 
considered a sanctuary (Dias, 2003). 
 
As there was already an abundance of comments and questions on the public-and-
private discussion boards which would inform the questions I wished to take to off-
line spaces, the decision not to invite members to respond to questions I had 
formulated was both strategic and ethical.  Although it is possible to gain informed 
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consent in Netography (Kozinet, 2010), and this is something I carried out later when 
I engaged with b-eat Ambassadors who self-identified as ‘recovering’, as a feminist 
researcher aware of the risks involved in talking about risk-taking activities such as 
difficult relationships to feeding the body, it was important for me to be able to 
negotiate ethics and consent as an on-going process with potential participants. At 
this relatively early stage of field work I felt best able to do this in a face to face 
context. As will become apparent later in the chapter, by using connective 
ethnography and following the flow of ideas, concepts and phenomenon to different 
spaces, I was able to meet a member of the pro-ana community off line who I could 
negotiate informed consent with on a regular basis. 
 
The eight pro-ana sites I explored at this point were considered in terms of postings 
which attracted both a significant amount of comments from members of the 
community and had been contributed to over a time period of more than one month. 
The field notes which were based on these spaces were an extremely significant tool 
in terms of working ethically and reflexively. They also provided a useful way of 
noting connections between people, places, ideas and communities. In other words, 
my field notes not only provided a record of time spent in a particular site, they also 
recorded how I had got there. As such, although in contrast to more traditional 
ethnographic work where the field diary documents the location, within the context of 
my move from location to locomotion (Markham, 2008) the diary remained 
significant, enabling me to reflexively record the circumstances which led me to be 
“telling this story about this object at this time and in this way” (Hine, 2000, 57).  
 
Bordering the field 
 
The decision to focus on particular discussions helped me to border the virtual field 
and the scope of the research more generally; particularly by narrowing searches to 
communal discussions which engaged with the idea of whether or not anorexia was 
a lifestyle choice or a mental illness. Within these threads another word became 
meaningful and visible and so was also followed. This portmanteau word was 
‘wannarexia’, a word which conflates the proper name ‘anorexia’ with the phrase 
‘wannabe’. It implies that wannarexics want-to-be-proper anorexics. Although this 
improper name is most commonly used as a pejorative term for those who ‘fake’ 
Page 105 of 229 
 
anorexia: Giving ‘it’ and the pro-ana community a bad name while diminishing levels 
of trust among site members (Giles 2006). Yet from my empirical observations it was 
also mobilised by members of the pro-ana communities I observed, who wished to 
acknowledge a degree of complicity or collusion with their ‘anorexic’ becomings. For 
instance: 
 
“maybe i did? i dont know...i've always wanted to be skinny, but then on 
holiday i was ill, dropped half a stone, and then became addicted to losing 
more. was i a "wannarexic"?”(Silvery Bones). 
 
The acknowledgement of collusion and desire which ‘wannarexia’ brings into focus 
can be connected to the Deleuzian event in terms of desiring, willing and waiting to 
bring about something which is already in movement. Already becoming but not 
towards one ‘thing’, one ‘destiny’ or one logical outcome. Put differently, the 
acknowledgment of desire and movement observed on-line disrupted the cultural 
freeze framing of media and medical representations of anorexia as synonymous 
with a particular weight or appearance. It also made it necessary for me to engage 
theoretically with ideas which could conceptualise nuances of embodiment, spatio-
temporality, language and causality.  
 
Oldfield House – 18+ out-patient service  
 
One of the sites I had come into contact with through Different Lines was Oldfield 
House, an adult out-patient service for people with a medically diagnosed eating 
disorder. At this site I conducted telephone interviews with one Counsellor and 
freelance therapist, and also with the Director of the centre as part of the prevention 
project. With the informed consent of the respondents these interviews were 
recorded using a Digital tapeless phone recorder and were later transcribed. As I 
have already noted, the prevention project did not lead me directly to participants 
who were in a position to give an account of ‘eating disorder’ and as such I made the 
most of my emergent relationship with Oldfield House by introducing the Director to 
my own doctoral project in the hope that this might become another field site in my 
mobile ethnography.  
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For three months after the initial contact I remained in conversation with the site 
through telephone and email exchanges. The questions the Director raised pertained 
mainly to my proposed methodology and ethics as they were unsure of ‘what 
ethnography was’. In response to this I articulated briefly on the telephone ‘what 
ethnography was’ in the context of my work, and suggested, in light of the invitation 
that had been extended to me to visit the clinic, that I provide some clear written 
documentation of my project in advance of any face to face meeting. In light of the 
Director’s lack of familiarity with ethnographic methods, and likely her staff also, I 
assembled a document to be circulated in advance of my visit. This document was 
reviewed and approved by my supervisory team before sending electronically to 
Oldfield House. 
 
As I was attuned to the questions and concerns of the setting in advance I organised 
six sides of A4 under eight headings: Introduction, my name, research background 
and institution; Method: an overview of some key ethnographic principles and ways 
in which it differs to clinical interviews; Ethnography and time, an indication of the 
significance of duration to my method, mindfulness of client and practitioner 
timetables, indication of days per week at site; Ethnography and sampling, establish 
a level of rapport and comfort before seeking participants fully informed consent, 
opportunistic sampling and/ or critical purposive sampling, mutual negotiation of 
journey together; Managing risk to participants, notification that the project adheres 
to Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) and British Educational Research 
Association (BERA ) guidelines; Putting ‘meeting’ into practice - participant 
information sheets and consent, inform all service users of my research in the hope 
that at least one will wish to contribute over time, consent will be regularly negotiated 
rather than sought only at the beginning of research practice; Ethical Ethnographic 
Endings, mindful of the potential time spent at the site and the in-depth nature of the 
work, in the event that participants become emotionally attached to the research, 
and or the researcher, the ‘ending’ should be a point of mutual negotiation between 
researcher and participants. 
 
After a considerable investment of time and resource I visited the site to meet with all 
therapeutic staff, including Tammy the Counsellor, and Sally the Director. The face 
to face visit enabled me to present myself, my institution and reiterate to all staff the 
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ideas and themes I had engaged the Director in. I was keen during this meeting to 
convey to practitioners the ways in which I felt my work to be potentially engaging for 
the adults they worked with. I wanted to indicate an awareness of their own 
professional discourse by considering in advance the ‘problems’ which the 
therapeutic discourse is mindful of, for instance transference and counter 
transference. I also wanted to draw on a feminist materialist discourses as they were 
important to the ethics and methods of the project. For instance, I was clear that I 
wished to give an alternative account of ‘anorexia’ by engaging collaboratively with 
the voices of the people they worked with. 
 
In the next section I will describe and analyse how this site helped me to become 
additionally appreciative of ‘sensation’ and ‘matter’. In addition to this I will also 
explore how it moved my project towards a critical engagement with the notion of 
‘recovery’, the proper name ‘Anorexia Nervosa’, the implications of being an 
‘ashamed adjective’ and how the politically motivated ascription of vulnerable can be 
implicated in unethical and undemocratic practices. 
 
“I find it infuriating that it’s portrayed as little middle class girls who are 
trying to get attention, media portrayals do a huge disservice to sufferers. 
We deal with every decade here, the oldest client that I have seen is an 
elderly lady of seventy six. If you eat you can have an eating disorder and 
it is as individual as the person who has it and may change over time as 
their situations do” (Tammy, Counsellor and freelance therapist, Oldfield 
House). 
 
Tammy was the first person I made contact with at Oldfeild House. As can be noted 
from the quote attributed to her above, she was critical of common sense ideas that 
it is only young, white, middle class girls who are affected by ‘anorexia’. Tammy 
noted that over the seven years she had worked at Oldfeild there had been a steady 
proliferation of what she termed ‘middle aged’ women who had contacted the 
service. Interestingly, not all of these older women had developed “eating issues” 
during adolescence. She noted that:  
 
“In my opinion it could be something to do with the physical and hormonal 
changes that occur in this age group of females, which is interesting as it 
mirrors the hormonal changes of puberty”.  
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In terms of the theories I was working with, particularly those of affect and new 
materialism, I felt that Tammy was sensitive to materiality and did not entirely make 
cognition the seat of agency and vulnerability. She added to this that she had often 
thought of anorexia as “the crisis of entering and departing ‘Womanhood’” She 
added to this by reflecting on her professional experience, suggesting that:  
 
“Adolescence is a time when young people become more critical of their 
body and it’s similar for older women too. In that sense It’s [‘anorexia’] a 
great simplifier in the chaos of life”. 
 
Talking to Tammy made me aware of multiple incremental connections amongst 
activities and processes in the production of affects, particulaarly the real and 
abstract risks of ‘not being anorexic’. Tammy stated that: 
 
“The longer the duration of eating disorders the harder it is to ‘cure’ or at 
least, the recovery is more associated with management. After ten years 
of suffering hope recedes. Each client is assessed in terms of managing 
the changes that they must make if they are to have a life which is not 
dominated by their eating disorder but this is always a very complex 
journey”. 
 
She added to this that she had been working with a client recently who had been ‘ill’ 
for thirty years: 
 
“This lady said ‘if I get better I’ll look stupid, what’s it all been for?’ There is 
this sense of ‘I can’t go back, I have to carry on even if I don’t want to”. 
 
Tammy then introduced me to a term she had coined which I found particularly 
engaging and perspicacious: 
 
“Anorexia is a rebellion, I call it “the silent scream”, it’s keeping the world 
at bay and having pain on your own terms, but it’s also an identity crisis so 
‘recovery’ or adapting to a new ways of coping means the crisis has to 
become more chaotic”.  
 
As an out-patient service with limited funding, Tammy said that when clients come to 
use the service, they, as practitioners, “look for a real desire for change, any 
ambivalence means that it won’t work”. She noted that practitioners had to try to 
“control the control”. When I listened back to transcribe the interview, this punchy 
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statement struck me as violently productive of, rather than disruptive to, the process 
whereby holding power is always already moving and becoming significant. The 
desire to seize power and ‘be in control’, which is seen to be indicative of 
pathologised ‘anorexic’ practices, is good sense if it is exerted through medically 
dogmatic notions of treatment. To ‘control the control’ inheres the logic, sets in 
motion for those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body, that if one does 
not control – one will be controlled. Also, and returning to the Deleuzian paradox to 
speak/ to eat, if you do not bite you will be bitten – served as food, spoken in front of 
as a pliable adjective rather than a proud verb. In chapter four the notion of control is 
returned to through the idea of the experiment and disrupted further still by inquiring 
into the strange capaciousness of non-human matter in the eating/speaking relation.  
 
The objectified control of ‘the anorexic’, to which normalising, controlling processes 
will be administered, has an embodied subject attached to it: Yet practitioners 
conveniently separate and split off the despised object from the ‘real person’. If 
control (of the body, of food) is the ‘problem’, common sense says it is that which 
must be controlled. “Controlling the control” suggests that dominant and powerful 
discourses must govern and produce potentiality as conservative. The normalising 
procedures of treatment, or ‘subjugating the subjugation’, highlight interconnections 
of power and knowledge as well as affective and incorporeal aspects of matter. We 
can see through the desire to “control the control” how for those with a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body power, control and discipline tautologically swallow 
up possibilities for living differently: Bodies remain in the real and abstract chains of 
the dogmatic image of thought. 
 
Returning now to Tammy, one of the themes I was most interested in engaging with 
her was how she worked with the notion of ‘recovery’. As we talked her words 
resonated with ideas I was beginning to formulate with regards to petrifaction, fixing, 
sensation (Massumi 2002) and the event, particularly the twenty second series of 
Logic of Sense, Porcelain and Volcano. Here the idea of “the silent crack” (2004a, 
176) repeats, with difference, Tammy’s own idea of the ‘silent scream’. For Deleuze 
the silent and imperceptible crack is neither internal nor external yet it makes its way 
to the surface. He goes on to note that it is at the edge of the crack that everything 
noisy happens. The silent scream, as with the silent crack is, “incarnated in the depth 
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of the body” (2004a, 177). Additionally the ‘scream’ is also connected to Deleuze’s 
writing on Francis Bacon. Deleuze notes that the scream in Bacon’s painting, which 
is of course silent, “is the operation through which the entire body escapes through 
the mouth” (2013, 13). He continues: 
 
“If we scream, it is always as victims of invisible and insensible forces that 
scramble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling” 
(2013, 43).   
 
The idea noted above, of invisible and insensible forces which are beyond pain and 
feeling returns us to points noted in the previous chapters. Here to scream, as a 
proud verb, is both beyond the actual ‘victim’ yet reliant on the body and its orifices 
to actualise the event which produces a change in the series. To paraphrase 
Massumi (1992), it is as though the event to scream momentarily borrows for itself a 
pair of lips from which to wail a hollow cry.  
 
I would now like to plug this idea into the notion of difficult relationships to feeding 
the body, what common sense refers to as ‘anorexia’, to create a mixture of theory-
data that would advance the idea that I have been trying to make regarding the 
affectivity and incorporeality of the eating/speaking body. To do this I cannot only 
consider the actual occurrences which take place in an individual’s life, for instance 
those instances which are recognised as being connected to the social, political, 
familial context. These ‘causes’ alone do not produce screaming spectacles even 
though they really do produce the wetness of tears, turning of stomachs and shaking 
of shoulders carried out by mixtues of bodies. Through Deleuze we are afforded an 
alternative insight which is “beyond pain and feeling” (2013, 43).   
 
Here we return to a thread which I began in the opening chapter and took further 
during the second, the disjunction between the signifying and signified series. We 
might say that the denoted silent scream that passes through Tammy’s lips, the 
words, do not, to paraphrase Williams, map onto what they truthfully correspond to 
“since [an actual silent scream] does not pass through [her] mouth” (Williams, 2008a, 
48).   
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We might say that this is because the scream is not hers. This is common sense, 
she is speaking of people who she works with, bodies defined as ‘anorexic’. But the 
silent scream is not theirs either. Even as it borrows their mouth and the body seizes 
the oportunity to escape through the opening, the scream remains pre-individual, 
lying “beyond pain and feeling” (Deleuze, 2013, 43). It is bought about not by things 
that we can recognise or predict (Deleuze, 2004b), but by “invisible and insensible 
forces” (Deleuze, 2013, 43). 
 
Following my discussions with Tammy and later the Director of the centre, I prepared 
to meet the professionals at Oldfield House. At this point I was very optimistic. I felt 
that I could very clearly ‘see the edges’ of my project. With this optimism in heart and 
mind I was surprised to receive the below email two weeks later. 
 
Hello Sylvie, 
  
Thank you for coming to our team meeting to discuss your research 
proposal and your request to access our clients to complete your Ph.D 
dissertation. 
  
The attending counsellors participated in a discussion and review of your 
proposal. The conclusion was that although we thought the question of 
the lived experience of anorexia nervosa is a valuable area for research, 
we could not consent to give you access to our clients. I know this will 
come as a disappointment to you but hopefully the following summary of 
the issues raised will offer some clarification of our position. 
  
Our team's primary concern was related to the relatively un-boundaried 
nature of the methodology. We were concerned that what was being 
asked of clients in terms of the amount of time and of themselves they 
would have to give was too vague (and potentially large)for them to be 
clear at the outset what they were committing to. There was a strong 
concern expressed by the team about the potential impact of participation 
on the clients and that this had not been adequately considered, 
particularly in relation to the risk of dependency or unclear role boundaries 
arising from the researcher potentially having a lot of personal contact 
with the participants. It was concluded that our clients are too 
psychologically vulnerable to be asked to participate. 
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It was suggested that it might be safer for you to interview recovered 
persons about their recollections of the experience of having anorexia. 
  
I hope this feedback is of use to you, and wish you the best in your work. 
  
Yours sincerely, 
  
Sally O’Dowd 
 
While I felt the meeting, my preparatory documents, and research project were as 
‘boundaried’ as a piece of inductive qualitative work should be in advance of entering 
the field, this was not the sentiment of Oldfield House. “The strong concern 
[regarding] the potential impact of participation on the clients” which was of particular 
concern in relation to the fear that clients may become ‘dependent’ on me, or 
‘unclear’ as to my role, seemed an odd justification given that these safeguarding 
issues had been covered in detail in my talk and textual documents. Suggesting that 
my method was ‘un-boundaried’, un-safe, risky, dangerous and even potentially 
damaging to participants affected me deeply. I felt that my work had been perceived 
as monstrous and unethical. It took a few days before I could read the email again. 
Although I was affected, feeling guilty, risky, damaging and monstrous, I copied the 
email text to a blank word document and read it again as dispassionately as 
possible. On this second reading I was struck by two particular assertions, firstly the 
idea that “It was concluded that our clients are too psychologically vulnerable to be 
asked to participate” and secondly “It was suggested that it might be safer for you to 
interview recovered persons about their recollections of the experience of having 
anorexia.  
 
In relation to the first point, Oldfield House was an adult service, not a child or 
adolescent service. To suggest that their clients were “too psychologically 
vulnerable” even to be asked to participate struck me as unethical and undemocratic. 
In my opinion the choice that Sally and her colleagues made foreclosed those of 
their clients. Additionally, the assumption that engagement with me and the project 
would pose risks to ‘their’ out-patient population seemed to disavow the potentials in 
everyday life for ‘risks’ of attachment. Deemed too vulnerable the clients themselves 
were not given the option to decline or accept and much like the young people of St 
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Catherine they were extradited from the assembly of decision making due to their 
perceived precarity and institutional powerlessness.  
 
The foreclosure of contributing to an account of ‘anorexia’ which was not 
represented through an ‘objective’ expert medical or psychiatric position, or the 
sensationalised ‘subjective’ two page image based accounts of the media chimed 
with Hepworth’s insightful assertion that “social and cultural aspects of anorexia 
concerned with prevention and treatment are less to do with explanation and more to 
do with which knowledge and whose knowledge will be allowed into debates” 
(Hepworth, 1999, 10). Here, it is not that I am criticising the good intentions or care 
of the professionals at Oldfield House, but rather noting how powerful discourses 
and practices, such as those which pertain to the protection of young and vulnerable 
individuals, pre-exist as solutions which recruit individuals, only to set in motion 
further problems. 
 
The second point, that it might be ‘safer’ for me to interview ‘recovered persons’ is 
also problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the evocation of ‘safer’ 
contextualises the aforementioned ‘un-boundaried’ nature of my project as inherently 
un-safe as opposed to iterative and open to processes of amendment and 
negotiation with my participants. Thirdly, and of extreme importance in relation to my 
overall project, is the idea that ‘recovered persons’ are a clearly defined group whose 
lived experience is no longer challenged by their relationship to feeding the body. 
The idea that those who are deemed ‘recovered’ are no longer vulnerable, and can 
therefore engage in ‘not-quite-safe’ activities, reinforces the idea that carrying a 
particular amount of body weight is synonymous with an emotional robustness or 
thick skin which a body with less weight does not have. 
 
Fourthly, the phrase “their recollections of the experience of having anorexia” betrays 
a linear temporalisation of that which is affective and relational. It also produces a 
grammatical paradox which conflates the past, recollections, with the possessive 
pronoun their and the continuous form of the verb ‘to have’ - having. In other words, 
expect people to talk in the past tense of that which remains owned and constant. 
This temporal and grammatical paradox produces the sense that although something 
may be lived as the constant property of an individual, if one does not meet the 
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category’s demands for anorexia, the increments of a lived relation to feeding the 
body are reduced to the invulnerable position of ‘recovered’.  
 
However, the ‘problematic’ nature of Oldfield’s response turned out, nevertheless, to 
be productive to the development of the thesis, particularly when their response was 
plugged into a Deleuzian critique of the well-formed problem. Put differently, the 
thesis departed firmly from axiomatic divisions between health and illness. 
 
In light of the feedback from Oldfield House and the absence of participants 
emerging directly through the Different Lines Project I arranged a time to discuss my 
work with an intergenerational feminist organisation, The Waves, in the hope that 
they would forward my call for participation through their network database. Out of 
one thousand youth workers, feminists and young people that The Waves 
disseminated to my invitation to I received only one response. This came from 
‘Joanne Jones’, a young feminist and as I found out later, a member of the pro-ana 
community. 
 
The Empirical Need to Draw on the Incorporeal  
 
While I waited for the responses to my call for participation through ‘The Waves’ I 
became increasingly involved with on-line spaces. I have already noted my 
engagement with pro-ana sites, but in addition to this I also spent a considerable 
amount of time searching the publically accessible site youtube.  Indeed between 
March 2011 and March 2012 my search results for *pro-ana* increased by 25% from 
just below 18,000 to just over 23,000. It was through this site that I ‘met’ Ella and the 
need to draw on language which could convey the immediacy of affective and 
embodied sense.  
 
On Ella’s video there was a message to ‘add me on facebook’. To trace her I 
searched the name she gave through YouTube. There was no face that resembled 
the one that I had been paying attention to, yet louder and more affective than that 
there was an embodied disposition rather than a body that I recognised. There was 
something which was not the body but “of it”, real and abstract: incorporeal 
(Massumi, 2002) which I was affected by. The embodied disposition in Ella’s 
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facebook avatar was productive of the sense that this was Ella, even though the 
well-dressed body had their back to the camera, their head down and shoulders 
slumped. I recognised ‘it’, dry and incorporeal. What I saw was not limited to what I 
saw in vision (Massumi, 2011). Ella’s affect on me had already started coming about 
before dialogue began. When I had received informed consent from Ella I asked her 
to tell me a little about what she thought of the notion of recovery. 
 
“Anorexia just seems to be part of who I am, I have always viewed it as 
just something about me, the same as my love of creative arts, the fact 
that my eyes are different colours etc. I think that maybe this is a reason 
recovery has always been so difficult for me, because I feel as though to 
recover I must lose part of who I am”.  
 
In the context of the assumptions made by Oldfield House Ella’s thoughts added 
momentum to my project and the need to think of anorexia as something other than 
a mental illness or a lifestyle choice. It was perhaps the articulation of loss that struck 
me most poignantly, reminding me of the words of the anonymous woman Tammy 
had spoken to me about and the assumptions of Levenkron’s stage model (2000) 
which was built on the metaphysical supposition that subject and object are separate 
and separable entities.  
 
Joanne Jones - the blended method and the face to face meeting  
 
One of the sites the prevention project bought me into contact with was, as noted, a 
feminist archiving project, The Waves. Through this site a detailed pro-forma, giving 
the details of my research aims, what would be asked of potential participants, and 
what they could expect from me in terms of rights to anonymity, confidentiality and 
ethical treatment, was disseminated to a thousand youth workers, feminists and 
young people. As previously mentioned, of the thousand inboxes to receive the email 
there was one response. This apparent reluctance to engage off-line with the issue 
of a difficult relationship to feeding the body was striking in its contrast to the number 
of people who I had seen engaging with similar themes on-line. Although I can only 
speculate about possible reasons for the lack of response my thinking-feeling 
(Massumi, 2011), particularly at the time of carrying out fieldwork, was that eating 
practices produce a particular vulnerability that perhaps potential participant wished 
to avoid.  
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Six weeks and three hushed telephone calls after the first email was sent I met a 
young woman called Joanne who described herself as a feminist. Over the next nine 
months (March 2011 – November 2011) we met between fortnightly and monthly and 
produced together seventy hours of recorded interview material. Below is an account 
of our first meeting through field note excerpts. Following the vivid and embodied 
account Markham (1998) gives of research and life on-line, I incorporate these notes 
to draw attention to the way in which the field diary remains essential to the 
ethnographic process when the field is also constituted by virtual spaces.  
 
15th March 2011  
 
2.30pm  
Waiting for Joanne, it feels as though it’s been a long time coming. The 
first call she had made was while I was en route to one of the schools the 
prevention project was working with. My plan is to introduce myself, my 
work and take it slowly. I also want to ask her why she has come forwards 
given that it appears to be a secret she keeps from her partner. I wonder 
what her story is. 
5pm 
The meeting went really well. Joanne has seven years of experience with 
anorexia and pro-ana. While she was still at school she had set up a pro-
ana forum under the guise of a creative writing group meaning that the 
space was unlikely to be ‘moderated’ or closed down’. Joanne is keen to 
convey the ‘everyday-ness’ of having a difficult relationship with the body 
and has agreed to contribute over time.  
7.15pm 
Just home and looked through some emails, opened facebook to see if 
my sister is on-line and Joanne has sent me a friend request. I can’t help 
but read into this that today was a good experience for her and that she is 
interested in the research. I’ve accepted the request but had to make a 
few decisions in situ. I have decided that if Joanne uses facebook to 
contact me I will respond quickly and ask if it is research related and 
therefore possible data. I will not contact her first or write on her publically 
viewable facebook wall. I don’t want her to feel as though me, or the 
research, are ‘everywhere’. 
 
These excerpts draw attention to the field diary as a tool which not only records 
where we have been, but also how we have got there – through off-line and on-line 
spaces. The field diary in the context of a blended methodology provides a means to 
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critically reflect on ethical issues which become apparent as field work develops and 
as we move back and forth between on- and off-line life. As an incremental process 
mobile or connective ethnography cannot predict at its inception all of the ethical 
considerations it may need to, to protect either the researcher or the participants who 
come forward over time. Therefore, as the project moves the field diary engenders a 
significant space for ethical reflection and decision making. 
 
Before we had met ‘Joanne’ had been clear that she would always contact me first 
as her partner was not aware of the way that anorexia had become meaningful to 
her again. I was highly aware of the risks she was taking in coming forward and as 
such the first meeting was an important opportunity to discuss the ethics and politics 
of the research. Although it is possible to gain informed consent on-line (Kozinet, 
2010), I felt most equipped to carry out these ethical procedures in a face to face 
context. As we talked about the boundaries of my field, what I wanted to find out 
about, what my questions were, I also wanted ‘Joanne’ to feel confident that her 
engagement with the research field had, if not boundaries, clear lines of respect and 
conduct. The final sentence of the excerpt above indicates the way in which reflexive 
ethical decisions were made to ensure that Joanne did not feel that either myself, or 
the research, was ‘unbounded’.  
 
During one of our meetings in July 2011 Joanne had mentioned that she was in 
contact with a group of young women who self-identified as ‘pro-ana’, and that they 
arranged face to face meeting, often in London. The idea that the on-line community 
met off-line was fascinating in terms of contesting notions of ‘anorexia’ only as an 
individual and individualising mental illness. It also troubled those forecasts which 
had considered the virtual as the “apocalypse of corporeal subjectivity” (Keeps cited 
in Markham 2008, 252). Rather, this move to the face to face reinforced the idea that 
to be pro-anorexic was communally meaningful.  For Joanne and others in the 
group, this communal meaning was at least in part due to the emotional spatiality of 
what might usefully be referred to as the field of anorexia. In other words, both face 
to face and on-line meetings made it possible to engage with others who had ‘been 
there’ and had their own stories of first-hand witness to share. 
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From this it became apparent that the pro-ana community was itself mobile. It moved 
to spaces which become meaningful and blended on-line and off-line methods of 
meeting and data sharing. This connection between theory, research and pro-ana 
practices became increasingly apparent as both myself, and Joanne, experienced 
the closure of the pro-ana site ‘Fragile Beauty’. Rather than a decision to ‘leave the 
field’ in a timely and ethically appropriate manner, part of the ‘field’ left us. For both 
of us this involved/implied no more data collection from this site, for me discussion 
boards, for Joanne the private inbox messages she wanted to save.  
 
S9: So I was looking at the website the other day and noticed that it was 
down, what’s happening? 
J: It’s completely closed down […] it was a big shock and I think that a lot 
of people took it hard. But because I mainly used the facebook group, and 
so did the people that I talked to it was not so bad…But I mean I did rely 
on it quite a lot, I did not realise how much I relied on the site for support 
and stuff but I still have my friend facebook group. The whole thing is 
gone now [..] completely deleted…our messages and everything are 
gone. I was gutted because she shut it a day early and I was not able to 
go on and copy and paste stuff that I wanted to keep.   
 
A bond of trust has been abused, something of value maybe lost….. 
 
As I noted previously, whether or not ‘ana’ and ‘anorexia’ can be seen as the same 
discursive object (Giles 2006) is debatable. However, I also noted that rather than 
investing in identities as real or un-real we might instead explore the ways in which 
the internet makes identities available and possible (Hine, 2000). Earlier I also 
introduced the phrase ‘wannarexia’ and how it had emerged as meaningful in the 
context of discussions about whether anorexia was a lifestyle choice or a mental 
illness, a theme which had helped to border the on-line field. The following quotes 
are from one of the sites I observed on-line. They indicate the complexity of names, 
embodied relationships and the spectral force of ‘authenticity’.  
 
“No one who is anorexic starts having food problems when they are 
already at an anorexic weight. We all start somewhere, and we are all 
different” (sw<3<3tboy). 
 
                                            
9
 S = Sylvie and J = Joanne 
Page 119 of 229 
 
“I was a wannarexic, I tell others that want the eating disorder about my 
story, how I wish I could go back to the day where I looked at my first pro-
ana website, how fucking stupid I was. Maybe I already had it though, I do 
think wannarexics have the start of an eating disorder but maybe 
someone could maybe talk them out of it but I don't think anything would 
of scared me off, only if I saw myself now, that would of changed my 
mind” (strangeasangels95). 
 
“the term wannarexic is ppl who eat normally, untill  they want to drop 
some lbs and goes for this as a diet, and try to be this” (Psychocandy). 
 
“Yes, I agree - eating disorders DO start somewhere but the ones who 
have that mental component won't be crash dieting. People who lie and 
claim to have an illness just for the ‘social status’ that’s what I think it 
means" (Eleph&ntwom&n). 
 
While for the on-line user sw<3<3tboy, ‘wannarexia’ was where anorexia starts, and 
strangeasangels95 acknowledged a degree of collusion with the desire that  
anorexia mobilised, Psychocandy’s suggestion indicated the reification of anorexia or 
‘this’, as real and desirable. Rather than conceiving of a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body, which implies embodied activity, Psychocandy considers anorexia 
as an authentic ontological position that wannarexics can only ever “try to be”. 
Eleph&ntwom&n’s suggestion was that because anorexia has kudos, people who 
have no rightful purchase on the position, those who have not earned the mantle, 
claim it for the purposes of ‘social status’.  
 
I am drawing attention to ‘wannarexia’ here as it returns me to earlier ideas 
concerning internal antagonism and contestation which were noted by Giles (2006) 
in an earlier chapter. It also provides an opening to explore Joanne’s account of what 
happened in the facebook group she relied on after the closure of ‘Fragile Beauty’. 
The empirical material below is cut apart (Barad, 2007) from the penultimate 
interview that Joanne and I experienced in November 2011.  
 
S: What things have you been talking about on-line recently? 
J: There has been this girl who was part of Fragile Beauty [who] got 
invited to the facebook group, but she basically faked [..]  being really ill 
[…]. Like if you look back at some of her comments, her symptoms were 
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basically what she was copying off this other girls so it was just 
offensive.[…]. I’ve met about eighteen of them at different meets and  
there are about thirty of us in the facebook group who’ve all met one 
another somehow, even if it’s through a third party.  
S: So I was thinking about faking it, what does that mean? Do you think 
that what she has done gives pro-ana’s and the community a bad name?  
J: Yeah, definitely, no one wants to be seen as an attention seeker or 
anything.[…]. People are still really, really uncomfortable and there are at 
least a couple of people that have barely posted since it happened [..]  it’s 
got a lot more strict because there were a few people on the site that were 
not using their real facebook account, they were setting up new ones with 
silly ana names but now you can only join if you are willing to use your 
own account, so if it turns out that you are not who you said you were then 
it could almost be used against you, so basically you are showing more 
trust if you are using your own username. 
S: How common do you think this might be? How many people do you 
think ‘fake’? 
J: I’d say quite a lot. I don’t know because you can’t say for definite that 
someone does or does not have those types of issues [..] it’s is part of the 
reason that I prefer facebook because I know who most of the people are.  
 
In addition to cutting this empirical material apart from something, a transcript, I have 
also cut it together with something else, the discussion between sw<3<3tboy, 
strangeasangels95, Psychocandy and Eleph&ntwom&n. I have done this in part to 
highlight the proximity of life on-line and off-line, in terms of community concerns. Yet 
more than that, I have facilitated conditions whereby they can intra-act (Barad, 
2007).  
 
Eleph&ntwom&n’s assertion raises the issue of truth and falsity through the idea that 
some people ‘lie’ about “hav[ing] [an] illness just for the ‘social status’”, an issue 
which is also engaged with by Joanne. We can note the challenge which false 
pretenders, i.e. those who “lie” or ‘fake’, pose. Not just to the actual members of the 
community, but virtually, as this event creates a change in series which may, or may 
not, produce further threats. The sense of this threat creeps out through Joanne’s 
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clarification that the Facebook community has, post event, “got a lot more strict”. 
Here, what is at stake is in excess of the enacting individuals who lie and are lied to 
in the state of affairs. Instead, the proud verb, to lie, produces a crack in 
communication, or more appropriately, a communication of events (Williams, 2008a, 
36). The gates to past and future assaults on authenticity are opened in the moment 
that relations between infinitives change. The sense of anorexia, pro-anorexia and 
wannarexia shift as to be (really ill) brushes up against to lie, changing further still as 
both come into contact with to fake. 
 
The internal antagonism which can be observed in both instances of empirical 
materials noted above, can be seen to affect levels of trust on-line. This, in turn, and 
perhaps paradoxically, engendered an off-line or real-life bias (Markham, 1998) 
among the pro-ana group that Joanne was part of. As she asserted “I’ve met about 
eighteen of them at different meets and there are about thirty of us in the facebook 
group who’ve all met one another somehow, even if it’s through a third party”. 
Another interesting idea which Joanne draws our attention to is the idea of the real 
facebook profile. This implies that facebook related activities are so ingrained in daily 
praxis that it can become the guarantor of a trustworthy pro-ana. As guarantor, 
rather than guarantee, the real facebook profile faces repercussions if the pro-ana is 
identified as improper: a ’fake’ or a ‘wannarexic.  
 
As this sub-section of the chapter draws to a close I would like to offer another way 
of engaging with the materials of the interview noted above. I will do this through 
Deleuze’s writing on The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy, the first appendix of 
Logic of Sense (2004a). This will offer another way of considering the gates to past 
and future assaults on authenticity.  
 
Deleuze notes that there is an impetus in Platonic thought to distinguish, to produce 
difference. He adds that platonic distinction occurs between two sorts of images, 
copies and simulacra. Copies are:  
 
“well founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance”, while simulacra 
are like false pretenders, built on dissimilarity, implying an essential 
perversion or deviation” (2004a, 294). 
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 Deleuze goes on to clarify that the platonic motivation to distinguish is based on: 
 
“selecting among the pretenders, distinguishing good and bad copies or, 
rather, copies (always well founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in 
dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph of copies over 
simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, 
preventing them from climbing to the surface, and ‘insinuating themselves’ 
everywhere” (ibid).  
 
This is a dense yet exciting quote, particularly as it intra-acts with the empirical 
materials of the November 2011 interview. However, before I begin to make any 
further cuts I would like to step back for a moment, allowing some theoretical context 
to take the next dance, as it were. Deleuze, following Nietzsche, seeks to reverse 
Platonism. This ‘means’ that the distinctions set about above, between copies and 
simulacra, are not advocated by Deleuze. He would rather “affirm the rights” of 
simulacra (ibid), the Nietzschian highest power of the false. To closely paraphrase 
Deleuze, the simulacra or false pretender, is not to be repressed or despised. Their 
“insinuating themselves everywhere” (2004a, 294) provides a spanner in the 
machine. Their ‘falsity’ resonates across series: “engulf[ing] all foundations, it 
assures a universal breakdown, but as a joyful and positive event, as an unfounding” 
(2004a, 300).  
 
For the purposes of the argument I am attempting to make the universal breakdown, 
“the unfounding”, implies the possibility of considering real differences amongst 
relationships to feeding the body, as opposed to the foundational thinking which 
reinforces anorexia as a dogmatic image of thought. The critique that Deleuze 
provides here of Platonic thought, is important within the context of the tentative 
claims that were made during the opening chapters of the thesis. Namely, those 
points raised by affect theorist Theresa Brennan who noted  the “complex of Platonic 
and Aristotolelian views on form and matter, activity and passivity, subject and object 
[that] give birth to the self-contained individual whose mind and body are separate” 
(Brennan, 2004, 77). I return to this idea to clarify, albeit obscurely, that the thesis is 
not simply critical of the medical discourse. It is also critical of foundational 
philosophical ideas which erect distinctions based on the eternally true and eternally 
false. To summarise, it is most critical of the meeting of the two with good and 
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common sense. To return to another quote from the opening chapter taken from 
Difference and Repetition: 
 
“every time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is 
inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a 
philosophy (that is why such encounters should be avoided at all costs) ” 
(Deleuze, 2004b, 282) 
 
With this context in mind I will now allow these ideas to mingle with the interview 
material that Joanne and I produced. From the points that Joanne raises it is 
apparent that amongst the good copies on the pro-ana site there is unrest triggered 
by the way in which the simulacra, the bad copy, has climbed to the surface. As she 
notes, “[p]eople are still really, really uncomfortable and there are at least a couple of 
people that have barely posted since it happened”. The way in which it was possible 
for the simulacra to copy symptoms “off this other girl” unnerves the community, or 
rather it produces a crack in the foundations. The terms by which true and false 
pretenders are based rests entirely on the “world of representation” (Deleuze, 2004a, 
299). Although the ‘fake’ poses a problem in the context of the pro-ana’s platonic 
convictions, according the Deleuze this “twilight of the idols” instigates a necessary 
challenge. An encounter which provokes him to suggest that:  
 
“[t]he simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours a positive power 
which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction” 
(ibid.)  
 
For the thesis this is particularly significant. Here, the simulacrum, which I would 
posit within the context of the project as ‘the wannarexic’, denies the original, ‘Proper 
Anorexia’, and the copy, ‘proper anorexic’, the model , which I will tentatively posit as 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, and the reproduction, an endless series of 
diagnoses. 
 
From Collection to Analysis and Writing – Becoming Bovine  
 
Having given an overview of how I collected empirical materials, in the next section 
of the chapter I will engage with theories which helped me to engage with the 
materials gathered. Here, having already noted the problems which emerge in the 
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context of a difficult relationship to feeding the body when the subject and object are 
separated out, in this section I will give a little more detail about how contemporary 
feminist qualitative researchers such as Alecia Youngblood Jackson (2013), Maggie 
MacLure (2013a, 2013b), and Lisa Mazzei (2013) have, in their work with post-
human, new materialist and Deleuzian theories, enabled my own capacity to listen to 
the symphony of the discordant idea and engage with empirical materials in a 
manner which goes beyond drawing circles and saying what “everybody knows and 
no one can deny” (Deleuze, 2004b, 164). Here the symphony of the discordant idea 
relates to the affective tonality of philosophy as Deleuze explicates it in Difference 
and Repetition (2004b). Opposed to the logic of recognition, a logic which is ‘itself’ 
linked to representation and common sense, that which is sonically discordant hums 
at the tension between clarity and obscurity. This, of course, is different to the clarity 
and distinctness of Descartes. 
 
At this juncture, having presented details of the mobile or connective ethnographic 
method employed to gather empirical materials, it seems apposite to engage with the 
problem of what to do with the voluminous body of material that this produced. To do 
this I will work with the insights of MacLure in her chapter in Deleuze and Research 
Methodologies, ‘Classification or Wonder? Coding as an analytic practice in 
Qualitative Research’ (2013) and then move on to consider the possibilities of a 
digestive assemblage, a becoming bovine of sorts, as the alchemic data table is 
engaged with as a second stomach.  
 
As MacLure notes, ‘coding’ “involves looking for pattern or order in a body of data – 
such as interview transcripts or field notes – by identifying recurring themes, 
categories and concepts” (2013, 164). To clarify, although MacLure is critical of the 
petrified outcomes of coding, she does find a certain value in the process of mingling 
with data that coding necessitates. She suggests that the process of prolonged 
engagement with empirical materials which refuse to yield a clear and distinct 
answer is part of the process whereby the important and relevant emerge. In her 
concluding remarks MacLure advocates that we produce cabinets of curiosity which 
are attuned both to classification and to wonder. Here, to add a little to what MacLure 
already sets out, the task becomes to hold elements or empirical materials in 
productive tension. Or perhaps more precisely, rather than hold, provide the 
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conditions whereby they might spin together and produce a peculiar whistle. Here 
the idea of coding as the production of a cabinet of curiosity necessitates that good 
and common sense, inherent in classification, is receptive to the affective tonality of 
wonder. 
 
“I have argued that what we commonly take to be individual entities are 
not separate determinately bounded and propertied objects, but rather are 
(entangled “parts of”) phenomena (Barad, 2011,125). 
 
As my engagement with the ideas, people, places and entities which comprised the 
‘field’ of my research developed, so did the coding spreadsheet I had designed early 
on in my doctoral project. What had started as a repository was soon in the process 
of becoming a second stomach. Initially this second stomach helped to aid digestion 
and increase the metabolic rate of the project. This was particularly valuable as my 
own stomach felt so overfull with rich and emotive empirical materials. The 
categories and themes that ran down the vertical axis gave order to the half-digested 
ideas and bits of things which ran across the horizontal axis. As the spreadsheet was 
in the process of becoming second stomach, the materials which had been bitten off 
during interviews and explorations of pro-ana sites were not just being held in a 
passive repository: They were being produced differently as they intra-acted with the 
alchemic table. Importantly this alchemic table is not an isolated entity, rather it is 
part of a capacious agentic entanglement which drew on my own, and my empirical 
materials, capacities to affect and be affected.  
 
As I tried to express intent and ‘fit’ my empirical materials into existing themes within 
the table there were those bits of things that gave themselves up to a good and 
common sense fit. For instance, interview data and pro-ana discussions which 
explicitly referenced ‘wannarexia’ were coded accordingly:  
 
Wannarexic / faker  FO2.1  FO2.3 FO2.5 GJJ7  DJJ4 
 
However, when I started to consider empirical materials beyond the accident, or 
what occurred, and started to consider the event, or the inside of what occurs, it 
became harder to fit data into boxes. The singularity of what I was trying to order 
resisted an intent that was at the threshold of my body and the machine I had 
created. These bits of things which resisted, were ‘rebel becomings’ that evaded 
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coding, capture, and were insensible in the face of any desire for generality 
(MacLure, 2013). The empirical materials that my own body and the second stomach 
worked with bit back, and did so with such force that the molar spreadsheet “that 
territorialises the flow of becoming” (Ringrose and Coleman, 2013, 15) ruptured.  
 
The second stomach, just like the human stomach, was never dumb matter – it 
compelled my body to perform particular tasks, often against my intent. ‘It’ had a 
gluttonous appetite. Put differently, even when I had made the conscious decision to 
cease ‘coding’, cease being slavish to the molarity of coding, my embodied practice 
remained towards feeding this second stomach. I could not explore empirical 
materials without assigning a code, to do otherwise felt foolish and wasteful. Here, 
the demanding organ, the second stomach, had to be challenged. My engagement 
with data had to become a body without organs, less concerned with volume and 
order and more inclined towards intensity “gaiety, ecstasy, and dance” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b, 167). 
 
Having pushed the alchemic table to breaking point it was necessary to look to other 
ways of engaging with data. Here the work of Mazzei and Jackson (2012) 
‘Complicating voice in a refusal to “let participants speak for themselves”’ 
engendered a necessary and relevant mixture of ideas. The very notion of a refusal 
to let participants speak for themselves seemed extremely provocative, particularly if 
readers , committed to a particular humanism and ardour (Massumi, 1992) were to 
‘recognise’ this refusal as indicative of epistemic violence, rather than encountering 
the post-human difference it offered. It struck me as valuable in terms of its potential 
uses for developing a methodological writing that was less extensive and more 
concerned with intensity. Their use of Deleuze to transgress the boundaries of data 
and meaning enabled me to think and feel more freely about the data I was putting to 
work, and being put to work by. It ceased to be a question of what utterances, 
gathered on-line and off-line actually meant and became an inquiry into what the 
sonorous productions of bodies do. Even more pertinently, which other human and 
non-human bodies are implicated in this doing. They ask:  
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“[w]hat might it mean to see a speech act according to Deleuze? How 
does this inform methodological thinking that discards the truth/fabrication, 
speech/silence or simple/complex binaries?” (2012, 748).  
 
In the couplings which Mazzei and Jackson put forward it is the truth/ fabrication 
binary which resonates with the empirical materials of the doctoral project, and 
therefore the methods which work with this ‘problem’. As I have already noted, the 
thesis works with the Deleuzian event as a means of disrupting the bifurcation of true 
or false, but what their questions raised was the thinking-feeling that the line of 
questioning I was proceeding with was important beyond the scope of the problems I 
was engaging with. They were beyond the general and the particular, they were 
eventful problems which attempt to distinguish not true or false, but sense and 
signification, accident and event. As Deleuze notes “problematic ideas are not simple 
essences, but multiplicities or complexes of relations and corresponding singularities 
(Deleuze, 2004b, 103).  
 
Additionally, Mazzei and Jackson’s re-working of the Body without Organs, to 
produce the Voice-without-organs, formed a sense which was in keeping with my 
own work with the event, the way in which I had attempted to disrupt the humanist 
subject by considering that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies. Mazzei 
and Jackson note “to think a voice that is not constrained by a speaking subject, a 
‘voice without organs’ if you will, that is not bounded by the binaries between the 
discursive and the material” (2012, 750). As will become clearer in the following 
chapters of the thesis , the way in which Mazzei and Jackson disrupt the authority of 
the speaker by asking what speaking and ‘the spoken’ does, enabled my own 
encounters with the voices of ‘Joanne’ and others to have a similar refusal, a similar 
post-human ardour.  
 
In ‘Data-as-machine’ Alecia Youngblood Jackson asks not what data means “as 
signified or signifier” (2013, 113) but how does it work with, and in connection to 
other things. Jackson begins the chapter with what she terms a “conventional 
descriptive piece of data” (ibid) but does not offer categories, themes or patterns. 
Instead she treats data-as-machine which works when it enters and interrupts flows 
to produce different ontological possibilities. This, she suggests, exchanges the 
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traditional qualitative research question ‘how do we accurately represent being’ for 
how does being become in the act of representation? As such Jackson asks what 
her participants become when they are plugged into Deleuzian ideas and from this 
begins to work with the notion of the threshold. She observes:  
 
“[A] threshold does not become a passageway until it is attached to other 
things different to itself. Thresholds contain both entries and exits; they 
are both/and” (2013, 116).  
 
This is interesting as there is here, in this due attention to conjunctive synthesis, 
both/and, a connection to the paradox which features in my own work. Here, what is 
different, and worth drawing out as it is difference, not similarity, I am interested in, is 
that the interconnection of series and events enable a way in which to explore the 
moving structures which produce the conditions in which events come about.  
 
Folds of drawing in and opening up 
 
In this chapter I have introduced and considered in terms of my theoretical 
framework, the people and places my mobile and connective ethnography has 
engaged with. In doing so I have also attempted to analyse aspects of data which 
were significant to my project. This preliminary introduction of data has set in motion 
what will occur in the following chapters of the thesis. In the next sections I will put to 
work in more detail the empirical materials that I have gathered through my 
engagements, on line and off-line, with ‘Joanne’ and the pro-ana community. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISRUPTING 
COGNITIVE INTENTIONALITY – 
MOVING FROM THE MANIPULATIVE 
SUBJECT TOWARDS A 
PERSPICACIOUS BODY 
 
“Illness presents an eminently moral problem which, while being physical 
and psychological with very real and often debilitating effects, is also 
thoroughly philosophical in its import” (Tynan, 2010, 158). 
 
Trickery and Ruse 
 
‘The anorexic’ tricks the body and tricks hunger according to Deleuze (Arsic, 2008). 
While this is interesting it is my feeling that this assertion does not do enough to 
engage with the vibrancy of matter and the question of what a body can do. 
Provoked by Deleuze, the following piece of writing attempts to engage with ‘trickery’ 
and attempts to dislodge ‘anorexia’ from its image of thought (2004b), by taking 
account of the body’s own ‘perspicacity’ and the agency of matter. By exploring 
notions of temporality, metabolism (Bennett, 2010) and the proud verbs to eat/ to 
speak, which emerge in one of Deleuze’s early works Logic of Sense (2004a), I will 
explore the way in which matter attempts to have ‘the last word’ in difficult 
relationships to feeding the body, by itself becoming trickster: If it were not always 
already so. 
 
In this chapter I will give an overview of an article written by Branka Arsic before 
engaging with my own writing which was provoked by this first meeting with Deleuze. 
I will then, in the second part of the chapter, move towards a discussion which took 
place on ‘Fragile Beauty’, one of the early sites I observed in my mobile or 
connective ethnography. The thread, or on-line discussion, is entitled ‘This is to the 
girl who said she wants to be anorexic’, occasionally abbreviated in the chapter to ‘to 
the girl’. In, amongst, and to the side of the sense, nonsense, trickery and desire 
which leaps from the thread there haunts a common sense articulation – the popular 
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notion of ‘being in control’. As will become apparent as the chapter develops, ‘being 
in control’ is always already paradoxically becoming out of control as the inside and 
outside of ideas and bodies each enfold one another in uncertain disorienting 
mixtures. 
 
Here the notion of control is pertinent in the context of the experiment, a concept 
which will be engaged with in the first part of this chapter. It is the contention of the 
thesis that both the testimonial ‘to the girl’, and the notion of the experiment fail, 
differently, to destroy ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought. In terms of the 
former, the address can be seen to attempt to become revolutionary, but in the 
mobilisation of accidents, and good and common sense, it colludes with the 
representational logic of the same difference, as opposed to real difference, or 
singularity. Here I am positing real difference as that which may be experienced by 
the bodies in their becoming different, becoming sicker and healthier- but not in 
terms which can be reduced to weight loss or other empirically observable ‘facts’, or 
accidents. The writing on the experiment that I engage with through Arsic and later 
through Mann O’Donnell, considers the possibility of ‘doses’ as a means of avoiding 
hypochondria (Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 176), which for the purposes of the discussion 
implies becoming colonised by illness, as divided from health.  
 
Here the idea of “small doses of self-dismantling [and] small tastes of de-
organisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, quoted in Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 177) is very 
useful to the thesis’ desire to look towards possibilities of movement which would 
dislodge ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought. This un-doing of the “organised, 
signified, subjectified” (ibid) self is, as doses implies, not an act. It is an ongoing 
activity, or rather, experimental practice. It can produce the conditions whereby new 
connections can be made, but only if one does not overdose.  
 
The experimentalist cannot take all their ‘meds’ at once. Becoming experimental 
involves a certain ‘realism’. A waking up to the idea that neither the hand of God nor 
a sacrifice made to the dogmatic image of thought can cure what ails you. The point 
is, what ails you is you. Not an essential or individualised you, but an organised, 
signified, subjectified you. To clarify the important point here, it is not a question of 
complete annihilation. These are “self-destructions that have nothing to do with the 
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death drive” (Deleuze and Guattari, quoted in Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 177). As 
Deleuze and Guattari assert: 
 
“You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn […] 
you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to 
enable you to respond to the dominant reality” (ibid).  
 
I now want to cut together these ideas of dose and experimentation with the sense of 
the address ‘to the girl’. Below we can see the working of recognition, “I wish you the 
best of luck in killing yourself. Because that's all you'll be doing”, and prediction, “I'll 
let you know exactly what will happen to you”. As noted at the start of this chapter, 
part of the sense produced by the address is revolutionary: Yet the mobilisation of 
accidents, good and common sense, prediction and recognition, collude with the 
representational logic of the same difference. As such, rather than engaging with 
“small doses of self-dismantling” (ibid), which are always happening in the middle of 
things, ‘to the girl’ speaks of an inevitable ending. 
 
“I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you. If this doesn't make you 
realize how completely stupid running out there and trying to develop 
anorexia is, then I wish you the best of luck in killing yourself. Because 
that's all you'll be doing” (unknown author of ‘to the girl who wants to be 
anorexic’).  
 
Here, in both notions of control, either being in control of the body through what I will 
term the super molecular promise of Anorexia, an idea which makes reference to 
Derrida’s idea of the promissory quality of entities (Bennett, 2010); or controlling the 
‘anorexic experiment’ through doses of self-undoing, there remain problems which I 
will spend time in this chapter teasing out. I will be exploring the way in which the 
address, ‘to the girl’, becomes impotent in its iconoclastic demythologizing task by 
representing ‘anorexia’ through good and common sense. Put differently, the tools 
the unknown author ‘selects’, or perhaps is selected by, to critique ‘anorexia’ actually 
reinforce it as a dogmatic image of thought. The other notion of control, that of 
experimentation and dosages, although it pushes the limits of possible ways of 
becoming healthy and becoming ill, fails to account for the not-quite-human-
capaciousness-of-matter that Bennett (2010), and other new materialists, draw 
attention to. 
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On the Experiment  
 
As I first encountered Branka Arsic’s article ‘The Experimental Ordinary: Deleuze on 
Eating and Anorexic Elegance’ (2008) something occurred. Having not previously 
read Deleuze, or his thoughts about eating, my ‘plugging in’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2013) to this text was awkward and ambivalent. What I would speak of it was that I 
did not care for it, particularly the playful approximation of ‘elegance’ and ‘anorexia’. 
It hurt my humanist soft spot and filled my head with general and particular images of 
thought which all danced with ‘I think’. The audacity of approximating that which 
gives rise to ‘suffering’ to a stylish flourish! It irked me, pricked me, felt poignant to 
me (Barthes, 2000). Yet what I would speak of it was not what I felt of it, not how I 
was affected by it. In a bubbling which would not find its way to words, was a 
ressentiment (Deleuze, 2004a, 170). It was Deleuze’s fault that I now felt confused 
and angry about what I thought I knew. I intended to avoid what I felt seduced by: I 
would avoid Deleuze and decline the event.  
 
However, this encounter was not limited to a present reading, a looking at words in 
the state of affairs. Instead something arched over a past-future, not the arrow of 
time but a thought needle picking up and dropping threads unpredictably. Something 
in the world produced something capacious. I did not resign myself to having to read 
Deleuze further, but found myself in the middle of doing so, eating the words that 
had already been partially digested by Arsic. I had to plug into a blank page and 
allow bits of things, vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010), to spill out. However, as we will 
see later, through the words of ‘precious pains’, it was not the case that “if I spilled 
out my guts, it would be this article exactly”, it was rather, something very different, 
something towards singularity. 
 
These ‘bits of things’ spilled; they materialised through matter and language, each 
fragment happily and unhappily contaminated by a certain visceral leaping. 
Memories were encountered that could not be reduced or claimed. In the process of 
writing I tried to become situated in the half a second before actual words emerged. 
In this situatedness non-human actants surfaced: ‘Things’ which could not be seen in 
vision. Phantasms of hysteria and trickery were conjured by spectres of logic 
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produced an entangled assemblage of words and things. In and amongst these 
quasi causal elements was the desire to engage with trickery in a manner which 
disrupted thoughts regarding how and where ‘tricks’ start and end, and ‘who’ the 
‘agent’ of the tricks, the tricksters, are. In this inquiry I hoped there might be a way in 
which to excavate the sedimented cleavage of conscious intentionality and dumb 
matter which, up to this point, had felt like a foundation rather than a brick wall upon 
which Humpty, the stoic master, sits “opposing the impassibility of events to the 
actions and passions of bodies[..]  in short, the ‘pride’ of verbs to the complacency of 
substantives and adjectives” (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 – 31). 
 
‘The Experimental Ordinary’ - Deleuze on eating and anorexic elegance. 
 
Arsic discusses Deleuze’s notion of the feminine through eating, cooking and 
anorexia, framing the latter as a “micro-political experimentation in fashioning one’s 
own body on its flight to becoming woman” (2008, 24). She mobilises the Body 
without Organs (BwO) and the possibilities it gives rise to in relation to the invention 
of desires . Arsic notes that “Deleuze’s understanding of anorexia differs 
fundamentally from the common understanding of anorexia nervosa” (2008, 35), 
which she notes as emerging from Freudian suppositions regarding origins, cause 
and effects. Deleuze is said not to take the ‘eating order’ or ‘shared bodily 
perception’ for granted. In terms of the former, the ‘eating order’, this is said to 
presume too much about what the organism ‘lives on’ (2008, 36), and in terms of the 
latter, this throws into question the readily available image of thought regarding ‘the 
anorexics’ skewed reading of bodily appearance. As Arsic notes: 
 
“To say that the anorexic has a different image of her own body, which 
does not adequately represent the ‘real’ shape of it [....] is to suppose the 
normalising instance of a shared perception: one should see one’s own 
body the way everybody else sees it” (ibid). 
 
In terms of experimentation, it is the ‘organised’ organic body which is refused in 
‘anorexia’. Here the Deleuzian lexicon provides a new weapon for engaging with 
embodiment, through the notion of the demanding ‘organism’, which, in the case of 
‘anorexia’ is denied its requests in the process of “becoming the inventor of a light 
and liquid body” (Deleuze, 1987, quoted in Arsic, 2008, 37). Arsic evokes the idea of 
natural hunger, without scare quotes or emphasis, stating that anorexia is a “politics 
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of betrayal of natural hunger” (ibid) as hunger is what the organism subjects the body 
to. 
 
On closer, or perhaps through a post-human reading, what initially bruised my soft 
spot, the notion of ‘anorexic elegance’, can be seen to disrupt linear temporalisations 
and the ruling Idea of the eating (order), “ [the] essentially [..] Platonic operation, as 
Deleuze describes it, of bringing things under the action of the Idea” (MacLure, 2013, 
169). Arsic addresses anorexic elegance as being “not about consuming – having 
things that everybody has – but rather about existing in a mode that subverts the 
difference between genus and species. It tries to find its way out of being and not 
being by entering the existence of becoming or more precisely, of manners. [...] The 
formula of anorexic elegance, therefore, is not fashion and consumption but fashion 
and manners, or style, “a ‘mode of life” (Deleuze, 1987, 3).  
 
The notion of ‘style’ links productively back to some important ideas which have 
already been introduced through Massumi’s Semblance and Event (2011), and also 
through the paradox that my work engages with, mental illness and ‘lifestyle choice’.  
Massumi gives a semblance as an aesthetic affect, from which we could make an 
obvious link to ‘anorexic elegance’ in Deleuze. Massumi notes the semblance as  
 
“a ‘placeholder’ in present perception of a potential ‘more’ to life’ [...] the 
thing’s perceived margin of changability, the thinking feeling of potential 
appearing [...] A semblance is a direct perception of a life style.” (2011, 
50-51).  
 
As such, it might be suggested that annunciations of anorexia as a ‘lifestyle choice’, 
one side of the paradox the thesis engages with, is not so much the evocation of free 
will per se, but the sense in present perception of a place holder of a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body’s “perceived margin of changeability”. In other 
words, we might consider this side of the paradox as a lived and abstract disruption 
of ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ as an unchanging, static, entity, represented through the good 
and common sense of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. In addition, the notion of 
manners is linked to the being of the sensible, “not the given, but that by which the 
given is given” (Deleuze, 2004b, 176). Not the varied, but the variation, the activity or 
process by which something becomes (Williams, 2008a, 25). 
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However, this style, this elegance, is not to be confused with the person who 
actualises it, it is not ‘theirs’. Manners do not exist as ‘mine’ but are possible only as 
the effect of the relation that connects impersonal lives. Here there emerges an 
encounter between ‘manners’ and Massumi’s notion of pre-personal affect:  
 
“Impersonal affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible 
glue that holds the world together. In event. The world-glue of affect is an 
autonomy of event-connection continuing across its own serialised 
capture in context” (Massumi, 2002, 217).  
 
Manners, much like impersonal affect, are processual yet a-temporal, negating the ‘I’ 
that always remains conditioned by time (Arsic, 2008). I would suggest that the style 
and elegance Deleuze and Massumi bring to bear are in the “fourth person singular” 
(Massumi, 2011, 134), or perhaps even more singularly, of the fourth person 
singular. Particularly as the evocation of ‘of’ makes apparent a link between manners 
and notions of virtuality, incorporeality, mood and the interval betwixt bodies and 
language. Additionally, both speaking and eating, which Deleuze brings to bear in in 
Logic of Sense (2004a) relate, in the state of affairs, to manners and etiquette. In 
other words, manners are both virtual and actual, corporeal and incorporeal. 
 
Here I would like to draw attention to the significance of this divergence of thought 
and the possibilities which arose from a desire to produce ‘anorexia’ as 
unrecognisable (Deleuze, 2004b). It is perhaps not only a questioning of the activity 
of thinking and researching ‘anorexia’ away from common popular reason, but rather 
of encountering ‘it’ as a rebel becoming which exceeds codes and representations 
as “static relations among already formed entities” (MacLure, 2013, 169-171). 
 
Returning to elegance 
 
Although Deleuze presents ‘aesthetic figures’ when he speaks about ‘anorexic 
elegance’ , for instance, Virginia Woolf, Murnau and Kay Kendal (Arsic, 48,55) I read 
this as distinct to ‘anorexia’ manifest in the state of affairs. It is instead, as noted 
previously, linked to style and manners performed in the fourth person singular. 
Rather than the conceptual personae, grasped in an absolute form, aesthetic figures 
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are ceaselessly becoming-other. Therefore, it is not only a literal starvation which is 
heralded as a micro-political rebellion, it is the virtuality of the movement, nuance 
and novelty of experimentation, the resistance of the stratified gendered and 
organised body which is in the process of becoming elegant. Although ‘aesthetic 
figures’ actualise this becoming, it is not ‘theirs’. The elegance is not some unveiled 
and latent quality, but rather in and amongst the assemblage of affects, movements, 
scents and sense which at times glide over actual things, becoming available to 
processes of individuation, as it were, rather than the possession of individuals. 
 
It might now be helpful to make a link back to the idea noted before regarding the 
way in which Deleuze questions the ‘eating’ order, and think of this becoming of 
anorexic elegance as connected to the paradox of health, whereby illness is an 
imminent process, not state, of health. Both are connected and moving along a 
mobius strip of toxin and remedy. “True health can only take the form of a continuous 
revaluation of illness [.....] which brings about its own autocritique and self-
overcoming” (Tynan, 2010, 155). Here it is my understanding that we see an 
important and relevant connection, or brushing up, between the real and abstract 
possibilities of counter-actualisation, as opposed to ‘recovery’, and the ‘art of 
dosages’ developed by Nietzsche in his flight from a Socratic ‘cure’. Ideas which are 
taken up by Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in their notion of the BwO (body 
without organs). Put differently, as with revolution, neither health nor victory can be 
proclaimed or secured once and for all. It is less a question of how to prevent or cure 
and more a question of bringing about paradoxically creative, measured, and 
unpredictable activities which re-double, rather than repair, the cracks which a 
body’s stuttering and vibrating bring about.  
 
I do not want to stray too far from the line of argumentation that I set out for this 
chapter. However, within this territory of dosages, experiments, health and illness it 
becomes necessary to draw attention to one of the pernicious effects of engaging 
with eating (dis)orders only through good and common sense which creates 
categories and assigns bodies to them. Following on from the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari Sarah Mann O’Donnell describes the art of dosages as ‘autoimmune self-
immunisation’ “by which we prescribe to ourselves just enough of the toxins of 
organisation and stratification to be able to take our experiments that bit further” 
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(Tynan, 2010, 156). Here, for my work there are many things going on and coming 
about and I have to take responsibility for the cuts that I am making here, bringing 
just one of Mann O’Donnel’s incredible insights to bear. However, for the purposes of 
this chapter, which engages with the organism, the experiment, relationships to 
feeding the body and the points at which theories-of-rub-against-practices-of, there is 
something within this notion of auto-immune self-immunisation which should be 
interrogated a little further. Particularly in light of the points I have attempted to make 
regarding the experimenting body.  
 
I am compelled, indeed moved to think-and-feel with the art of dosages and the idea 
of ‘auto-immune self-immunisation’, which on one hand appears to have the texture 
of becoming master of causes and actualisations (Deleuze, 2004a), “allow[ing] the 
self to deterritorialise and reterritorialise itself into just enough of a balance to 
continue the experiments” (Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 178). Yet, on the other hand, this 
seems to glide too easily over the way in which relationships to feeding the body, the 
experiment, imply numerous human and non-human others in its corporeal and 
incorporeal mixtures. To engage with the (abstract of the) concrete I would like to 
draw attention to the way in which the experimenter is answerable, in many diverse 
and paradoxical ways, to funders and stakeholders: parents, mealtimes, friends, 
siblings, carbohydrates, health practitioners, the stomach, metabolism, hormones 
and the DSM, and currently, ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought. 
 
I cut together the empirical material below with the idea of the complicated 
experiment. This ‘data’ is cut apart from a discussion between ‘myself’ and ‘Joanne’. 
Cut apart from the other 7,000 words and innumerable movements, sounds and 
potentials of ‘the interview’, manifest in the state of affairs.  
 
S: How are you feeling? 
J: well good because I’ve actually managed to lose some weight this week 
but worse because I’ve not had the energy to do the exercise and I’m 
trying to find a balance between feeling better because I’ve not eaten 
anything and feeling better because I’ve exercised but I have been 
struggling to do both  
S: So something that I would like to know more about is why it is difficult 
to go for meals out? 
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J well I don’t like people seeing what I’m eating anyway and even though I 
know what a normal portion is I always feel like I’m eating too much or I’m 
hardly eating anything and its Bens dads birthday tonight so we are all 
going for an Indian  
S: so what are your thoughts there?  
L: Scared, it’s really difficult with Ben’s family because they are all, apart 
from his dad, quite big and there is no such thing as a normal sized 
portion. When we went on Monday I was really careful because I know if I 
eat too much they notice if I don’t eat enough they pick up on it so even if I 
were to eat normally ...I feel I have to over eat to please them. 
S: So do you feel you want to do what pleases you rather than what 
pleases others? Lots of energy seems to be spent on doing things for 
others and keeping them feeling okay, do you ever feel angry and want to 
put your foot down?  
J: Not really cos i nearly did end up in hospital last time and i know that if I 
was to say I don’t want to eat that Ben would take that really, really bad, 
he’d have me down the doctor 
S: So you said that you were nearly put in hospital, when was that?  
J: My grandma nearly had me put in hospital then when I was seventeen, 
I was nearly sectioned because of my eating habits  
 
In the above empirical materials one of the things that is of interest in the context of 
dosages is the way in which ‘Joanne’ is trying to ‘experiment’. She notes:  
 
“I’m trying to find a balance between feeling better because I’ve not eaten 
anything and feeling better because I’ve exercised but I have been 
struggling to do both”. 
 
From this we can see that the ‘balance’ ‘Joanne’ is trying to accomplish 
includes affects and proud verbs, to feel better, to find. Yet she is finding the 
experimentation difficult, as she notes, she is ‘struggling to do both’. Joanne 
thinks that she is struggling to find the appropriate mixture which will produce a 
desired affect. Importantly she does not just want to feel better. Here, I would 
like to suggest that ‘Joanne’ wants to find the perfect, perfectly prescribed dose. 
The point at which a dosage becomes a repeat prescription. A prescription, I 
would argue, would remove the gift-burden of experimentation. It would 
promise a feeling-better not just in the present, but in the future as well.  
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Although experimentation might involve formulas, structural practices that 
provide particular conditions, these structural practices are always already 
moving. Bits of things, human and non-human entities get added to the mixture 
without the express intent of human activity. Objects become apparatus and 
contrariwise apparatuses become objects (Barad, 2007). Here, on this tangent 
of ‘change’ I would like to return to some of the ideas I discussed in previous 
chapters regarding series, events and proud verbs. As ‘Joanne’s’ corporeality 
facilitates the bringing together of the infinitives to feel and to find changes are 
produced in both series. The residue of affects produced by the event to feel 
seep into the event to find and curdle into a desire for certainty that will return 
‘Joanne’, differently, to an organised, stratified, subjectified body. Or perhaps it 
will not. I cannot predict that it will. What is important here is that it becomes a 
possibility due to the change in sense which emerges as infinitives intra-act 
(Barad, 2007) with one another. 
 
To return to the quote with which the chapter commences, health is both corporeal 
and incorporeal – touching mixtures of bodies and the philosophical corpus. In other 
words, although self-immunisation is possible, at the level of the state of affairs, 
within the territory of the actual where good and common sense circulates readily, it 
would be unethical and uncritical to suppose that the experiment of dosages is not 
inf(l)ected by or in relation to, the moving structures of age, gender, race, class and 
sexuality. We feel this in the material affects produced by Joanne’s words above as 
she speaks of her previous brush with being sectioned: A brush which was 
conditioned by her age, which was in turn inflected by her gender. This event, to be 
sectioned, produced a change in the series of eating and speaking, the sense of 
what is to eat and the sense of what it is to not eat. 
 
Here I would like to re-connect the idea of proper names by making the point that 
potentially radical experiments tend to become formulaic and not simply because 
eating behaviours accord an inherent logic. On the contrary, as we have seen 
‘sense’ is a moving and movable feast. What I am suggesting is that the grammar of 
everyday use, What Deleuze and Guattari refer to as standard language, (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994, 176), is not the language of the event. Standard language is 
always already circumspect to nominal categories and proper names. My point is 
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that difficult relationships to feeding the body are not predicable, yet they are 
produced as such by orthodox material-linguistic-affective practices. Here I would 
like to suggest that the proper name ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ is an ‘assemblage converter’ 
(Bennett, 2010, 42) which conservatively re-shapes experimentation and potentiality 
into forms that it can recognise. In other words, within the state of affairs more often 
than not experiments with the ‘eating order’ are stratified. In the unhelpful and 
conservative process of becoming-proper bodies are unable to “free aesthesis from 
its petrification within established [..] models in order to put processes of creativity 
into contact with everyday experience” (Tynan, 2010, 160). To once again cut 
‘Joanne’s’ words together with a discussion of dosages I would like to disrupt an old 
adage of difference, ‘one man’s meat is another man’s poison’ – ‘one man’s 
autoimmune self-immunisation could be a young girl’s entry to a psychiatric ward’. 
The point that I am trying to make here is that although there is hopefulness in 
experimentation it is not a hopefulness that is available to all equally.  
 
Returning to Arsic, the article ends by stating that:  
 
“In thinking about anorexia I don’t intend to recommend it. It is up to 
everybody to invent their own micro politics of pain. Anorexia should be 
understood to represent a particular strategy of resistance, and rescuing it 
from the inane ideology of an ‘eating disorder’, as well as from the blunt 
theory of a ‘consumption’ neurosis is a function of such resistance” (2008, 
57).  
 
Here, while I do feel that challenging the notion of ‘eating disorder’ is productive, the 
idea of rescuing anorexia is not. I feel that there is already a good deal of virtual ink 
spilled by members of the pro-ana community trying to rescue ‘it’ from becoming a 
bad name (Giles, 2006). I would suggest, quite contrary to any rescue mission, that 
we make the standard language of ‘anorexia nervosa’ cry and tremble (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, 176), while engaging more abstractly with those who have a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body. 
 
The infinitive ‘to ‘rescue’ is not only ‘a couple of words’, it has material implications. 
Not only does it create an event through the infinitive or proud verb, rather 
unhelpfully the event which is evoked involves the heroic subject of humanism and 
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imperialism. Also, it is my feeling that it is unethical to speak about difficult 
relationships to feeding the body in terms of understanding; as though sense and 
nonsense were a non-relation and the marrow of meaning could be extracted 
(Barthes, 1982). Also connected to the way in which Arsic recommends a particular 
‘understanding’ is the infinitive, or proud verb to represent. In addition to the 
problems of representation per se (see MacLure, 2013), to suggest that anorexia 
represents “a particular strategy of resistance”, is to make it speak on behalf of 
something else. By speaking on behalf of something else it is denied its real 
difference. To evoke anorexia as a ‘resistance’, without also engaging with the 
paradoxical nature of conformity and resistance is unhelpful (See Day, 2010). It is 
my contention that there can be no radical resistance where proper names are still 
mobilised. They always, perhaps necessarily so, bring with them a residue of 
conformity and stratification. Arsic notes that: 
 
“Needless to say, the experimentation called anorexia can be dangerous, 
indeed lethal. The anorexic has to be able to guide the experiment without 
being guided by it. She has to experiment without ending in the failure of 
experimentation, the point at which the experiment turns against the 
experimenter and becomes deadly” (Arsic, 2008, 58. Emphasis added)  
 
In the above quote the subject, the anorexic, and the object, anorexia, the knower, 
the anorexic-experimenter, and the known, the anorexic-experiment, are positioned 
in a manner which pre-supposes a human agent who has the capacity to ‘be in 
control’ of an experiment. As such it is the contention of the thesis that this 
conclusion undermines the visceral knowledge of that which is being experimented 
on – the body-organism – the matter of matter. It does little to make apparent a “lack 
of fixed object-apparatus distinction” (Barad, 2007, 357).  
 
This point leads me back to my original notes on ‘The Experimental Ordinary’ and 
my critique of the way in which it is only the human which is performing the trickery. 
Here original writings are enfolded into new idea-machines thereby functioning in the 
methodological interval of ‘data-analysis-interpretation’  
 
Swallowing Hunger  
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“An apparent conflict arises between desiring-machines and the body 
without organs. Every coupling of machines, every production of a 
machine, every sound of a machine running, becomes  unbearable to the 
body without organs. [The] sound of [the] machine running [is] unbearable 
to the body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, 9). 
 
In the case of a difficult relationship to feeding the body, previous relations to the 
organism shift. The rumbling stomach, the annoying noise from the depths of the 
body is ignored. The previous practice of relating to the body through externally 
sourced food transmutes into the body that eats itself- along with hunger. Both are 
swallowed down into the depths of the body – in the autopoiesis of becoming 
cannibal. 
 
The organism’s appetite has to be silenced. Hunger, both as embodied sensation, 
and as Idea is refused, and refused so often that the stomach-organ, confused, 
acidic, and having too much space to think, no longer knows its own stomach-mind10. 
Hunger is in the process of becoming an undefined sensation among other confusing 
singular flows: tears, nausea, lethargy, thought, affects.  
 
However, appetite cannot be totally forgotten, totally swallowed or refused. There 
remains something dry and incorporeal about appetite that keeps coming up, 
connecting to what I will term the gastro-pellation of the noisy stomach. It moves 
about the arms and legs which are becoming achy, sore and twitchy. So often 
ignored the sound of the organism changes its refrain, it sneaks back in through 
other tunes, orchestrating a confused and confusing human non-human dissonance. 
Take for instance the stomach of a ‘well-functioning’ body which is accustomed to 
regular intervals of nourishment, it is capable and clever enough, through its 
interconnection to other organs including hormones and blood, of self-regulation; of 
indicating that it has been fuelled sufficiently. However, the stomach in its shrinking 
disconnection, silenced and forced to the corner of the organism in the depths of the 
                                            
10
Although this is not the basis of the argument, the idea of a second brain in the stomach has been 
engaged with, particularly in the field of Neurogastroenterology where the interactions between the 
brain and gut are studied. An article in Scientific American by Adam Hadhazy (2010) notes that 
“Given the two brains' commonalities, other depression treatments that target the mind can 
unintentionally impact the gut. The enteric nervous system uses more than 30 neurotransmitters, just 
like the brain, and in fact 95 percent of the body's serotonin is found in the bowels 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gut-second-brain/[accessed 22
nd
 March 2014] 
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body, doesn’t remain quiet indefinitely. All stomachs rumble from time to time; 
however, with a difficult relationship to feeding the body this indecipherable 
cacophony appears to come from outside: a sonorous quality and quantity which 
cannot be spoken of or eaten indefinitely. 
 
Body-becoming - cartel 
 
‘Anorexia nervosa’, the stratified and proper name translates from Latin as ‘nervous 
loss of appetite’. But the organism doesn’t lack appetite, it is always getting bigger 
and getting smaller than it was – breaching into territories of sickness, tiredness, 
lethargy, angst and elation. The body without organs, which is not the body itself as 
projection (Deleuze and Guatarri, 2004a) is virtual – real and abstract – incorporeal. 
However to properly consider the ‘anorexic’s tricks and betrayal’ or what Arsic 
following Deleuze refers to as “a micro-political experimentation” (2008, 43), we must 
consider also the actual body with its blood filled organs and flowing hormonal 
actants. The disobedient vital organism will not stay where it has been put. 
Annoyingly it attempts to crack through the strictures towards the mouth opening. 
Sometimes it cannot be forced back down to the depths and manages to procure 
things which feel both too big and too small for a body steeled and practiced at not 
doing this sort of thing. What was overcome in this acquisition of what was always 
too big and too small was the actuality of food, the virtuality of intentional will, and 
the proud verb to refuse. However, if pride comes before a fall, this is not a “Fall 
from, but a beginning Fall” (Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 163) which entails the almost 
unbearable waiting for possibility and actuality.  
 
"If I am nineteen years old, sixty pounds, and eating a carton of yoghurt a 
day, and it takes me precisely two hours to eat this carton of yoghurt, and 
I smoke a cigarette every fifteen minutes to prove that I can stop eating, 
then I will be safe, retaining my dictatorial grip on my body, my life, my 
world. By contrast, If I so much as taste a bit of unsafe food on my tongue, 
it will not travel through my body in the usual biological fashion but will 
magically make me grow, like Alice taking a bite of the wrong cake." 
(ana4eva). 
 
The language ana4eva serves to the reader seems to contain traces of esoteric 
riddle which would not be out of place in either Carroll’s Wonderland or The Logic of 
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Sense. “If I am, x, y, z: what am I?11” One could almost imagine the haughty 
caterpillar, through rings of smoke, or the Cheshire Cat through his disembodied 
smile, presenting this puzzle to the adventuring Alice.  However, alongside this 
answerless riddle we find in the recipe of ascetic bodily practices something real and 
abstract, virtual or incorporeal. Ana4ever suggests that there is something other than 
‘usual biology’ at work which can bring about magical growth.  
 
For both Deleuze and ana4eva there is more to the body than meets the eye. As we 
have already noted bodies are causes in relation to one another, causes of 
“‘incorporeal entities’ […] events” (2004a, 7). Here, the language of the event allows 
us to engage with this idea of magical growth without discounting it as the bizarre or 
paranoid fantasy of the mentally ill. The tasting body does not cause the f-actual 
growth of usual biology; it causes a magical and imperceptible growth which pertains 
to the incorporeal dimension of the body, its potential. To paraphrase Massumi 
(2002), that which is imperceptible and insensate; but moves through sensation. 
 
In this articulation we have perhaps an awareness of the virtual: the potential of the 
body in movement. However, this movement refuses the final resting place of a 
distinct emotional state or particular word. It relates to both the depths of bodies and 
the surface of language. Although the extract evokes a process of becoming, of 
potential, in the last instant this is somewhat tied to the fixity of being an actual 
anorexic. Ana4eva senses the potential of the body, yet potential is not amenable to 
a dictatorial grip. As such, potential must be sutured to a predictable, determined, 
individualised actual: physical growth. To an obdurate palette, the uncertainty of 
embodied potential creates an abject taste on the tip of the tongue. The pre-
individuality of the event is individualised through a focus on ana4eva’s actual body. 
 
The long term reverberations of a difficult relationship to feeding the body affect what 
‘it’ can do. Veins, ovaries, stomachs, breasts, legs and arms may shrink but they 
remain defiantly present. They form a cartel and begin making noisier demands for 
sustenance. Since stomach rumbles can be ignored too easily, blood, hormones and 
chemicals become actants insisting that difficulty be overcome so that the body is 
                                            
11
 Anorexic, Ana, Mentally Ill, Wannarexic etcetera, etcetera 
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fed. The organism is starting to play its own tricks, engaging in its own 
experimentation. 
 
The material and bio-chemical connections pertaining to appetite and satiation within 
the organism and which work to sustain vitality have been attacked. There has been 
an attempt on upon life. This deliberately disconnected body no longer functions like 
other bodies: It is becoming different. A difficult relationship to feeding the body 
pushes to the corners of its territory, and treats as suspicious, the organs it must live 
at the border of.  
 
What is this sensation? Where is the sound coming from? It can’t be hunger that was 
eaten a while ago to assuage some previous affect. More to the point though is the 
question of what is to be done about it. The organism will not eat; but if the organism 
does not eat it will not quieten. How much to eat? Until the stomach says enough? 
But the stomach has shrunk and its already full bits of things, acid, angst, butterflies 
and hunger. The organism can’t be trusted: but still the noise, everywhere. Moving 
and affecting, sanguine and alive: the body is indubitably with organs.  
 
The Experimenting Body 
 
I now want to move more firmly away from the idea of a trickster subject to consider 
a trickster of another kind – the experimenting body. Here I want to consider the 
‘cleverness’ of the body-machine when it cannot, or will not, be fed. Due to the fact 
that matter, in good and common sense, is so often reduced the dumb material 
which houses the higher power of the thinking mind, what is often misunderstood is 
the issue of trust. Those who have a difficult relationship to feeding the body can’t 
trust any-body. They cannot eat comfort or assurance spoken by those who are 
assumed to eat with comfort. Those who have experienced the jolting territory at the 
surface of sense and in the depth of the body cannot bite the hand that feeds them, 
or tries to rescue them. It is not necessarily the case that the Other does not know 
what ‘eating disorder’ means, this is a miscalculation of ‘the problem’. It is more likely 
that problems emerge because the other thinks they do.  
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What this abstracted good sense cannot know is the situated intensity of the food-
body-consuming assemblage. These “consolations á l’ameriaine” (Deleuze, 2004a, 
177) - “you won’t over eat”, “you won’t put on lots of weight quickly”, “you’ll feel better 
in yourself” - cannot be swallowed. In the case of a difficult relationship to feeding the 
body, fear inspiring bodily difference is apparent. You cannot assume what a body 
can do, contrariwise, you cannot assume what it will not do, which is to say that it will 
always already be doing something – bubbling, effervescing unpredictable potential. 
 
Incrementally, the organism’s corporeality and wetness set in motion a biological 
becoming. As Deleuze was never a little girl, he never experienced this first betrayal, 
this experimenting body. His change in appetite would lead him to an entirely 
different machine, an entirely different social power. Questions regarding where this 
‘trickery’ starts and ends, or who or what make the first betrayal both miss the point 
of middling activity yet provide an interesting encounter for thought. It might be 
suggested that it is the organism that makes the first move in the far from ideal 
game. As the matter of the body changes, without permission, or without what we 
usually take to be permission, a trick is played.  
 
The young girl affectively knows that her change is instigated by an experiment not 
of her design, an experiment watched by the Other and her own alterity, doubled in 
language, doubled as she produces her own corporeal and incorporeal double. 
 
“The ideal little girl incorporeal and anorexic[..] must disengage 
themselves from their real, voracious, gluttonous or blundering images” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 30).  
 
The girl’s organism is always already pushing her into a contested and ambivalent 
spatio-temporality, the demanding category of Woman. Given that “the individual that 
has never recognised itself within the limits of [gender] the self and the I, even where 
these are universal” (Deleuze, 2004b, 323), the promissory quality of ‘Anorexia 
Nervosa’, as short hand for difference and an apparent alternative to metaphysical 
limits is a powerful one. Even though the promise is whispered in good and common 
sense, a body can become enchanted by the possibility of becoming limitless.  
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Perhaps there is a paradoxical acknowledgement in a difficult relationship to feeding 
the body of the ‘cleverness’ of matter. Here, and by relating to it as dumb, to be 
controlled, restrained and disciplined, is the alibi of a secret: an unholy knowledge of 
the organism’s own knowledge and astuteness, its capacity to become both as lived 
abstractness and blood filled flesh. Perhaps, without access to the materiality of the 
language of the event to plug into, the difficult relationship to feeding the body steers 
and disciplines female matter not because it is fat and stupid, on the contrary, it is 
steered and controlled because it so cleverly has a sense of its own difference. This 
difference is always too much and not enough because good and common sense 
and the ‘eating order’ reduce difference to mere resemblance, the same, or the 
similar (Deleuze, 2004b).  
 
A digestive assemblage 
 
I would now like to engage with a digestive assemblage which includes the human 
and the non-human. Here, to help me engage in a more post-human manner with 
the body I will draw on Jane Bennett’s work on the agency of assemblages and 
edible matter (2010), Karen Barad’s notions of intra-action and entanglement (2007) 
and Deleuze’s notion of the dual cause (2004a). I will put these to work with 
empirical materials noted at the beginning of this chapter, those emerging from the 
discussion thread entitled ‘To the girl who says she wants to be anorexic’.  
 
The thread in question is the most sustained discussion that I observed whilst 
engaging with pro-ana spaces on-line, and emerged one month before the site which 
hosted it was closed. The thread is initiated, but not written, by a user called 
Porcelainshell. The empirical materials it produced on the forum amounted to almost 
ten thousand words from users such as cosmicdancer, Am3thyst and monkigal. 
Copied to a word document for early and provisional analysis this empirical material 
became enfolded into other literatures, moments and ideas as I scribbled in the 
margins. As I scrawled arrows, left coffee stains and made indelible references to 
pages in books that emerged in the encounter that this discussion provoked. The 
thread commences thus: 
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“In the few short days I have been on this forum I have noticed a number 
of posts regarding people who want to be anorexic and are here for that 
sole purpose. I didn't write the following but found it about a year back and 
wanted to share it with everyone, anorexic or not, in hopes of putting how 
serious this lifestyle/disease is into perspective. I'd like to know what 
everyone else’s thoughts are on this. (Porcelainshell) 
 
Due to the length of material found and posted by Porcelainshell, just over 3,000 
words, it cannot be quoted in its entirety. Additionally, and methodologically, the 
presumption that reproducing ‘word for word’ the testament of an individual, would 
somehow unveil its ‘truth’ would be counter to my interest in the sense of the event. 
As such I will write with-and-of the unnamed writer, allowing their words to collapse 
into ‘my own’ materiality and ‘my’ words to hopefully provoke a sense of the 
discussion, rather than conceitedly explaining ‘what it really means’. 
 
In addition to the voluminous contributions which emerged over the on-line life of the 
thread, what was also interesting was the way in which it wrote of the body and went 
some way to disrupt both good and common sense understandings of eating 
disorders and also Deleuze and Arsic’s ideas regarding the experiment. Put another 
way, this material intra-acts productively with the ideas I developed earlier with 
regard to the experimenting body, returning me to cut together the quote which 
opened the chapter to consider how this attempt to disrupt the promise of ‘anorexia’,  
its desirability, is limited by the mobilisation of good and common sense which keeps 
the territory stratified. Consider these questions, prepared by Deleuze, and by on-
line user ANANA respectively, about danger and limits.  
 
“Is it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack while 
taking care not to bring it into existence, and not to incarnate it in the 
depth of the body? More precisely, is it possible to limit ourselves to the 
counter-actualisation of an event – to the actors or dancers simple, flat 
representation - while taking care to prevent full actualisation which 
characterises the victim or the true patient (Deleuze, 2004a, 178 – 179). 
 
“Do you honestly think that you'll be able to do this and not wind up this 
way? Do you think you are the one person on earth who can control this, 
who can just stop??? Do you think that maybe you can just do this, get 
thin, and stop?? WRONG! It doesn't work that way” (ANANA). 
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The question that Deleuze posits emerges in the twenty second series of Logic of 
Sense, a portion of the text which engages substantially, as noted in the quote, with 
the idea of the crack. I cannot, and do not wish to suggest what this quote means, 
but for the purposes of discussion I would like to draw out the sense it evokes as it 
intra-acts with this discussion of digestive assemblages. As such, rather than saying 
what any of it means, I will draw out what it points to as important and relevant in 
relation to an understanding of health and illness.  
 
In the question that begins “[i]s it possible to maintain the inherence of the 
incorporeal crack (2004a, 178 – 179) Deleuze invites us to consider the connection 
of the actual and the virtual, or rather, the reverberations between the two. The crack 
is neither inside, nor outside, internal or external. It is at “the frontier” (ibid): Where 
the action happens. What occurs on one side is already beginning on the other 
plane. Something, a movement, a series of potentialities, is already stirring in the 
depth of the body, and has done for some time by the point at which there is any 
sense of a crack up. Contrariwise, there has for some time been a series of virtual 
events hovering over the body, waiting for something of the body to feel compelled. 
“To become the quasi-cause of what is produced within us” (Deleuze, 2004a, 169).  
 
Deleuze goes on to question whether it is “possible to limit ourselves to the counter-
actualisation of an event – to the actors or dancers simple, flat representation” (ibid). 
Within these evocative mixtures it is important to remember the “ridiculousness of 
the thinker” (ibid), the one who assumes the uncontested space of “I think”. These 
questions do not have an answer that everyone knows and no-one can deny. They 
do not yield themselves to a clear distinction between true or false. Yet they do 
provoke an encounter with the uncertain frontier. Here, something of the problem 
posed by Deleuze produces a sense that to dance, to produce flat representations is 
always already informed by previous event activity passing out. As I noted in the 
opening chapter, “events are much more than an actual thing ‘happening’ in a limited 
space and time” (2008, 31). Therefore, I would suggest that counter-actualisations 
are also “much more than an actual thing ‘happening’ in a limited space and time” 
(2008, 31). 
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What I am suggesting is that a counter –actualisation is not an individual’s dance or 
jig. The steps that the event draws into itself were never limited to something a 
subject learnt within the context of their life. The point that I am attempting to make 
here pertains to choice and to affects. I would suggest that it is not an individual’s 
choice as to whether we “limit ourselves to the counter-actualisation of an event”. In 
other words, the inherence of the incorporeal crack is not a problem that would be 
resolved by “pulling oneself together”. It is not a question of attaining a conscious 
will, showing strength or resolve in the face of difficulties or challenges. The fights 
and frolics that compel the body, draw it out, undeniably result in the spilling of fluid, 
tearing of flesh and audible screams: Yet there are also wars and oscillations with 
invisible and imperceptible forces (Deleuze, 2013) that take place at the frontier. 
“[T]aking care to prevent full actualisation which characterises the victim or the true 
patient” (2004a, 178 – 179) is not a conscious choice that an individual makes. It has 
much to do with pre-personal affects and the sense which emerges when infinities 
intra-act - to starve, to wait, to choose, to live. It is not that an individual does, or 
does not, ‘choose’ to be a “victim or the true patient”. There are multiple human and 
non-human actants within the digestive assemblage of choice, as Bennett notes 
notes “we are also non-human and [..] things, too, are vital players in the world”. 
(2010, 4). 
 
I will now cut these ideas together with ANANA’s who asks “Do you honestly think 
that you'll be able to do this and not wind up this way”. By ‘do this’ I take the activity 
ANANA refers to, to imply the deliberate restriction of nutrition supplied to the body. I 
infer that ANANA is speaking about an individual’s intended activity to “get thin”. The 
question they pose, “do you think you are the one person on earth who can control 
this” is both rhetorical, ANANA knows the correct answer already, “WRONG! It 
doesn't work that way”, and also provocative, it throws down the gauntlet. It evokes 
what I previously noted as anorexia’s super-molecular promise, the promise of 
intelligible difference that can be recognised in the state of affairs and “a fullness that 
is elsewhere, [..] a future that, apparently, is on its way” (Bennett, 2010, 32). 
 
ANANA does not appear to think that it is possible to take “dosages of self-
dismantling” (Mann O’Donnell, 2010, 177). Or more particularly, they do not feel that 
‘anorexia’ can be controlled, as they strongly note, “It doesn't work that way”. But 
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how do they know? My point here is that ANANA recognises relationships to feeding 
the body in terms of the accidents of the event, for instance, “get[thing] thin”, and 
predicts the outcome. Within the utterance ANANA signifies their disbelief with an 
excess of question marks. In both instances where question marks are used they 
follow the stop sign. What I infer from this is that for ANANA, and many others who 
adhere to the logic of good and common sense, controlling something means putting 
an end to it. If you cannot put an end to ‘it’ you cannot control ‘it’. Yet isn’t the activity 
of becoming experimental, as opposed to the state of being controlled, carried out in 
the middle of things, close to the frontier, informed by the crack? I would suggest that 
ANANA’s epistemic-ontological convictions about how things “work” are less 
concerned with an embodied relationship to feeding the body and more concerned 
with ‘anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought. As such I infer that ANANA senses 
no possibility of re-territorialising the body or real difference. 
 
As Sarah Mann-O’Donnell notes in her working through of Nietzschian true health 
“the organism must become ill before it can become healthier, because falling ill 
makes those who can survive it healthier” (2010, 167). However, it is the contention 
of the thesis that achieving the proper name gets in the way of a radical experiment. 
The art and the politics of dosages is left at the shore as advice ‘for others’. 
Captivated by an actualised moment, the deceitful promise of eternal super 
molecularity, or ‘being in control’, the important experimentation of counter 
actualisation is undesirable. Not least of all because in good and common sense it 
begins to take a dogmatic form that goes by the name ‘recovered’. 
 
This of course is not the same as saying ‘experimentation’ is impossible. Rather, it is 
to say that the notion and discourse of ‘recovery’ is incredibly problematic because it 
divorces health and illness: Spatio-temporalizing them, rather than folding them into 
the lived and abstract activity of on-going over-coming; the administration of doses. 
As such, becoming different either through the stratified space of ‘anorexia’ is 
reduced to the same difference, the general difference offered through 
representational thought and thinking. As Deleuze notes in Difference and Repetition 
(2004b):  
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“so long as [difference] is subordinated to the criteria of resemblance 
within perception, identity within reflection, analogy within judgement and 
opposition within the concept, difference is not regarded as individual 
difference, it remains only general difference, even though it is born [or 
actualised] by the individual” (Deleuze, 2004b, 309).  
 
And it is here, with this idea of same difference that the thesis returns, differently, to 
ideas set out in earlier chapters regarding the accident of a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body – a particular weight or appearance – which, as with many things 
appearing in vision – steals the show (see Massumi, 2011).  
 
For the remainder of the chapter I will encounter the data from the thread previously 
introduced, not to make it make sense, presuming my agency, but rather to make 
cuts in the middle of things, where things happen, where there is movement. It is 
worth making note here, in terms of the thesis push towards the destruction of proper 
names, that writing with the nameless, and pseudonymless, writer of ‘to the girl’ 
disrupted the project of thought considerably. In other words, it affected the thinking-
feeling of writing. It put a further, indeed methodological, obstacle between thought 
and its subject-objects. It was harder to gain purchase when writing with the 
nameless author as compared to writing with words which apparently ‘belonged to 
someone’; even if this was a pseudonym, and further to that, a pseudonym which 
had been further disrupted in the process of ‘heavy-cloaking’ (Kozinets, 2010).  
 
Can you have your data and eat it?  
 
“So...you think starving is a good way to lose weight, do you? I think 
you've read too many fairy tales. Well, this isn't one. Neither are eating 
disorders. They are sheer and total HELL. But, since you want one, I'll go 
ahead and prep you for it. I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you. 
If this doesn't make you realize how completely stupid running out there 
and trying to develop anorexia is, then I wish you the best of luck in killing 
yourself. Because that's all you'll be doing. 
 
In the series entitled ‘Porcelain and Volcano’, Deleuze engages with the 
(im)balances, or disjunctions, of actualisations and counter-actualisations, asking, as 
noted above, “Is it possible to maintain the inherence of the incorporeal crack while 
taking care not to bring it into existence, and not to incarnate it in the depth of the 
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body?” The address of ‘to the girl that wants to be anorexic’ from ‘the girl who really 
is’ annunciates an irrepressible right to speak “with [the equivalent of] all the gallons 
of alcohol they have drunk which have actualised the crack in the body” (2004a, 
179). The words which are cut together in this thread promise, in their articulation of 
bearing witness, that they risked something “and went as far as possible in taking 
this risk” (ibid). It might be suggested that it is this risk, this apparent 
experimentation, which gives birth to the address and an “irrepressible right” (ibid) to 
speak of food and expect others to eat words (2004a, 29). Within this opening a 
pedagogic tone is assumed – “since you want one, I'll go ahead and prep you for it. 
I'll let you know exactly what will happen to you”. Not only does this reduce the real 
difference of a difficult relationship to feeding the body to the general and particular 
of ‘Anorexia’. It also tacitly makes an identity claim to authenticity and properness by 
suggesting that ‘they’ can ‘prep you’, as they might for an exam, or perhaps for the 
DSM grading which proves that there is ‘really something wrong’. 
 
As I read the address something began to resonate with the thesis’ points of 
engagement. I sensed there was an attempt in the address to destroy Anorexia as 
the dogmatic image of thought by cutting it together with an iconoclastic style. 
However, the opening remained within a spatiality of fixed aspiration rather than fluid 
singular desire .This mixture of words and things assumed that ‘anorexia’ is ‘out 
there’; that’s where the girls who want to be anorexic ‘run to’. By evoking the idea of 
‘running out there’ there is a failure to acknowledge the way in which a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body emerges incrementally, over and through a temporal 
space which cannot be limited to a past-present-future progression. It also assumes 
that the body is separate from the worlding of the world and that it is the individual 
girl’s agency which places them in relation to ‘anorexia’: her choice to “run[..] out 
there”.  
 
Moreover, the idea that “If this doesn't make you realize how completely stupid 
running out there and trying to develop anorexia is” suggests that rather than there 
being deposits of discursive-material-political affects in the world, functioning as fatty 
reserves for potential events, the subject actively goes in search for a cause. Here 
the denotative logic of ‘this’, in the formulation of “If this doesn't make you realize” 
seems to refer to the ‘testimony’, the words of the speaker. However, this articulation 
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presumes that each experimenting body is the same and that the dosage that each 
can take is the same. What this assertion fails to engage with is the seepage of 
difference that inspires wonder: how far might ‘my’ body be able to go”?  
 
Also worth noting here is the way in which the testimony-warning produces the 
sense of ressentiment that reduces the revolutionary possibilities of the mixture of 
words and things. Here, this is not to say that it is the bitterness of the speaker, per 
se, that produces this ressentiment. However, as will become clearer a little later on, 
it is the thesis contention that this also occurs because of the way in which the 
propositions mobilise the narrative or personal testimony as opposed to working with 
that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of bodies.  
 
The completely ironic part about people trying to lose weight by starving is 
that half the time it does not work. [..]The less you eat, the lower your 
metabolism goes. You might starve and starve and barely lose 
anything...or you might be extra lucky...you might starve and starve and 
gain weight. Your body might just shut itself down and the weight go 
nowhere and even though you aren't losing, you'll still be HOOKED.  
 
Here what is presented as ‘ironic’ can more productively be engaged with as a 
paradox - always getting bigger and smaller at the same time. The slowing of the 
metabolism links to something noted earlier in the chapter regarding the body 
carrying out its own experiments – the notion of becoming cannibal and eating 
yourself alive. Which, for the purposes of re-connecting to the materiality of the body 
and its connection to other bodies, and mixtures of bodies, produces sensory and 
olfactory affects –the ‘pear drops’ odour of Ketoacidosis. 
 
The assertion “you'll still be HOOKED” draws on the psychological, and 
individualised, good and common sense of an addiction discourse. Indeed, the 
capitalisation of ‘hooked’ gains an almost sonorous quality as it stands out from the 
other words in the proposition. However, in the separation of weight loss and the 
compulsion to engage in practices which would result in weight loss, i.e. a particular 
ascetic relationship to feeding the body, there is a disruption of cause and effect. 
You do not persist because the practice is predictably fruitful: As we see above, the 
non-human actant of metabolic rate  makes it necessary to reconfigure doses.  
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Rather, in the organism-food-assemblage, everything is always already 
unpredictable. Here, the perspicacity of matter’s own experiment, its capacity to ‘shut 
itself down’, is read as the failure of the individual subject’s conscious will. Here, as 
shameful affects become enfolded into sanguine flesh they are breathed out as the 
matter of fa(c)t : ‘I’m still too big”. 
 
Additionally, to continue differently with the notion of being ‘hooked’, this utterance 
suggests that a line of flight is becoming which is not going towards a particular ends 
for instance the accident of weight loss. Put differently, in this relational practice of 
food stuffs and matter, an assemblage which includes the human and the non-
human, there is something else at work. Some process which can’t be reduced to 
the accident of that which occurs. There is a sense of something desired and hoped 
for. Here I would like to make a link between ‘Anorexia’ and the ideas that Bennett 
engages with through Derrida’s notion of ‘messianicity’:  
 
“the open ended promissory quality of a claim, image or entity [which is 
the] condition of possibility of phenomenality: things in the world appear to 
us at all only because they tantalise and hold us in suspense, alluding to a 
fullness that is elsewhere, to a future that, apparently, is on its way” 
(Bennett, 2010, 32).  
 
Bennett continues 
 
“this promissory note is never and can never be redeemed: the ‘straining 
forwards towards the event’ never finds relief. To be alive is to be waiting 
‘for someone or something that, in order to happen...must exceed and 
surprise every determinate anticipation’ In naming the unfulfillable promise 
as the condition of the appearance of anything, Derrida provides a way for 
the vital materialist to affirm the existence of a certain trajectory or drive to 
assemblages without insinuating intentionality or purposivness” (ibid).  
 
This explication of messianicity has the feel of the Deleuzian event which became 
‘the biting point’ of the thesis, the idea whereby “[t]o the extent that events are 
actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. (Delueze, 2004a, 169) Additionally, 
these words provide a relevant return to the notion of dosages as explicated by 
Nietzsche. Not only for the obvious link to the idea of waiting which was so important 
for Nietzsche as the philosopher physician (Mann O’Donnel; 2010, 163), but also for 
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what this opens up in terms of a politics of non-arrival, a “not yet arrived at health” 
(ibid). Here, the notion of a not-yet-arrived-at-health, as it disrupts the metaphysics of 
being and nods towards becoming, destabilises the distinction between being 
anorexic and being well, being proper and being improper. In other words, it enables 
a refocus not just to become ill, or actualise ‘anorexia’, but to engage seriously with 
the “not yet arrived at health” that produces the sense of the event’s counter-
actualisation. 
 
What these words evoke is continual movement, activity and process. In this sense 
the event is a theorisation of struggle. Not as the motor of history as Marx would 
have it, but as more and less than both: Event momentum - events passing out and 
coming about and always already producing the potential of multiple and moving 
structures, or series, to be selected by further events. Events are already in the 
future and already in the past and have both actual and quasi causes. The points of 
this theory of struggle and potential has dimensions which are infinitely squared, dual 
structured and caused, multiple, serial and singular. It is obtuse, imperceptible and 
insensate yet moving through sensation. War is not waged for victory, stability, or 
fixity to be secured, war is waged on wars. It is actualised through impassioned 
matter, yet remaining, in part, linked always to dry impersonal affect. The neutral, 
unpredictable pre individuality of the event.  
 
“You still won't be able to stop. By the time your body shuts off from 
malnutrition, you'll be too far in it to *snap* think "Oh...this isn't working...I 
think I'll eat again." No...you'll be desperate and eat less and less and 
work out more and more. Eventually, you won't be ABLE to work out. Your 
muscles will eventually stop cooperating. Then you'll panic and try and eat 
even less to compensate for not being able to work your ass off (simply a 
figure of speech, since you're not losing any weight, of course).By then 
you can't eat less. You're barely eating enough to stay alive as it is and 
you can't stop. [....] This is true if you weigh 150 or if you weigh 70. You 
will be fat. Insane is the proper term for it, isn't it? Yes, you might just be 
one of the lucky ones, one of the ones that doesn't lose weight. But don't 
sit there and think that means you won't be sick. Not true...not true at all. 
Your skin and hair will be dry, your teeth sore, your period gone, your 
bones aching, your muscles cramping...well, no need to go on. You still 
want this, of course. After all, you won't be like that. You won't be one of 
the failures. You'll be successful; you'll be thin and perfect. Beautiful. 
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This is a very interesting section as it invokes the good sense that would have the 
‘misperception’ of matter as insanity, as noted earlier through Arsic, as though there 
were an ‘eating order’ and ‘body image’. These words draw attention to the 
unpredictability of the eating order and relationships to feeding the body. Here the 
idea that “not every – body loses weight” goes some way to indicate the difference of 
and between bodies, the idea that ‘anorexia’ or more appropriately, a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body, can’t be reduced to an equation of the same but it 
can work at the cleavage of difference. In and amongst this section are the 
accidental examples of aching bones, muscle cramps and sore teeth. Those 
empirical examples which can stir the personal rather than evoke the pre-personal. It 
is something within this territory which I find particularly interesting. 
 
The empirically personal of physiological manifestations is denoted: ‘your period 
gone’, ‘your teeth sore’. Here a couple of words represent the complex embodied 
assemblage of the intra actions that the materiality of ‘period gone’, ’teeth sore’ 
conjures. This could be taken, in conjunction with good and common sense notions 
of ‘what a body does’ as an indication of lower level hormonal functioning due to 
reduced body fat, thereby drawing attention to the intra-activities of non-human 
actors, or stakeholders, that are part of the ‘experiment’. But period gone could 
simply be the organism playing tricks again. Having the organs before birth their 
activities were always conspiring without consent. Who or what is to say ‘period 
gone’ is for sure. What I am trying to convey here is that the flat representation of 
aching teeth, bones and cramping muscles is both more than words and less than 
experiencing matter. They themselves have a ‘promisory’ quality, of properness, 
which the author has a sense of. 
 
The proposition “you still want this, of course” is asserted not as question or even as 
a rhetorical question but towards an acknowledgement of the sense that is being 
produced between words and things. It is in the words that follow “you still want this, 
of course” that I am pricked (Barthes, 2000), that something turns towards 
singularity, or perhaps resides at the spaltung or cleavage of the sense of the event 
and the Cartesian knower and platonic original.  
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“You still want this, of course. After all, you won't be like that. You won't be 
one of the failures. You'll be successful; you'll be thin and perfect. 
Beautiful” (Unknown author of ‘to the girl’). 
 
Here the idea of ‘you won’t be like that’ works as both promise and threat for those 
who reside at the margin of properness, those who are always already in danger of 
not being recognised and equally, those who are at risk of being recognised and 
thereby vulnerable to molar interventions: being sent into recovery. Here we can 
recall the threat-promise of Joanne’s grandmother. In both cases good and common 
sense ascribes bodies to orders of generality. Always too ascetic and never ascetic 
enough. At the point of the ‘you’ the narrative speaks at the level of second person 
singular, which reduces the eventful, yearning experience, the ‘waiting’ as it were, to 
the possibility of a designated aspirational state – the accident of thinness.  
 
“Well, since you're going to win, why don't I tell you about your prize, 
hmm?? It's quite nice. You will be skinny. You will be sickly thin. Your ribs 
will stand out and your hipbones will be sharp. You won't see it. You'll look 
in the mirror and see fat. You'll see rolls. You'll look at girls who weigh fifty 
pounds more than you and wonder why you can't be as thin as they are. 
You'll look in the mirror every day and swear that you've gained at least 
ten pounds. Other people will see you shrink but you won't get to watch. 
You'll never see the truth. Others will though”.  
 
“You'll never see the truth. Others will though”, “you won't see the truth. You'll never 
actually know what you look like”. This articulation highlights the way in which the 
speaker of ressentiment still speaks through good and common sense. It also calls 
to mind Arsic’s suggestion that “to say that the anorexic has a different image of her 
own body, which does not adequately represent the ‘real’ shape of it [....] is to 
suppose the normalising instance of a shared perception: one should see one’s own 
body the way everybody else sees it” (Arsic, 2008, 36). 
 
Here, this not seeing correctly, or not perceiving correctly is given as a marker of 
pathology, not simply difference but the proper(tied) territory of insanity.  
 
“You will not be attractive. You won't. You'll have huge dark circles. Your 
skin will be pasty pale and have a lovely grey tint to it. Makeup will NOT 
help this. It won't, so don't think it will. Don't even bother to attempt it. 
You'll be wasting your time; time that could be better spent doing your 
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usual pastime, staring into the pantry to watch the food. Of course, people 
might not notice that you're grey. They could be too busy staring at the 
dark black, blue, and purple spots you're covered in. Everything you do 
will result in a bruise. Everything. Do you have pretty hair? You won't 
anymore. It will be straw dry and dull. Speaking of hair, do you like facial 
hair? I hope so. You'll have it. I have some lovely sideburns. Quite 
gorgeous. Actually, I have sexy hair everywhere. Fuzz, fuzz, fuzz. It's hot. 
All the guys love it and all the girls I know ask how to get some. They're 
jealous, you know. I tell them how I got it, starving. They never attempt 
it...I know why though. It’s not because they're smart and healthy...no, no. 
It’s because they're weak. Not strong like me. Of course, my muscles are 
deteriorating as we speak and I can no longer use even my five pound 
weights but I'm still strong, aren't I? Yes...because I don't eat. And that's 
true strength, isn't it? Denying yourself the basic fuel you need for life. 
Yup...strong and smart”. 
 
All of this talk of external appearance could be considered as the accident of the 
event – what occurs. It seems to follow a linear logic of degeneration and 
deterioration. It works to a shock logic raising undesirable issues such as female 
body hair and bruising and this is the point in the address where reader meets 
author, so to speak, in the sense that it becomes a personal narrative. Perhaps here 
it could be suggested that this is a moment of intensity or singularity – a turning 
point. There is a new kind of passion which emerges when the issue of body hair 
appears. There is a complex becoming of pride and shame as the accidents, 
damaged skin and ‘excess’ hair speak to the properness of meeting good sense 
criteria for a difficult relationship to feeding the body, while also resonating with a 
certain disruption of gendered aesthetic codes, a feminine improperness.  
 
There becomes a tongue in cheek pride possible due to a logic of indifference. 
Jealousy is the only option when real difference, difference in itself is pushed out. 
Here, this difference in itself is pushed out as the author has nothing but good and 
common sense to draw on and to “scratch at their sores” (Deleuze, 2004a, 173). 
They do not have access to the subtlety or nuance of the language of the event, and 
so they denote and make manifest the accidents of anorexia – making every 
empiricist’s confusion. However, by remaining within this accidental economy, one of 
representations and appearances, that which is evoked, no matter how prohibitively, 
falls back into the circle of images – the dogmatic image of thought of ‘Anorexia’. 
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What I have posited as the turning point in the address, the point where the author 
can no longer remain in the third person, has an urgency of the present. There is 
here the recognition of the author’s fallibility or uncertainty as they cease to denote 
‘this and that’ and begin to ask, what seem to be rhetorical questions.  
 
“Of course, my muscles are deteriorating as we speak but I'm still strong, 
aren't I? Yes...because I don't eat and that's true strength, isn't it? 
Denying yourself the basic fuel you need for life. Yup...strong and smart. 
Fainting is common too but you might be distracted by the headaches. 
Take some aspirin...oooh...or don't. Your tummy's too empty; it'll only 
make you throw up everywhere. it's worth it right? Anything's worth it, 
even your hair, nails, bones, muscles, possible children, your family's 
heart, everything. Sacrifice it all, throw it all away. You're thin now, that's 
what counts, even though you don't know it. You'll probably get chest 
pains. Maybe heart flutters. This is scary too, because you never wanted 
to die, you just wanted to be thin. But remember, you can't tell. Telling is 
forbidden and asking for help is weak”. 
 
This cascade of accidents does however seem to respond negatively to the question 
Deleuze posits in one of the opening quotes of the chapter; whether or not it is 
possible to keep the crack at the incorporeal surface or whether or not it has to go to 
the body.  
 
The speaker works with the accidents of the event to make manifest the ‘facts’ as 
they ‘know them’ to be. Here the ‘eating disorder’ is separated from the materiality of 
the body, vitamin deficiencies pertain to the body while the eating disorder is located 
in an unspecified elsewhere. We might here consider ‘insomnia’ to be indicative of 
the body ‘tricking’ ‘anorexia’ and the human subject, carrying out its own experiment.  
 
“WHY do you want this?? WHY?!? I know, even after reading this that 
you're still sitting there, wanting this. Why? What is it you want?? Is it 
beauty? Do you honestly think you won't be like this?? Do you honestly 
think malnutrition won't steal your looks? Is it glamour? READ THIS. Show 
me the glamour. Is it control?? Let me tell you, you'll NEVER be more out 
of control than you are when you have an eating disorder. You don't 
control what you put in your mouth. Hell, you don't even control your 
thoughts. You have NO control. None. Do you honestly think that you'll be 
able to do this and not wind up this way? Do you think you are the one 
person on earth who can control this, who can just stop??? Do you think 
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that maybe you can just do this, get thin, and stop?? WRONG! It doesn't 
work that way”. 
 
“WHY do you want this?? WHY?!? I know, even after reading this that you're still 
sitting there, wanting this” is a pivotal assemblage of words and real and abstract 
entities such as ‘looks’, ‘glamour’, ‘control’. Here, the sense that rises from these 
words begins to evoke another turning point, a moment of singularity as the address 
shifts from its vehemently dissuasive beginnings. I would like to suggest that there is 
here an opportunity to sit with the affective, corporeal pull of words and the process 
of writing. Throughout the address there is a sense of baffled insight into the pull of 
the event and the way in which bodies are “tempted to become […] equal”, yet here 
what bubbles is ressentiment. 
 
In addition, this is also a pivotal assemblage as it evokes the illusory, perhaps 
‘messianic’ (Derrida, cited in Bennett, 2010) promise of control. As I noted earlier, 
this promise of control is always paradoxical, and might more helpfully be considered 
in terms of a power-knowledge relation. It is both corporeal, enacted by bodies and 
things, and incorporeal, belonging to no-one. Having to do with words and matter, it 
is not a something which can be fixed, harnessed or occupied, It is, depending on 
the series which flow into and out of it, apart from the enacting body -  a placeless 
occupant - an occupant without a place.  
 
“But do you know what? Self-hatred is the least of your worries now. 
Because you've likely just signed your own death warrant...and you likely 
don't even care...yet. But you will. You will care. You will care and you will 
cry and rage and swear you'd give anything to take it all back. But it's too 
late, because by the time you're in deep enough to care, you're already 
dying. It’s too late to snap out of it now, no matter how much you want to. 
This is the reality of anorexia. It is nothing like the powerful articles you 
read on how so and so overcame it. It is nothing like the beauty you see 
when you look at that thin model. It is nothing like that beautiful popular 
girl who naturally weighs 80lbs. It is nothing like anything you've ever lived 
before and you will never be the same”. 
 
The next section of the chapter encounters responses to the address, and as with 
the above sections I attempt to work with the ‘what occurs’, the accidental words, 
while also attempting to engage with the inside of what occurs: the event. 
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Can you Have Anorexia and Eat It?  
 
Definite wakeup call! That should be a required read before allowed a 
membership! I can gladly say I haven't been that severe as above, but I 
can vouch for the dental care problems...And as an adult trying to find a 
dentist who won't bring up your ed. It's embarrassing! But they can tell 
even when you lie. If you are young and not anorexic and just want to 
be...JUST EXERCISE and EAT HEALTHY- You can't just "become" a 
disease! (weakness101) 
 
Weakness 101 draws attention to ontology through putting ‘become’ in scare quotes, 
highlighting the logic of fixity and a denunciation of the incremental becomings of life, 
they separate out the states of ‘not’ and ‘want’, or absence and desire. In other 
words Weakness101 erects a division between an ontology of lack, or not being, and 
an ontology of excess, of being. Here there is a lack of subtlety and nuance which 
does little to evoke the powerful sense of the event, reducing it to the accidents of 
health. They state ‘just exercise’ and ‘eat healthy’, but as noted previously, these can 
be considered in terms of “consolations á l’ameriaine” (Deleuze, 2004a, 177). 
 
Further to this, the assemblage of ‘eat healthy’ and ‘just exercise’ is problematic as it 
fails to acknowledge the mixtures of humans and non-humans implicated in these 
relationships, for instance the metabolism, hormones, acids, proteins, DNA, shared 
family meals. What is it to ‘eat healthily’? The experimentalists Nietzsche and 
Thoreau would not share the same diet, digressing on the foodstuff of vitalism and 
the imagination (Bennett, 2010): What was good for the dog did not suit the gander.  
 
That article is so truthful it hurts because I sit here and remember all those 
things I went through before my first recovery. It got just about that bad. 
Now this is my 4th time relapsing. It’s ridiculous, shameful and sad. But 
this is how it will be. If I could go back 8 years I would. I still to this day 
suffer horrible side effects and I know it will kill me someday (Emmarald) 
 
The most biting aspect of what Emmarald makes manifest is the assertion that “I 
know it will kill me someday”. The first point I am moved to make is that this 
knowledge is impossible, as Massumi notes in his ‘User’s Guide’. 
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“For Deleuze, the essence of meaning [which Deleuze and Guattari 
occasionally call ‘essence’], the essence of essence, is best expressed by 
two infinitives: ‘the cut,’ and ‘to die’. A person is either still alive or already 
dead. The moment of death is ungraspable” (1992, 20).  
 
Indeed, the cold indifference of the third person paradoxically merges and folds with 
the immediate enveloping of difference and repetition to invoke the dry incorporeality 
of ‘it’. Emmarald knows it will kill them someday but this is the abstract ‘it’ of the 
mouse’s tail (Deleuze, 2004) and event which has “no recognisable tense” 
(Massumi, 1992, 20). 
 
“People have to understand that being anorexic is not a choice.  It's a 
mental illness.  You can't just wake up one day and decide to become 
anorexic for the sake of losing weight.  It's dangerous and if you're not 
serious, you'll end up bingeing and feeling bad about yourself. Don't dig a 
hole for yourself.  Most anorexics want to get better--not necessarily gain 
weight, but I don't think they want to hate food” (Seacret).  
 
“wow. i only read about half of this and was thinking omg this is so right 
the whole time. but the wierd thing is after even reading it i still know i'll 
never not be ana. it's like i don't understand how someone could NOT be 
anorexic. like...doesn't everyone think about food the way i do? how i love 
the taste but feel like crying if i eat it? how i never ever stop thinking about 
it? how i always want to lose just 5 more pounds? it just doesnt seem 
possible. because even after my doctor made me gain some weight back 
the whole time i was just waiting until they stopped paying attention so 
that i could lose it again. and i look at my friends eat and think oh my god 
how can you not feel disgusted with yourself?! it's like im a different 
species or breed of human or something. it's sooo frustrating!! (graylouis)” 
 
In this correspondence from graylouis there is a strange mixture of sameness and 
difference, rather than difference in itself. They note that “i don't understand how 
someone could NOT be anorexic. like...doesn't everyone think about food the way i 
do?”. This absence of understanding of an alternative ‘way of thinking’ implies the 
stratified logic of a particular relationship to feeding the body for them. Here a 
particular relationship to feeding the body is elevated to a level of universal common 
sense “doesn't everyone think about food the way i do? how i love the taste but feel 
like crying if i eat it? how i never ever stop thinking about it? how i always want to 
lose just 5 more pounds?”  
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In the final few words of the feedback graylouis says “it's like I’m a different species 
or breed of human or something”. To the side of the denotative logic which gives this 
as an example that I would suggest is a particularly interesting working of the power 
of the dogmatic image of thought. Here ‘anorexia’, as well as an understanding of 
health as unconnected to illness, and a ‘transcendental model of recognition’ 
(Deleuze, 2004b) work to limit the possibilities of living differently or counter 
actualising as opposed to recovering or being ill.  
 
As greylouis “looks at [their] friends eat and think[s] oh my god how can you not feel 
disgusted with yourself?” there Is a reduction of the other’s difference and 
particularity. Here, and to evoke the notion of the experiment, is the positivism of 
what is most often referred to as ‘anorexic thoughts’. Here if eating is x and feeling is 
y, greylouis can only conceive of the one tailed hypothesis which results in 
repudiation and disgust. “The Kantian object = x where ‘x’ means ‘in general’ 
(Deleuze, 2004a, 111). We might say here that relationships to feeding the body, 
difficult or elsewise, do not force greylouis to think (Deleuze, 2004b, 175). ‘Anorexia’ 
is for now an object of recognition for greylouis: “thought is thereby filled with no 
more than an image of itself, one in which it recognises itself the more it recognises 
things: this is a finger, this is a table, [this is anorexia, this is normality]” (ibid). 
 
“yes...i agree w/ everyone here that this is a really, really well-written 
article and 100% true...if i spilled out my guts, it would be this article 
exactly. You know what's sad though? is that this stuff doesn’t even 
bother me anymore, even though I know it should. Like I could care less 
that I look like sh*t and people look at me weird and I'm cold all the time 
and my hair is falling out...and I wish I did care...cause at one point in my 
life I was pretty, and since ana I have not been and I know it, but it's not 
about being pretty anymore, it's about being thin and about being sick.And 
the worst part? I don't even care that I'm dying. Doesn't phase me in the 
least, just like the person who wrote the article said. Anyway, I'll stop 
rambling and complaining about myself now...sorry. But yes, for anyone 
who wants to be anorexic...please don't..there is no good end to it. You 
WILL either end up gaining the weight back or dying, or going up and 
down in your weight which is miserable too, and you will affect so many 
other people...that's the worst part, that's one pain that won't go 
away...knowing that your family or friends have been devastated by 
Page 165 of 229 
 
something YOU'VE done. even though it is not fair because it's your own 
body...it doesn't work like that and trust me I wish it did” (Preciouspains) 
 
Preciouspains feel that what she has read is “100% true” which indicates an 
agreement with the sensibility of the author. However, something which is 100% true 
leaves little room for difference. They go on to say “if i spilled out my guts, it would 
be this article exactly”. Here the spilling of guts is interesting as it calls upon the 
edible nature of things and the trope to speak/ to eat: The visceral sanguine quality 
of words, their materiality as opposed to their bordered actual dullness. Instead of 
appearing through typing digits and thinking brain the gut is drawn into the textual-
material-affective assemblage to write.  
 
In saying they are “cold all the time and [their] hair is falling out” Preciouspains 
alludes to the possibility of the experimenting body I developed at the start of this 
chapter. However, possibly the most interesting points Preciouspains makes is: “[b]ut 
yes, for anyone who wants to be anorexic...please don't..there is no good end to it. 
You WILL either end up gaining the weight back or dying, or going up and down in 
your weight which is miserable too”. Here the idea that “there is no good end to it” is 
insightful, not because of the fatalism inherent in the evocation, but rather because 
of the use of ‘it’, which speaks its own sense. “The equivocation of ‘it’ is therefore 
distributed in accordance with the duality of denotation and expression. The two 
dimensions of the proposition are organised in two series which converge 
asymptomatically, in a term as ambiguous as ‘it’” (Deleuze, 2004b, 31 – 32).  
 
''Thinner, it said. You've got to get thinner. But you know, even then, that 
word was wrong. It is more than Thinness, per se, that you crave. It is the 
implication of Thin. The tacit threat of Thin. The Houdini-esque-ness of 
Thin, walking on hot coals without a flinch, sleeping on a bed of nails. You 
wish to carry Thinness on your arm, with her cool smile'' (threesheets2the 
wind). 
 
This excerpt from threesheets2thewind exudes an evocative and strangely seductive 
sense. It is a précised, or thinned down, extract from Wasted (1998), the work of 
Marya Hornbacher. Although threesheets does not reference her explicitly, the words 
moved me to search for them, to move from off-line to on-line and to enter them into 
an on-line search engine. However, in keeping with the way in which post-human 
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and new materialists such as Mazei and Jackson engage with ‘voice’, I would like to 
show due care and sensitivity. Although it is credited to Hornbacher, as she 
actualised it, the sense of what these words evoke cannot be reduced to the 
‘accident of what occurs on the page or screen. These words are the force of the 
Cheshire Cat’s smile, moving against nothing and everything, what can and cannot 
be denoted or made manifest. They paint the scream rather than the horror 
(Deleuze, 2013).  
 
In the assemblage of the human and non-human, threesheets2thewinds regurgitates 
Hornbacher, while I invite Deleuze and Carroll to join us at dinner. And yet the 
incorporeality of ‘it’ appears unannounced and without a gift for the hosts. As I read 
the words I re-encounter the haughty caterpillar mouthing smoke rings. Here in this 
mixture of bodies and words, this capacious encounter, we meet the incorporeal 
aspect of a difficult relationship to feeding the body. Just as the caterpillar’s smoke 
introduces a sense of that which is not the body, but of it and en route to becoming 
indignant expression, transforming into smoke and in the process of becoming 
reptilian. [T]hreesheets2thewind-and-Hornbacher note that is not a question of actual 
thin as they assert “you know, even then, that word was wrong”. They go on to clarify 
that it is instead the “tacit threat of thin [,] her cool smile [which] you wish to carry on 
your arm''. 
 
In this chapter, by working with ideas regarding dosages and experiments I have 
been able to cleave a space in which to consider empirical materials. Not to breathe 
life into them as though they had passively waited for my human touch, I have 
instead, in the plugging in (Mazzei and Jackson, 2012), provisionally worked with the 
sense that was produced at the frontier (Deleuze, 2004a).   
 
In the next chapter I attempt to take up Patti Lather’s call to risk not being 
understood (2007) by further disrupting the humanist supposition that data, as a non-
human object, dispassionately waits for the autonomous, cognitively intentional, 
human acts of analysis and interpretation, in short, qualitative research. 
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CHAPTER 5: ‘JOANNE?’ – 
TOWARDS A POST-HUMAN CASE-
STUDY 
 
Introduction  
 
“[T]he language of humanism. . . a discourse that spawns structure 
after structure after structure—binaries, categories, hierarchies, 
and other grids of regularity that are not only linguistic but also 
very material” (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000,4). 
 
“[I]n the research relation with data, we must be invited in” 
(MacLure, 2013b, 662). 
 
 
Within the first chapter of the thesis my work was introduced and the ‘problems’, or 
what were termed as points of engagement, were developed through the use of key 
concepts and theories. In the second chapter, literature relevant to my area of inquiry 
was explored and critiqued which further developed the significance of the abstract, 
affective and embodied theories which the thesis puts to work. These textual 
movements bled into the methodological chapter wherein the people, places, ideas 
and entities my work brushed up against were conceptualised as a mobile or 
connective ethnography (Hine, 2000). 
 
The methodological chapter drew to a close by noting that the chapters which were 
to follow would make recourse to the empirical, on and off-line materials I have 
gathered; particularly how flows of theory and practice, as they plugged into one 
another (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013), set in motion what my work sought to trouble 
and disrupt. It was also in this third chapter that ‘someone’ called ‘Joanne’ was 
introduced. In this chapter we will meet Joanne for a second time, under increasingly 
post-human conditions, and with ‘her’, go further towards the possibilities of 
disrupting proper names and fixed identities. In other words ‘Joanne’ the ‘someone’, 
or more appositely the individual, will cease to be bordered in the ways that more 
traditional and humanist inquiry encloses the ‘what’ to which it refers.  
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[I]n philosophical enunciations we do not do something by saying it but produce 
movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona”. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 64). 
 
To do this I will be working with a conceptual persona, a body who both slithers and 
leaps, who is cut up and cuts, who administers doses of theory-data. As Deleuze 
and Guattari note in What is Philosophy: 
 
“The conceptual persona is not the philosopher’s representative but 
rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of [their] principle 
conceptual persona (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 64). 
 
Actualising a sensibility irreducible to the individual, this figure is always biting off 
more, and less, than can be chewed and digested. Both elegant and awkward, 
actualising frowns of perturbation whilst becoming the quasi cause of the singular 
and incorporeal smirk of curiosity, this personae will paint the movements of a 
scream rather than the horror (Deleuze, 2013) of an emaciated image.  
 
Lecerle notes that Heaven, the space of angelic communication, is a “place of 
unspeakable boredom, much in need of a serpent to make it interesting”. He 
continues, asserting that, “angels are no poets, in spite of their lyres”. In light, or 
perhaps more appositely, in the shadow of this idea I put forward a figure who begins 
in the middle of things: the-becoming-sanguine-serpent-of-the-angelic researcher 
(see Lecercle, 2002 quoted in MacLure, 2013b, 664-5). By working with this 
conceptual persona this chapter will not be heavenly, It will not be a “polite 
conversation between angels” (ibid). Instead, it will evoke singular pre-individual 
veins and invisible forces, which like Eden’s own serpent, wait and offer the 
possibility of transgressive onto-epistemologies (Barad, 2007).  
 
A return to methodology, differently. 
 
In this chapter I am interested in disrupting the humanist supposition that data, as a 
non-human object, dispassionately waits for the ‘breath of life’ that is the 
autonomous, cognitively intentional human acts of analysis and interpretation: In 
short, qualitative research. As Jane Bennett notes, “process itself is an actant” 
(2010, 33) and as such it is necessary to consider the process of working with 
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empirical materials differently. This chapter will do this by working way from good 
and common sense and attempting to engage with the ways in which we eat 
empirical materials and how these same empirical materials bite back at us. In this 
sense we can no longer consider ‘empirical materials’ as passive, or even impassive; 
devoid of and having no affects. We must instead think of them as what Jane 
Bennett refers to as ‘Vibrant Matter’ which has “a not-quite-human capaciousness” 
(2010, 3). Here I am chosen by the choice of a move towards the frightening territory 
of ‘not being understood’, a position Patti Lather, as noted at the end of chapter four, 
refers to as an‘ethical imperative’ (Lather, 2007). As such, and at the necessary risk 
of ‘not being understood’, ideas and practices taken from trans-disciplinary post-
humanism and new materialisms will be drawn on to allow me to consider data-as-
agent, as the Deleuzian quasi cause of affective researching assemblages.  
 
It is hoped that this post-human encounter with data will engender an ethical 
assemblage of words and things, enabling an engagement with a difficult relationship 
to feeding the body which does not, in the last instance, mobilise recuperative good 
or common sense. In other words, although what Joanne makes available to the 
project through her perspicacity and candour evokes the lived and every day of life 
on, and off-line, the work of the thesis, in its refusal to be satiated with good and 
common sense regardless of the actual lips through which it passes, is to engage 
with the inside of what occurs. This inside of what occurs is both more and less than 
what Joanne and I produced together in the state of affairs.  
 
To spatio-temporalise and individualise Joanne’s account would obfuscate the inside 
of what occurs in favour of that which is accidental. It would reduce the affective and 
pre individual flows to the (f)acts of one young woman’s life. It is my thinking-feeling 
that what Joanne contributed to the project, and the problematics it conceived, was 
more than the actual time, insightfulness, desires and frustrations she shared with 
me. Rather, what ‘Joanne’s’ actualised utterances of embodied and affective labour, 
proper names, ontological (un)certainty, validity claims and demanding categories 
opened my work to was the power of good and common sense to produce matter as 
mattering, or not. Here good and common sense are considered as real and abstract 
agentic entities which assemble with other entities to cut real and abstract flesh. 
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What occurred was that we met and we talked. The inside of what occurred was 
always more and less, getting bigger and getting smaller than her relationship to 
feeding the body, her political activities and the communities she was part of. More 
and less than the theories I engaged with, the conversations I had had over time and 
the hopes I had regarding the utility of this shared intellectual and embodied 
endeavour. In working this way my hopes are towards what is possible when 
accounts lived are opened to the event and the series which are selected by it. As 
such, I will not trace out a linear and humanist case study. This would sediment or 
stratify Joanne and the significant contribution she made to the project. I will 
organise this chapter according to those ‘bits of things’ which began to glow 
(MacLure, 2013b ), leaving Joanne to become and become again, and allowing the 
thesis to avoid humanistic ethical folly.  
 
Disrupting the Subject, a Case-Study Undone  
 
“[Anorexia] is an attempt to make the two incommensurable faces 
coincide or correspond. However, the two sides do not meet, and every 
[occurance] remains double. On the one hand, it is a ‘de-differenciation’ 
which compensates for the differentiations of the I and the Self in an 
overall system which renders these uniform; on the other hand, it is a 
matter of individuation, a protest by the individual which has never 
recognised itself within the limits of the Self and the I, even where these 
are universal” (Deleuze, 2004b, 323). 
 
Leading out from the crystals of these ideas I would like to conceive of the data that I 
will put to work in this, and previous chapters, not as from Joanne as a bounded 
identity, but instead as of Joanne: Her becomings. These are unlimited in the sense 
that they are no more unconsciously determined than they are intentionally chosen. 
As I have noted previously when trying to clarify, while leaving sufficiently obscure, 
the event as the inside of what occurs is not limited to the psychic interiority of an 
individual. In the case of ‘Joanne’ ‘the inside of what occurs does not lead out from 
her linear past. The event as sense and the sense of the event is not what was said, 
but rather of it, reaching and stretching towards multiple elsewheres. As such, it is 
not a question of representing “static relations among already-formed entities” 
(MacLure, 2013a, 169), sorting and coding what occurred into themes. It is a 
question of engaging with the mad or rebel element, the non-spaces, the occupants 
without a place and the placeless occupants that mock, and are mocked by, good 
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and common sense. Those bits of things which fly off from paradoxes and are 
swallowed, unintentionally, by the body. 
 
Sense is not only articulated at the surface of language through propositions, it is 
also of the body. ‘Joanne’s’ becomings will be shown to always already be in relation 
to other bodies and social spaces, humans and non-humans. It is in this sense that 
‘data’ which was put to work and into language in this text were produced intra-
actively by Joanne and I and a number of other (unintentional) actants. While 
‘Joanne’s’ contribution is engaged with ethically, responsibly and respectfully, and 
the words attributed to her emerged from her body and passed through her lips, It is 
my contention that how and why she speaks of food reflects the words she, and 
numerous other ‘women’, incorporeally and affectively eat in ways which “sidestep[..] 
each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs [...] eventum tantum.” 
(Deleuze, 2004, 172).  
 
Working with what Joanne and I produced is inside the process of sensing emergent 
connections to partially digested bits of things - quotes, political antagonisms, 
frowns, waterless tears, theoretical ideas and long standing research questions. It is 
in this manner that the sense of the event is away from that which can be seen. It is 
not just the exoteric object. As I noted in the initial chapter of the thesis, the account I 
wish to give of a difficult relationship to feeding the body is opposed to the true or the 
false. Additionally it contests that which only concerns the individual and that which 
is individualising. Related to previous points I have made with regard to 
individualising discourses and good and common sense, to engage with the event is 
to engage with that which is beyond the general and the particular, neither only 
subject nor only object, only past, present or future. Here, as with the affective 
theories I put it to work with, the event and its singularity, can’t be reduced to either 
or distinctions. The pre-individuality of the event is actualised by bodies, such as 
‘Joanne’s’, but not limited to them.  
 
As I have attempted to convey throughout the thesis, the potential and intensity of 
relationships to feeding the body are reduced to either or distinctions through the 
logic of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. A lore which is not limited to any one 
discursive domain. Here I would like to suggest, recalling an idea Giles (2006) 
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propagated, that the DSM functions as a foundation test whereby pretenders are 
judged and their pretentions are measured. 
 
DeLanda notes that “Importance and relevance, not truth, are the key concepts in 
Deleuze’s epistemology” (2002, 7). This was touched on in the second and third 
chapter when Deleuze’s writing on the simulacrum was drawn on and put to work. 
Through drawing on Nietzsche’s power of the false, the pseudos, Deleuze’s reversal 
of Platonic thought challenges notions of the true and authentic and enables a very 
productive disruption in the context of my thesis. In other words, through these ideas 
I am able to question what proper anorexia is and who proper anorexics are – both 
of which pertain to identity and ontology as fixed, ideas I have already 
conceptualised as problematic.  
 
A Smile without Organs? 
 
“One senses that the smile will survive the effacement of the body” 
(Deleuze, 2013, 21).  
 
The extract below is taken from my field notes. During this time a humanist method 
of analysis and interpretation formed the cornerstones of what I felt ‘proper research’ 
comprised. However, as I return differently to this empirical material I will be 
engaging with it, and it me, but I will not be ‘interpreting’ it. Having come into contact 
with material practices and methods of inquiry that disrupt and dislodge the expert 
subject, it is possible for me to consider the cuts that I make, and the responsibility 
that engenders, and the cuts that are made of me, and the entanglement that 
engenders, away from the spectres of ineptitude and monstrosity. 
 
‘I’ am not, the “intentional subject standing separate and outside of ‘the 
data’, digging behind or beyond or beneath it, to identify higher order, 
meanings, themes or categories [I am] obligated to acknowledge that data 
have their ways of making themselves intelligible to us” (MacLure, 2013b, 
660).  
 
As MacLure goes on to suggest, in her exploration of the possibilities of research 
without representation, data that makes itself known to us, or rather, affects us, could 
be conceived as that which is in the process of becoming interesting, “a sarcastic 
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comment in an interview, or a perplexing incident, or an observed event that makes 
you feel kind of peculiar” (ibid, 660-661).  
 
I begin this section of the chapter with such a perplexing incident, a smile that made 
me feel peculiar and which bought about questions and a desire for answers. Yet 
this became an encounter with the unanswerable that provided me with a taste for 
more interesting and relevant questions. In keeping with the intent that I have thus 
far laboured, I will try to move beyond the representational capacity of the accident, 
by also engaging with the event, its intensity, singularity and virtuality. 
 
As noted a moment ago, I will not be interpreting these materials, nor will I spend an 
extensive amount of time analysing them. They are not lifeless, they already have a 
strange capaciousness (Bennett, 2010) and I have incorporated them to highlight 
that analysis is not an activity that can, or should be, located to a past or present. In 
other words, analysis comes about and keeps coming about. There are analytical 
points which are actualised in the field diary that are potentialities to be counter-
actualised in a future that will only be retroactively defined (Massumi, 2002). As 
such, we might say that the ‘unfounding’ (Deleuze, 2004, 299) of post-
representational analysis draws into itself, much like the event, a past-present-
futurity which seems to hover above itself. With each visit and intra-action something 
new is produced at the threshold (Jackson, 2013). 
 
The diary extracts were produced six months apart, June and November 
respectively. Under each entry I will spend a little time drawing out what feels 
important and relevant to the concerns of this chapter and the wider thesis. 
 
Field Diary June 2011 
 
Joanne text me ten minutes before the start of the interview to say that 
she was running late and had had problems – that I was free to cancel the 
interview if I wanted as she expected to be at least an hour late. I 
responded saying that I hoped she was okay and that I would rather not 
cancel. I would see her as soon as she could get to the meeting place. 
She arrived an hour later and she was visibly thinner since the last time 
that I had seen her a fortnight ago - I felt a sort of jolt. I felt that to 
comment on what was visible would be counter to the ethics of the 
Page 174 of 229 
 
project. I did not wish her to think that was the most interesting or 
particular thing about her. Joanne seemed to be in a good mood, I asked 
her why then moved to suggest the things I would like to talk about, the 
things I had made note of last week, particularly communities and how 
she felt about the research – both gleaned interesting responses. 
 
Again it was a tearless, a dry meeting. There were moments where she 
smiled which seemed to stifle some unsayable thing rather than 
encourage conviviality or amusement. It was as though she found the 
predictability of her own response comforting in some way, as though her 
responses conformed to what ‘an anorexic’ may say or think. It wasn’t a 
shared smile, and it didn’t strike me as a nervous smile either. She looked 
down and her lips curled at the edges. 
 
Although there was an absence of tears in the interview and Joanne had 
not seemed perturbed by our communication, at the end of the interview 
and in the evening afterwards there were lots of ideas that came through 
for me and I found it hard to leave the site of the interview. I even woke up 
thinking about it. She has been called a ‘wannarexic’ on–line by two girls 
who were older and in her words “severely under-weight, four or five 
stones”. The word for some reason stopped me in my tracks, it was the 
accusation of being unreal, improper, and inauthentic and I was not sure 
what to ‘do with it’ yet. Is it perspicacity on their part and ‘something other 
for me’, is this why she smiled when I was asking her about why she 
came forward – was talking to me part of becoming by enacting – being 
the doer behind the deed, colluding with anorexic subjection? Was 
engaging with the project off-line connected to the way in which she and 
others in the community reinscripted shame on-line? With me did she take 
her indulgent self, the body that ate, as object? 
 
We both had needs and desires in relation to the time space and issue of 
matter that we shared, which produced us and which we produced in the 
questions asked, answers given, abject tears and controlled assertions. I 
was getting something, I was getting ‘data’ but what was she getting? She 
said at the end of the interview when, I asked her about her participation, 
that she had come to realise things which had been important to her. 
Something struck me, a question, was I as much a part of her work as she 
was part of mine? 
 
In this entry to my field diary I note the significance of a smile. A gesture which 
returns me to the quote that opened this sub-section. Indeed, the residual affective 
activity that the smile provoked in me, according to my diary, does suggest that the 
smile’s ‘itness’, its dry incorporeality, did survive the effacement of both mine and 
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Joanne’s bodies in the state of affairs in the interview setting. It is also the smile 
which makes these collection of words and things, separated by six months resonate 
to produce a sensation (Deleuze, 2013).  
 
Field Diary November 2011 
 
J: “I can’t meet you Tuesday. I instead get to have an intervention about 
my ED. I want to drop out of your research, keep what you have, but I 
don’t want to do anymore x” 
S: “Are you okay? Do you want to talk x?” 
J: “Not ok at all. I don’t know what to do and I’m scared” 
J: “My fucking mate has taken an OD” 
 
It was 1.30am by the last text – I fell asleep half an hour before – I felt 
guilty and responsible but having read a lot of the interviews recently as I 
transcribed I was confident I had always been ethical and that I had never 
ever commented on the way that she looked. I had reassured her that she 
mattered because of what she had to say, not because of the way she 
appeared. In the morning I asked if she wanted to talk – she said thank 
you but she couldn’t speak – her throat was too sore. It was my feeling 
that she had binged worse and purged worse than ever and felt there was 
no room left to manoeuvre.  
 
She just text, its 3.30pm, saying she appreciated me being in contact and 
“I don’t know. Im just panicking so much. I’m scared that it’s going to be 
‘recover/ eat/ put on weight or leave” Initially I thought she was being sent 
to a residential place but her “?” to the query makes me think its 
university. Her next text clarified “leave volunteering with Upstarts etc. It’s 
the whole if I’m not a good role model and cant sort myself out then I can’t 
work there stuff” “Sorry for not being clear. Its an intervention with some of 
the Upstarts staff x”  “I don’t know what to do. I don’t know how anyone 
can help”  
 
I thought last night as I lay awake back to what id noted about being part 
of her work – the narrative that she gave, the mixture of a new body and 
new words about it. If she was being made to recover that was not 
something that she wanted documented, not something she wanted to 
pass through her lips. 
 
As I previously intimated, it is the contention of the thesis that these empirical 
materials are not impassive, devoid of or having no affects. Yet this does not stop 
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me from making, and taking responsibility for (Barad, 2007) the cuts that I make into 
them to produce further affects.  
 
What I would like to draw attention to from this second entry is the way in which the 
smile that disturbed me at the time of the interview produced a “temporary point of 
indecision on the threshold of knowing”. A quote I have already attributed to Maggie 
MacLure during the second chapter. The smile, and the problems it poses, floats 
over the research project. Like the needle of a sewing machine, rhythmically bobbing 
across a fabric of problems and solutions, the smile was the indistinct moment 
between a moving needle’s entry and departure. The moment where inside and 
outside, external and internal, subject and object ceased to be appropriate terms of 
reference. The cracked smile that first appeared in June pulled up a thread in 
November as I considered Joanne’s departure from the project and her 
unwillingness to have ‘recovery recorded’. Good and common sense would perhaps 
focus on the accident of the overdose and the threat of treatment, yet the event 
would be somewhere else. Inside infinitive serial mixtures of to die, to live, to take, to 
document. As Joanne says in the afternoon text massage: “to recover/ [to] eat/ [to] 
put on weight or [to] leave”.  
 
A voice without Organs  
 
Lisa Mazzei writes that “[i]n humanist qualitative inquiry, the assumption is that voice 
is produced by a unique, essentialist subject. [She] then explain[s] that from a post-
human stance, interview data, the voices of participants, cannot be thought as 
emanating from an essentialist subject nor can they be separated from the 
enactment in which they are produced, an enactment among researcher-data-
participants-theory-analysis – what [she calls] a Voice without Organs (VwO)” (2013, 
732). Mazzei goes on to note that:  
 
 “[s]ince voice cannot be thought as existing separately from the milieu in 
which it exists, it cannot be thought of as emanating ‘from’ an individual 
person. There is no separate, individual person, no participant in an 
interview study to which a single voice can be linked – all are entangled” 
(ibid. 734). 
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Before Mazzei develops the idea of the VwO she notes the humanist suppositions of 
the qualitative research project, drawing attention to the way in which the methods 
“oblige researchers to ‘centre’ the subject” (ibid). Here I would like to draw attention 
to the role of the idiot in Deleuze’s thinking and suggest that lacking the compass to 
draw circles can be usefully applied to the way in which we ‘draw’ our research 
subjects, or perhaps more appositely, the way we animate and map our subject-
objects. 
 
As the chapter moves on I would like to take the ideas that Mazzei develops in this 
article and put them to work, to explore what they can do with and to the empirical 
materials that joanne-and-I-and-others produced. Here, in using a hyphenated form I 
am attempting to materialise, rather than represent, the intra-action: put it to work in 
practice. In the conjoined conjuring and its boundary leakage there is perhaps a way 
in which to illuminate the impossibility of separateness and to produce the illusory ‘I’ 
as somewhat unrecognisable to itself (Deleuze, 2004b). In working with the sense 
that leaps from what Mazzei produces, and by plugging it into (Mazzei and Jackson, 
2013) the proud verbs to eat/ to speak that Deleuze conceptualises in Logic of 
Sense (2004a) I am becoming interested in sloping towards the edible nature of 
things, cutting them together and apart, waiting to be invited in to the spaceless-
places where rocks can be nudged to release dry, neutral and inedible stuff.  
 
Perhaps this returns me differently to the territory of the-becoming-sanguine-serpent-
of-the-angelic researcher, or perhaps it produces another encounter with the haughty 
caterpillar, the rings of smoke and the quasi cause of possibilities and problems. 
Here the problem is not equitable with either the true or the false, the authentic or the 
pretender. As Deleuze notes: 
 
“the problem bears resemblance neither to propositions which subsume 
under it, nor to the relations which it engenders in the proposition: it is not 
propositonal, although it does not exist outside of the propositions which 
express it” (Deleuze, 2004a, 140).  
 
Much like sense’s special relationship to language, which does not expel, express or 
contain ‘it’, the problem might be said to have a special relationship to the 
Page 178 of 229 
 
proposition whereby ‘it’, dry and incorporeal, does not exist outside of that which 
expresses it or brings it about. In other words the problem may be actualised in 
propositions: But it is not reducible to them. The problem as proposition, as denoted, 
made manifest, or signified is a red herring becoming a white rabbit, running but 
always too late, towards the solution - its conditioned condition. Sense and the 
problem might therefore usefully be thought together, not as good or common, but 
towards mutual illumination or flattening out. In other words, and to work with the 
glowing imagery of the 1978 film Watership Down, rather than chasing a white rabbit 
further down the rabbit hole to ask it questions and to find out what it knows, become 
affected also by the problem of Fiver’s incorporeal double released in fields of blood; 
never staying still, relaying from soil and sky. 
 
“I don’t know what it is,” answered Fiver wretchedly. “There isn’t any 
danger here, at this moment. But it’s coming – it’s coming. Oh Hazel, look 
at the field, its covered with blood”. “Don’t be silly, it’s only the light of the 
sunset. Fiver, come on, don’t talk like this, you’re frightening me” (Adams, 
2005, 7). 
 
“That the problem does not exist outside of the propositions which, in their 
senses, express it means, properly speaking, that the problem is not: it 
inheres, subsists, or persists in propositions and blends with this extra-
being that we had previously encountered. This non-being, however, is 
not the being of the negative; it is rather the being of the problematic, that 
we should perhaps write as (non)-being or ?-being. ” (Deleuze, 2004a, 
140). 
 
For Fiver, a small rabbit, it is not that the entity, the thing, ‘the danger’ is here and 
now, “the problem is not: it inheres, subsists, or persists in propositions” (Deleuze, 
2004a ibid), for instance “look at the field, it’s covered with blood”. Here Fiver is not 
seeing in vision, but with vision, as a vision effect (Massumi, 2011). Hazel, also a 
rabbit, is frightened and refuses the sense that is momentarily actualised at the 
surface: “it’s coming – its coming”. The blood that seeps through the seams of the 
field is not the (f)actual blood of one or two rabbits, it is dry and yet still running, real 
and abstract:  incorporeal. Rather poignantly more it than what. The it that passes 
through Fiver’s lips and finds its way to the surface is not a particular identity or entity 
– the problem is not what is coming, the problem is that it is, dry and incorporeal - 
insensate yet sensed (Massumi, 2002). 
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Hazel is frightened, moved to feel unsafe by the affective transmissions and 
reverberation that Fiver’s wild eyes, the field and sky actualise. Desiring stillness, or 
stratification, Hazel plugs into that which really petrifies: good and common sense. 
He gives a clear and distinct reading, unlike Fiver’s obscure and distinct reading, of 
the terrain. He suggests that rather than waterless tears and aliquid blood it is “only 
the light of the sunset” causing this effect. While Fiver speaks of terrifying 
possibilities, Hazel eats them, perhaps becoming the quasi cause of a different kind 
of event, on its way to else wheres, or perhaps he wishes to avoid actualisations and 
skip straight to counter actualisations, securing the health he was given and losing 
sight of grand health (Deleuze, 2004a, 182). Hazel allows that which is accidental, 
the sunset, to ‘steal the show’ (Massumi, 2011).  
 
During the fourth chapter of the thesis I considered the notion of the crack, 
suggesting that it was the frontier, or ‘where the action happens’. Having already 
begun to explore the crack in terms of health and illness it now becomes important 
and relevant to my discussion of lapins Hazel and Fiver. Deleuze observes that “if 
one asks why health does not suffice, why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps 
because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs”. He continues:  
 
“anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through [the 
crack] in people ready to destroy themselves – better death than the 
health which we are given.[…] we must not lose sight of grand health 
(2004a, 182). 
 
Here I do not read the idea of “better death than the health which we are given” as a 
literal health or death. I do not sense that it is a bombastic repudiation of the flesh or 
vitality, on the contrary. Within the context of actualisation and counter-actualisations 
this assemblage of words draws attention to the struggling, experimenting body of a 
different health, a different ontology. A becoming-healthier not a being healthy. (see 
Mann’O Donnel, 2010; Tynan, 2010). 
 
The pre individuality of the event, that which is ‘coming, coming’ (and never ceases 
to do so), is actualised by the twitching writhing body of Fiver. We can see that, but 
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what we cannot see so readily are the manifolds and vectors which also produce the 
agentic assemblage. As with ‘Jonanne’, it is not Fiver the individual rabbit we might 
focus on here, it is the mixtures of bodies in the bloody sky, the field, fear, farmers, 
human economics, haemoglobin, adrenaline, glucocorticoid, and the surrounding 
territories of the warrens filled with non-human bodies.  
 
Having engineered this encounter with Fiver and Hazel in a bid to engender a sense 
of the virtuality of the inside of what occurs, which is always already moving with the 
actuality of the accident, or what occurs (Williams, 2008a), I would now like to return 
to the material from my field diary and the interviews which produced them, one from 
June 2011 and the other from November 2011. As noted previously, this will not be 
according to themes, but instead according to those bits of things which are the 
quasi cause of further engagement; to borrow again from MacLure, those bits of 
things that began to glow (2013b).  
 
As the actual and the virtual must be thought in disjointed tandem it is perhaps time 
to adopt that disjunctive gait of the angelic researcher becoming sanguine serpent. 
However, before that I would like to note what occurs, the accidents, of the 
interviews Joanne and I produced together in the state of affairs. Occurring in such a 
spacetime, or chronos, these things can be denoted, made manifest and signified. 
‘Joanne’ and ‘I’ met, as we had done for months previously, in a cafe a good 
distance from where we both lived; I bought coffee for myself and bottled water for 
her; she found a table; we sat down; I activated the digital recorder; we talked; an 
mp3 file was produced; I used my laptop to write field notes on the bus home; I 
transcribed the audio file and merged it with the fieldnotes; I highlighted and added 
comments to the transcript, making links to theories and other empirical materials.  
 
What occurred is represented here in this methodical methodological list of 
intentional human actors, personal pronouns and apparatuses - buying, sitting, 
activating, talking, and recording. However, these accidents do too little to engage 
with the interplay of words and things, the materiality of language and the vibrancy of 
matter. As Barad notes, “’[t]his’ and ‘that’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ don’t pre-exist what 
happens but come alive with each meeting” (2007, 396). Following this I will now try 
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to also engage with the inside of what occurs while exploring the entangled relation 
between ‘researcher’ and ‘participant’.  
 
As was noted previously, what produced these interviews and transcripts as in the 
process of becoming interesting was a smile, something actualised by Joanne, both 
coming up from the depth of her body and going down and out as lips curled at the 
edges. This smiling cracked-up-face produced at its edges a thought that became 
available to me. As the eyes in the entanglement became downcast and searching, 
affects emerged. Initially I reflected on this and a question emerged, was I as much a 
part of her ‘work’ as she was part of mine?  
 
For many months these reflexive words made me feel uncomfortable. Perhaps they 
touched my humanist soft spot that spoke through personal pronouns and was both 
too shy to make language stutter, tremble, or cry (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176), 
yet hubristic enough to think of ‘my research’, what ‘I’, and ‘I’ alone was responsible 
for. Conversely, reading this diffractively, rather than reflexively, it was impossible to 
pre-suppose that Joanne and I were separate entities (Mazzei, 2013) unaffected in 
the material intra-activity of the research. The process was itself an actant (Bennett, 
2010). Following this diffraction different questions began to matter. For instance, 
was the agentic assemblage that comprised the field, the method, the apparatuses, 
language and matter, rather than ‘Joanne’ the intentional individual, producing me 
differently? Or was the agentic assemblage noted above producing an emergent 
subject –object relation that stuck in my throat and made its way to my field-notes?  
 
Questions of responsibility are not absent if I step away from the taking of property 
that emerges from good and common sense. As Braidotti notes. 
 
“The ethical imagination is alive and well in post-human subjects, in the 
form of ontological relationality. A sustainable ethics for non-unitary 
subjects rests on an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and 
others, including the non-human or ‘earth’ others, by removing obstacles 
of self-centred individualism on the one hand and the barriers of negativity 
on the other. (Braidotti, 2013, 190). 
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If I am to take responsibility for the agential cuts I have already and will continue to 
make within this chapter it is necessary to encounter the notion that research 
practices do matter, and that the shared practice of meeting, speaking of food and 
eating words, materialised the world differently (Barad, 2007,89). Put another way, 
having worked defractively with what occurred and the inside of what occurred, it 
seems pitifully limited to suggest that ‘I’ were not also part of Joanne’s material 
discursive work. To think otherwise is to hold tightly to the mythological and 
paradoxical ‘I’. An ‘I’ which splits ontology and epistemology and takes as good and 
common sense its own subject position and property: A vantage point which sees 
from a safe distance the borders of that which it is not, but can now represent. 
 
Overview of the interview  
 
“The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass 
into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cry or 
even sing: this is the style, the ‘tone’, the language of sensations, or the 
foreign language within language that summons forth a people to come 
[….] The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and 
rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from 
affectations,  the sensation from opinion” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 
176). 
 
“The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what our verbal 
performances say, more readily than we can know the objects those 
sayings are about is a Cartesian legacy, a linguistic variation on 
Descartes’ insistence that we have a direct and privileged access to the 
contents of our thoughts which we lack towards the ‘external’ world. 
(Rouse, quoted in Barad, 2007, 49). 
 
As I engage with the eventfulness of the empirical, what occurred and the inside of 
what occurred, it feels both necessary and relevant to make note of some of the 
scenery from which the empirical materials mentioned earlier, the field notes, were 
cut apart. This, perhaps, will not produce a clearer or parsimonious account, adding 
to the already proliferating opacity of words and things rising to the surface, but it will 
hopefully work with the foreign language within language. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994, 176). In this sensational becoming murkier, the affective tonality of words and 
things has an increased chance to glow, to become luminous not by comparison, but 
as superposition (Barad, 2007, 76), in the combination of disturbances. As such, 
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rather than casting shadows of doubt from objects of inauthenticity or falsity, the 
quasi causal timbre of the glow, which “does not obey our laws and is apt to elude 
us” (Massumi, 1992, 53)12 draws instead percepts to the bits of things which do not 
rest in or on individuals, but are always already of them. “Being worthy of the event is 
not an individual’s task – events are occasions of communication rather than 
isolation” (Williams, 2008, 168). 
 
As was noted earlier in the chapter, this interview featured a dry smile which 
escaped my desire for the moistening of ‘meaning’ (Barthes, 1982), doing me the 
peculiar favour of becoming unsettled. A becoming Fiver, as it were. This meeting 
was the first time Joanne and I had ‘seen one another’ for a month, a much longer 
period than usual. Although this meant an absence of face to face meetings we 
remained virtually present to one another through social media newsfeeds. Below 
are a few of the words which appeared, but perhaps rather than ‘words’ it may be 
more apposite to refer to them as an assemblage of words, things and 
“[p]erformative statements [which] change things by being said, they have an 
illocutionary force” (Massumi, 1992,29). Perhaps further to this I would like to relate 
these ideas to Derrida’s notion of ‘messianicity’, noted in the previous chapter as 
pertaining to the “open-ended promissory quality of a claim, image, or entity” 
(Bennett, 2010, 32). Below are performative promises of what a body can, and will, 
do. 
 
“Bah, so frustrated with myself. Only burnt 218 calories today -_-'I'll just 
have to do some more later! Off to the gym again!” 
 
“Well, it definitely hurts this morning, but who can complain about losing 
2lbs over-night?! =D  Going to do the same again today, I think =)” 
 
“It'll take time, but it'll come off =) x Sweat is fat crying. =) back to the gym 
today and make it cry a little more, it felt too good yesterday not to!” 
 
To add one more verb and suggest that this is what a body can be made (to do) is 
both possible and relevant. Yet this must be done adroitly, taking good care not to 
                                            
12
 Here I am making a link between that which Deleuze refers to as the quasi cause in the Logic of sense and 
what Massumi engages with, in the context the quantum void of potentiality. This discussion of ‘Quarks and 
company’ (1992, 52 – 53) covers very similar ground to Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway 2007), chapter 
two, pages 71 – 94.  
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take Decartes’ hand and join him in his stovepipe daydreams (Massumi, 2011) of 
disembodied thought. Here it is not simply the ‘I’, or cogito, Joanne’s or anyone 
else’s that intends what a body can be made to do. The above performative 
promises express not so much the will of the individual knowing subject, but the 
machinations of words and things, that which is pre-individual and in mixtures of 
bodies. Here we might say that a body’s doing, a body being made t(hr)o(ugh) 
do(ing), is always already comprised of a dual causality – quasi and actual.  
 
These performative statements that ‘Joanne’ had typed on a keyboard in some other 
elsewhere had affects. They produced a problem to me ‘somewhere’ else in a way 
which cannot be reduced to the division between on-line, or off-line or as a cause 
effect chain that was in the future of her on-line utterances. Instead, these 
statements, as they glowed, became a needle of Aion, looping backwards and 
forwards, picking up incorporeal threads of matter and dropping words: Tying knots 
which compelled me not to undo them, but to tie them differently.  
 
“A line of becoming is not defined by the points it connects, or by points 
that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up 
through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived […] 
A line becoming only has a middle[…] fast motion” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004a, 323 ). 
 
The notion that ‘[s]weat is fat crying. =)’ seems to engage with the ‘laws’ of 
thermodynamics in a rather interesting way – not simply matter converted to energy 
– the lowest common denominator of human labour in capitalist societies, but more 
precisely the conversion of ‘fat’ into tears of sweat. The production of an unctuous 
mixture which “fe[lt] too good” not to do[..] again”.  
 
As ‘Joanne’ asks “who can complain about losing 2lbs over-night?!”. There is an 
interesting intervention into logics of time and practice. In one sense, perhaps both 
common and uncommon, as that which happens ‘overnight’ disrupts the notion of the 
intentional human actor. Because they are presumed to be asleep, the intentional 
will is not being exercised towards a particular effect, a possibility which draws 
attention to the agency of matter, or the organism, and its capacity for 
experimentation. Without the cognitively intentional subject in the driving seat the 
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body, not the mind, has a transformative capacity – it moves – it feels – it feels itself 
moving (Massumi, 2002) and vibrating with relational agency. 
 
However, these words also, rather more conservatively, temporalise activity to the 
actual night in the state of affairs, the place where accidents happen. Here a cause 
and effect chain is set up wherein the intentional physical activity occurring hours 
previously, in the gym, leads to two pounds weight loss by the morning. It is here that 
something is becoming luminous, something beyond the general and particular 
which requires nuanced consideration. I would now like to plug into Fiver, the 
aesthetic figure introduced earlier, and the interdisciplinary practice of new 
materialism. To become-Fiver, in the context of analysis, is to feel compelled by 
invisible forces and silent screams (Deleuze, 2013). To say, as it were. “I don’t know 
what it is […] but it’s coming – it’s coming” (Adams, 2005, 7).  
 
Thinking with and through these literature-machines (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a) 
opens the inquiry to the reverberations of agency, affect, sense, intent, determinism, 
the body and the organism in ways which are nipped in the bud by good and 
common sense. However, although they are nipped in the bud by the language of 
good and common sense, incorporeally and affectively they manage to grow tubers. 
Unfortunately though, these suspicious growths all too often tend to be chopped from 
the experiencing body before being saturated in good and common sense and 
served through conservative empiricism. Processed and served according to this 
recipe, affective and incorporeal tubers tend then to be refused as unpalatable and 
paranoid leaks from abhorrent the object, the illness. This recalls the problematics 
that were set out in the opening chapter of the thesis.  
 
If ‘anorexia’ is object to the authentic subject it must be denied, prevented and cured, 
but how can potential be prevented and sense cured? If on the other hand ‘anorexia’ 
is conceived as the true or authentic subject matter then becomes overwhelmed by 
the platonic Idea and that which is lived and living becomes objectified and shameful. 
This separation of the subject from the object, or the knower from the known, 
produces ‘anorexia’ as both inside and outside of the subject depending upon where 
we look for the singular cause. We thereby fail dismally to conceive of the idea that 
‘it’ is always already in the middle of things as the insensate sensation of something 
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coming about: The quasi sensory tingling of the virtuality and actuality of a matter 
shifting somewhere. “There isn’t any danger here, at this moment. But it’s coming – 
it’s coming. (Adams, 2005, 7). 
 
“In reality, every point of your body is such a singularity or a turning point; 
each is potentially the locus of an inflection or change. So though we often 
become fixated on standard thresholds, such as [weight gain or loss], this 
is often at the expense of missing more intense ones that remain 
imperceptible yet determine us more strongly as individuations none the 
less” (Williams, 2008, 91).  
 
It is not that the above readings of time and matter are contradictory, revolutionary or 
conservative, insightful or illusory, possible or impossible. It is instead that when it 
comes to the matter of matter it is important to engage with its real abstractness, its 
incorporeality, its virtuality. It is important to engage with emergent paradoxes so as 
not to weigh the true and the false and dead-end possibility for the sake of easy 
answers. Although the loss of matter is representable from one point to another, as a 
“standard threshold” (Williams, 2008, 91), what the scales ‘say’ from one morning to 
the next, the vitality of matter cannot be reduced to a formula of actual causality - 
calories burnt as compared to those consumed. ‘Joanne’, as traditional realist, notes 
she is “[g]oing to do the same again today” in her update. But she can’t. She can, in 
some sense, intend the repetition of the previous day’s activities, continue with her 
experiment, but the difference of the body-organism, from one day to the next, 
cannot be reduced to single figure variables of causality. The same body is always 
already becoming different as it intra-acts and either becomes drawn in, or leaps 
towards, differing agentic assemblages (Bennett, 2010).  
 
To initiate a rejoinder to the notions of sense and dual causality, the ‘over-night’ 
effects were both long since in motion; but also unfinished at the point at which she 
steps onto the scales. There are movements of the body which scales cannot speak 
of. Even the sort that Joanne owned which passed electrical signals through her 
body to determine her weight, body fat percentage, body mass index (BMI), water 
percentage, muscle percentage, bone mass percentage and estimated the number 
of calories she had eaten. The real cause of this shift in threshold, this weight loss, 
was actualised by a number of actants which cannot be reduced to the human. For 
Page 187 of 229 
 
instance the water carried around to “fill [a] stomach”, the money spent on gym 
membership, the electricity that powered the treadmill and running machine, 
reproductive and appetite hormone levels such as grehlin13 and oestrogen, laxatives 
and diuretics, adrenaline, the pedometer application on a phone, the kitchen scales, 
the shelf in the fridge where ‘safe foods’ are located. In addition to this range of 
ingredients, many of which are seen, through optics of either plain sight or 
microscopic technologies, there are also the quasi causes of previous events 
slopping about in an agentic affective soup women have eaten over the course of 
many lifetimes - misogynistic words and the affects of pride and shame. 
 
‘Joanne’s’ intra-action with the scales draws attention to the way in which knots of 
autonomy and mastery can be unpicked and retied to make apparent the 
significance of technologies by which nature and culture interact (Barad, 2007, 42). 
Here what occurs in the state of affairs, the accident, is a measurement of matter by 
a techno-representational apparatus, the inside of what occurs is perhaps 
possibilities of a new body – not a body that appears new as this is not only an 
actual body caused to change by its own agency, but a body becoming something 
other.  
 
In stepping onto the apparatus something of them both, in excess of electricity and 
adrenaline, leap forwards: Something quasi causal diffracts the agency of each to 
produce an intermingling of human and non-human material. ‘Joanne’s’ body is 
actualised as momentarily eventful, full of possibilities: Yet haunted by a proper 
name. Here issues of actualisation and counter actualisations return differently to the 
thesis as possibilities of difference are reduced to the same differences of a 
reduction in weight and being proper or authentic. This changing, potentially 
deterritorialised body, which is both actual and virtual, very quickly becomes 
reterritorialised by good and common sense. 
 
Below is an excerpt from the interview which the earlier field notes came. In keeping 
with Mazzei’s insights (2013) I consider this enactment amongst researcher-data-
participant-theory-analysis in terms of the ‘voice without organs’, or VWO. I have cut 
                                            
13
 Ghrelin is an amino acid hunger-stimulating peptide and hormone that is produced mainly by cells 
lining the human stomach and cells of the pancreas. 
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this data together with the above points, regarding the potentiality of a body to 
become different, to draw out the way in which the tyranny of doxa stratifies the 
possibilities of real difference in favour of same difference: proper names, clear 
topography, and common sense distinctions between inside and outside, subject and 
object.  
 
I have incorporated the transcribed material at length, not to suggest that ‘it’ speaks 
for itself, but also, by making this agential cut, not to assume that ‘it’ does not 
produce sensations prior to my analytical work. This connects with ideas I introduced 
at the start of the chapter, my attempted disruption of the humanist supposition that 
data, as a non-human object, dispassionately waits for the ‘breath of life’ that is 
analysis and interpretation. Here I have also engaged with the idea that matter is 
vibrant, having “a not-quite-human capaciousness” (Bennett, 2010, 3).  
 
S: I wondered if you could tell me a little bit about the relationship between 
you and your eating issues, what it means. Does it make sense when I 
say ‘it’?  
J: Yeah I think, yeah it does it sort of varies day by day and I kind of don’t 
see it as being mine but me being its if that makes sense  
S: Okay so that’s a difficult one to talk about but it does make sense for 
me to use the word ‘it’? 
J: Yeah  
S: And does it correspond to your experience if I say that other people 
prefer to split ‘it’ off, like I love you but I don’t love ‘it’ 
J: Definitely. My partner says things like ‘oh it changed you, I hate what 
it’s done to you’ 
S: I wondered as you said that you were ‘its’, if you felt that ‘it’ had a 
power or personality of its own? 
J: Yeah I think, I always really hate being stereotypical, like if I say all the 
right things then I must just be faking it and be a ‘wannarexic’, so that’s 
why I don’t like talking about the stereotypes of it but yeah, it does feel like 
that  
S: So ‘it’ has a capacity? What do you feel about the personalisation of 
‘it’? 
J: Er well I think it’s something that I tried to avoid thinking about for a long 
time in this relapse because it is something that does happen, it seems 
silly all these girls talking about Ed or ana or mia in their lives and I didn’t 
want to be that sort of person and fit into that stereotype and it seemed, 
well that voice had always been there, and I just associated it with this 
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sort of personality I just never saw it in terms of the names ED, ana and 
mia like thinking about it more recently it does happen 
S: You say a lot about not wanting to be stereotypical, is your difference 
from them, the others on-line, important to you? 
J: Yeah but I think it’s more to do with my size, like I almost don’t deserve 
to be that way even in the sense that it would be arrogant if I did say that I 
was meeting the stereotype because of my size, I’d be a fraud, it feels 
safer to say I’m different because to say that I’m the same would make 
me sound like a fraud and make me more vulnerable, wannarexic. 
S: So is there a real or true anorexic 
J: Errr, no I don’t, I know that eating disorders shouldn’t be based on 
somebody’s weight but, I know it’s based on behaviours and the way that 
our eyes look...but for me it is about weight, like when I go to the meets, I 
always feel so disgusting because I’m the biggest one there and that I 
don’t belong there and shouldn’t be there and that I don’t deserve the 
label of eating disorder, never mind anorexia because of my size and it 
even feels sort of stupid saying the word anorexia because of my size 
even though I know I have the exact same behaviours as someone 
diagnosed with anorexia it just doesn’t feel like something that I can say 
because  ..(trails off) 
S: Okay I understand what you just said and I need to think about that in a 
productive way, that’s really insightful. Something that just struck me 
when you were talking was that you didn’t deserve the label and while I 
understand what you were saying I just wanted to add, so you might 
respond , aren’t eating disorders in practice about a lot of pain and 
anguish and sacrifice, are you saying you don’t deserve that?  
J: Ermm I don’t know 
S: Do you ever think that the criteria that makes possible this idea of a 
‘proper anorexic’ needs to be challenged?  
J: No I just want to get there as quickly as possible. 
 
Here, and on the floor once again, the sanguine researcher can sculpt out a trench 
to engage with the virtuality of a difficult relationship to feeding the body. To consider 
not what but who, how and why something is leaping from ’It’. Which entities, which 
onto-epistemologies are possible if ‘its’ becoming borrows lips to say something 
other than ‘I’m too fat’? How might difference in itself become possible, before and 
after, ‘it’ is stratified by propositions which lack any sense other than that which is 
good and common and say. Propositions which mouth “it’s the illness talking, I hate 
what it’s done to you’ ”? Represented as a bird in a gilded cage14 or affixed as a 
butterfly whose wings are tacked to each DSM criteria who might be possible if 
                                            
14
 Hilda Bruch (1978) The Golden Cage – The Enigma of Anorexia 
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inquiry encounters the eating order differently? If it attempts to find a way in which to 
think and feel with the shuffles, manoeuvres and frictions of the chrysalis while not 
being aghast if the cocoon contains a Russian Doll or the Cheshire cat’s smile?  
 
By using post-human and new materialist theories these embodied utterances cease 
to be the words, and actions, of ‘Joanne’ the individual, the feminist, the LGBT 
activist, the Woman, the pro-ana and they become a voice without organs (Mazzei, 
2013) asking questions of what a body can (be made to) do, and what human and 
non-human actants this doing draws on. Further to this, this voice without organs 
leads us to territories of actualisations and counter actualisations which make glow 
the issue of how activities and processes produce female matter as mattering, or not. 
 
Prior to the actual interview, and having re read the transcripts of our previous 
meetings, I wanted us to talk a little more about the communities Joanne was a 
member of – the feminist network, the LGBT group, and, of course, the Pro-ana 
community. I also wanted to bring up the issue of participation again and why this 
research, our research, mattered enough to make the hour long journey to the city 
each week.  
 
As a member of the feminist network Joanne did not feel that she had the right to 
speak, ‘as a feminist’ on the issue of body image or ‘eating disorder’. She could not 
speak of food, and relationships to it, in case she was interrogated further as to how 
and why she knew such things. I would like to suggest that how and why ‘Joanne’ 
was privy to such knowledge was disruptive to a common sensibility based upon a 
visual economy. I would also like to suggest that this was something ‘Joanne’ had a 
sense of. She felt ‘too big’ to speak as a body who would unquestioningly know, i.e. 
a ‘proper anorexic’, a body represented by the DSM; and too small to speak as the 
youngest and only member of the group whose opinions were antagonistic to the 
common sense idea that x causes y and z. The question of “what is more serious, to 
speak of food or to eat words” (Deleuze, 2004a, 29) becomes poignant in this 
instance as ‘Joanne’ listened to what other members of the group, the mixture of 
feminist bodies, felt caused body dissatisfaction and eating disorder amongst young 
women. Were the group speaking in front of the one who was to be served as food 
(ibid)? 
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“I just felt really awkward because the way that they were taking about it 
was just like the media was this really big horrible thing that was 
manipulating the way that young women think and from personal 
experience and also the friends that I have the media has had nothing to 
do at all with the way that we view our bodies, like maybe a little bit but it 
wasn’t the reason that we started to or it isn’t a very big influence now and 
also it was like the way that they were talking it was like I couldn’t join in 
with the conversation because I do eat really badly and because I do have 
negative body image myself and I just felt really uncomfortable because I 
just didn’t feel like I belonged to be there because it was almost like I was 
on the opposite side”.  
 
Here, and because ‘Joanne’ remains respectful of the insidious workings of good 
and common sense, the categories they produce and the force they express to 
position bodies, she is an abashed placeless occupant. She cannot surf the 
paradoxes of bodies and politics. In this sense ‘Joanne’ sees only the contradictions, 
and ‘either-ors’ that good sense alone permits. These movements can also be seen 
to be at work in Joanne’s relationship to other significant communities, the Pro-ana 
group and also the LGBT group. In terms of the latter, Joanne was concerned with 
the bodily binaries of butch and femme, and had ‘chosen’ to become absent from the 
group she had been part of for years, until she “got smaller” and would, 
“unquestionably”, meet the demands of the category she had chosen. In terms of the 
Pro-ana group it is both the other-and self that define Joanne as placeless. 
 
Even whilst attempting to move away from a model of pathology, which a feminist 
discourse of disordered eating seeks to do, the idea of causality remains external. 
The work of resisting, is in the last instance, remains internal and individualised. A 
paradoxical failure is set up whereby Joanne’s becoming, as is the case for many 
young women, is imbued with precarity. A failure to resist slenderness, as it pertains 
to dominant heteronormative ideals of feminine slenderness (Day, 2010) engenders 
feelings that she is out of place and unable to speak as a feminist; while a failure to 
resist food and a maintenance of a ‘normal’ level of slenderness undercut her claims 
to observable’ anorexia’. 
 
Here we can see how the notion of resilience mobilised within preventative 
programmes which are informed by sociological and feminist ideas about disordered 
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eating, can easily become caught within a highly responsibilitised and individualised 
discourse. The idea that Joanne feels herself to be on the ‘other side’ is open to 
interpretation, what does she imply by the other side? Pro-ana/ Men/ Capitalism/ 
Conservatism/ Post feminism / all and none of the above? Although none are 
explicitly referenced what is clear is that she feels herself to be out of place, on the 
wall with Humpty Dumpty, yet without his mastery of verbs. 
 
Although it could be argued that Joanne is among the best placed at the meeting to 
speak of food, and that the others who are present may benefit from eating her 
words, she herself feels out of place, as though she does not belong. The 
pathologisation and shamefulness of disordered eating in everyday discourses 
serves to keep her quiet. This, I would suggest, is at least in part due to the fact that 
her real observable body cannot yet be seen to speak for itself, or ‘anorexia’, 
properly. She could not claim a space of annunciation as a real feminist or as a real 
anorexic. We have seen already that she feels silly saying the word anorexia, 
“arrogant if [she] did say [she] was meeting the stereotype because of [her] size”.  
 
Here we see again the lived implications of setting up ‘proper anorexia’ as 
observable emaciation. To speak as either a feminist, or a pro anorexic, in this 
situation would engender the risk of appearing as a false pretender and/ or as 
pathological. Her weight, which at the time of the meeting was slightly above that 
which would be diagnosable, serves to maintain her anonymity as a pro-ana during 
the feminist meeting, allowing her to remain quiet. However, this same body is 
recognised by her as being too voluminous and abstractly verbose for the pro-ana 
community, somewhere she wishes to belong.  
 
“J: I have got a lot of negative comments because I’m like so fat that they 
feel like I shouldn’t be there but even though I have exactly the same 
behaviours , even though I haven’t had period for about four months, even 
though I have a lot of the symptoms of anorexia because I’m not that 
underweight they feel like ... 
S: what kind of things have they said if you dont mind me asking 
J: wannarexic (immediate answer – tip of her tongue quick). 
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In one sense the words ‘Joanne’ puts to work, and is put to work by, have a 
reductive quality. They focus, while navigating through a defensive sensibility, on 
what occurs, the accident, the ‘behaviours’ which play out in the state of affairs. Here 
‘behaviours’ might also be said to include the matter of menstruation, something a 
‘proper anorexic body’ cannot do (APA, 2000)15 The performative statement 
‘wanarexic’ positions ‘Joanne’ as placeless to the proper. This word is part of an 
agentic assemblage which includes her embodied participation in pro-ana forums, 
‘the internet’, on-line communities,  “‘choice feminism’ (or what some call ‘post-
feminism’)” (Hatton and Trautner, 2013, 74),identity politics and  the esoteric word. 
But perhaps even more eventfully than that, the possibility of such a word through a 
good and common sense that valorises authenticity and‘ properness’ at the expense 
of matter.  
 
Concluding thoughts  
 
In this chapter I have tried to work with the empirical, not conservatively, but radically 
(Massumi, 2011). I have worked with the bits of things which emerged and affected 
the directions and connections of my project’s becoming. This different, or new new 
way of engaging with the empirical has been provoked by Deleuze’s suggestion that 
the task of challenging and disrupting the stranglehold of good and common sense is 
the work of avoiding the empiricist’s confusion between events, accidents and 
essences;  
 
“To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to 
substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities. A double battle has 
the objective to thwart all dogmatic confusion between event and 
essence, and also every empiricist confusion between event and 
accident” (Deleuze, 2004, 64).  
 
As I engaged eventfully and abstractly with the data ‘I’, ‘Joanne’, notebooks, cafes, a 
digital recorder, invisible forces and a laptop produced, I also folded in the other 
people, places and ideas which produced the agentic assemblages. In other words, 
there was a disruption of distinct states of ‘feildwork’ and ‘data collection’. This 
                                            
15
 In the most recent Diagnostic Statistical Manual, published in 2013 (DSM V), criteria d, ‘amenorrhea’, or the 
absence of at least three menstrual cycles, has been removed. At the time of the interview it still comprised part 
of the claim to the proper name Anorexia Nervosa.  
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method of engagement has attempted to fold my inquiry into what Lather and St 
Pierre (2013) refer to as ‘the posts’. I have drawn out what occurs, the verbal 
exchanges, the on-line practices, the political activities, but also connected then to 
the inside of what occurs. I have stitched and been stitched up by a needle-
becoming-tack of singular and pre-individual sense. It has drawn together patchwork 
mixtures of bodies with pre-individual and singular textures. To add a final patch I 
would like to attach the thoughts of MacLure who asserts that a “materially engaged 
language would [..] be non-representational, non-interpretive, a-signifying, a-
subjective, paradoxical and embroiled with matter” (2013, 663).  
 
Put differently, given the points of engagement which have ‘invited me in’ (MacLure, 
2013), and the theories and methods which have chosen me as much as I have 
chosen them, to have then worked with empirical materials, or data, through the 
comfortable strides of humanism and constructivism would perhaps have let me run 
faster and in straighter lines. However, my post-human slithering has enabled me not 
to simply ogle at ‘anorexia’, but rather to explore the ways in which powerful, 
demanding, ordinary and violent categories of good sense, such as those of the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), colonise the possibilities of more liveable lives 
and potential becomings. 
 
To slice into and produce differently some of Deleuze’s insights I have tried to avoid 
moving in the circles humanist inquiry already (thinks it) knows. Forfeiting Heaven, 
and the ennui it promised, (see Lecercle, quoted in MacLure, 2013b, 665) has 
enabled my becoming-sanguine-serpent. My speaking in forked tongues hopefully 
facilitated the necessary speech impediment to make language tremble, or cry 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 176). With one prong leaning out towards the virtual 
and the other slanted to catch the actual, both have intimately connected as they 
have touched my soft palate and become enfolded into my eating of words and my 
speaking of food. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONSIDERATIONS 
 
“[I]n the philosophy of language and philosophy of events, problems, 
series and events are interconnected to the point where any worthy 
response to our problems is also a response to the problems of others” 
(Williams, 2008a, 137, emphasis added). 
 
In this concluding chapter it is important and relevant that I argue for the contribution 
that I have made to knowledge, being as clear as possible about what that 
contribution is and what its implications are. This, at a very simplistic level, is a 
response to the question of ‘so what’. As part of this process I will provide a succinct 
overview of the thesis before introducing what I feel are the limitations of the 
research. I will also as plainly as possible state what the thesis does, and does not 
do. This hoped-for lucidity will help me to substantiate the claims to knowledge that I 
am trying to make and afford the reader clarity about what the inquiry sought to 
achieve. I will use this chapter to recapitulate the importance of my inquiry while 
remaining cautious about producing any dogmatic claims regarding its potential 
impact. What I will try to suggest is that as a result of this doctoral inquiry possibilities 
and openings have been cleaved asunder; to produce both a semblance of the 
subject-object of my inquiry (Massumi, 2011) and the subject-objects of further 
inquiries. I will do this by re-joining to the literatures which were explored in chapter 
two and throughout the thesis, noting how the particular assemblage of literature and 
methodology that the thesis has ‘plugged into’ (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) has 
enabled a “response to the problems of others”: a worthy response, (Williams, 
2008a, 137, quoted above).  
 
Within this chapter I will also draw together the ideas which have been engaged with 
in the preceding chapters, drawing attention to the possibilities which arose from a 
burgeoning desire to write about ‘anorexia nervosa’ in a manner which sought to 
produce it as unrecognisable (Deleuze, 2004b). Here I hope to conjure the 
significance of questioning the activity of thinking and researching ‘anorexia’ away 
from common popular reason, and instead encountering ‘it’ as a rebel becoming 
(Deleuze, 2004a, 86) which exceeds codes and representations, “static relations 
among already formed entities” (MacLure, 2013, 169-171). I will note how I have 
tried to engage with difference and intensity, rather than difference and similarity.  
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The parameters of the thesis – what it does and does not do 
 
Before I explicate what I feel are the thesis’ main contributions to knowledge, I would 
like to make clear what the thesis sought to accomplish, what it prioritised, and what 
it did not. This overview will help me to discuss the limitations of the thesis later on in 
the chapter and lead into a brief discussion of where I think future inquiries would be 
usefully developed.  
 
 The thesis does operationalise the complex conceptual language of the 
Deleuzian event. 
 The thesis does provide a critique of the connections between good and 
common sense, philosophy and science, using the medical discourse and the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) as subject-objects of critique, 
conceptualising the latter as an apparatus of extensity.  
 The thesis does not provide an individualised, cognised, spatio-temporalised 
or first-hand account of ‘anorexia’. Instead, it does explore relationships to 
feeding the body as both pre-individual and affective and also within mixtures 
of bodies. That is to say, as affecting and being affected by mixtures of human 
and non-human entities. 
 The thesis does attempt to produce an alternative account of choice by 
working with the notions of dual and quasi causality. 
 The thesis does not, in the last instance, take the position that relationships 
to feeding the body are either chosen or determined. Instead it does advance 
the position that health and illness, agency and determinism are mutually 
enfolding paradoxical relations which produce abstract and actual events. 
 The thesis does not suppose that science, per se, is conservative or 
restrictive to the task of inquiring into eating relationships. Rather, the thesis 
does hold the contention that what might be termed state philosophy and 
science (Massumi, 1992) reduce difference to the same difference; thereby 
reproducing problems and solutions which fail to engage with the real 
abstractness of matter and the complexity of difficult relationships to feeding 
the body. 
 In keeping with the above point, the thesis does draw on trans-disciplinary 
theories of politics, philosophy and science. Indeed, it is the inter-connection 
Page 197 of 229 
 
of trans-disciplinary works such as Deleuze and Barad that have enabled the 
thesis to produce a different account of relationships to feeding the body. 
 The thesis does not provide a new dogmatic theory of ‘anorexia’, or 
‘disordered eating’. However, it does pry a space for rethinking relationships 
to feeding the body by providing an original consideration of the role that non-
human actants play within the eating order. 
 The thesis does not engage with every aspect of ‘anorexia’, instead it does 
engage with a specific ‘problem’ of whether or not ‘anorexia’ is a choice or an 
illness. 
 The thesis does not provide an exhaustive literature review of conventionally 
cited eating disorder literature, but it does provide sufficient material to 
highlight the scarcity of texts which engage with the incorporeality of the body 
and the concrete abstractness of eating relations. 
 The thesis does work rigorously with various concepts which comprise the 
Deleuzian event, for instance, accident, event, paradox and proud verb. 
  The thesis does use the concept of series to analyse empirical materials. 
 The thesis does engage promiscuously (Childers et al. 2013) with literature 
and ideas about choice, determinism and materiality in ways which are rarely 
put to work in more traditionally bounded ‘disordered eating’ research. 
 The thesis does attempt to produce an account of relationships to feeding the 
body which disrupts proper names and fixed identities, noting how they can 
limit liveable lives and colonise potentiality within the human and eating 
orders. 
 The thesis is one of the few sustained works which does engage with the 
concept of ‘wannarexia’. 
 By working with ideas that contemporary Deleuzian scholars have developed 
regarding health and illness the thesis does develop an alternative account of 
what it is to be healthy. 
 The thesis does theoretically and methodologically work with paradoxes, it is 
critical of the limitations of contradictions within social inquiry. 
 The thesis does acknowledge that it is a small study based on the limited 
empirical materials gathered throughout the course of the doctoral project, 
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however, it does not suggest that this under cuts the emergent lines of 
inquiry which the thesis engages with. 
 The thesis does engage with on-line and off-line spaces and does engage 
with the appropriate ethical considerations of both ‘spaces’. 
 
Contribution to knowledge  
 
The bifurcation of choice and determinism haunts many social, cultural and 
philosophical inquiries. Particularly those which engage with, in varying forms, 
structure and agency. What I have produced throughout the course of the thesis is a 
response to this lingering problem. In this response I have plugged empirical 
materials into what eminent Deleuzian thinker James Williams notes as: 
 
“perhaps the most important non-reductive contemporary work opposed to 
the modern foundations of free choices and their judgement through 
actual or predicted consequences” (2008a, 5).  
 
By engaging empirical materials with a non-reductive work such as Logic of Sense 
(2004a) I have produced an account of the eating order that both questions and 
disrupts the ascription of proper names and their capacity to order and organise 
bodies that matter. I have also disrupted fixed identities, highlighting their 
metaphysical and material(ising) limitations.  
 
I have contributed to the ongoing and extremely important trans-disciplinary 
conversation on the post-human in a number of ways, taking seriously the watch 
words of Brian Massumi that “[p]rotestations in favour of ‘human warmth’ betray an 
inability to feel an ardour of a different kind” (Massumi, 1992, 47). He continues by 
noting that what are important are “stirrings that are not just prepersonal, but 
impersonal, bodily but inhuman, outside intentionality, open irrevocably to chance” 
(ibid).  
 
The subject-object of my inquiry, a difficult relationship to feeding the body, is deeply 
visceral, material and at times, indigestible. I feel that one of the most significant 
contributions the thesis makes to knowledge is its refusal of the humanist hail to 
shed tears in the state of affairs and make “consolations á l’americaine (Deleuze, 
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2004a, 177). As I noted in the second chapter, encountering Massumi’s words and 
feeling the possibility of “an ardour of a different kind” (1992, 47) was a point of 
singularity, a turning point for the thesis in movement. It compelled the inquiry 
towards affects which were expansive beyond individuals, and beyond individuals’ 
sorrows. This is put to work throughout the thesis and can be noted as having a 
particular impact within chapter five. To summarise this point I would like to draw 
attention to the materiality of the words “[p]rotestations in favour of ‘human warmth’, 
and the abstractness of the matter they affected. It was not that these words had any 
essential meaning, but the sense they produced enabled a methodological resolve to 
resist the warrant of what Ferreday terms the “overcoming/journey narrative of the 
misery memoir” (2012, 153). 
 
Within the thesis ‘anorexia’ has been reconceptualised as ‘a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body’. As I noted in the opening chapter, ‘a difficult relationship to 
feeding the body’ does not pathologise. It highlights embodied struggle and 
movement, activity and process. It foregrounds the relational aspect of the doer and 
the done, without individualising the subject on ascription. It cleaves a space in 
which to consider the innumerable human and non-human actants (Bennett, 2010) 
that are enfolded in the digestive relation. It engages with how “living with 
transforming impersonal events takes precedence over identifying oneself and 
maintaining that identity” (Williams, 2008a, 129). 
 
‘A difficult relationship to feeding the body’ looks towards what a body does – not 
what it appears to be, and not what it represents. As such it avoids “the cultural 
tendency either to reduce anorexia to abject spectacle or to elevate it to heroic myth” 
(Ferreday,2012; 153). It implies process, activity and movement but not towards a 
fixed or individualising identity. It de-territorialises the striated spatiality of ‘Anorexia 
Nervosa’ and acknowledges becoming rather than being. In doing so this conceptual 
disruption engenders a schism between ‘accidental’ appearance, consumables, and 
the fixed metaphysics of being. Working away from the ‘proper name’ moves 
possibilities of thought away from ‘authenticity’ towards a more attuned engagement 
with bodies, matter, and bodies that matter. Following Deleuze’s reversal of platonic 
thought I disrupted the notion of ‘proper anorexia’ by engaging with the simulacrum 
and the power of the false.  
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As was noted earlier, “a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only 
when new functions in new fields discharge it. […] it is better to build the new 
function and discover the new fields that make it useless or inadequate” (Deleuze, 
quoted in Durie, 2006, 169) It is hoped that the thesis’ attempt to engage with the 
real abstractness of matter has contributed to that new milieu, and that new functions 
will emerge which make staid ideas about bodies, and what they can do, inadequate 
in the context of consuming and producing relationships.  
 
Massumi notes that virtuality is a pivotal concept in Deleuze’s work, yet the least 
understood (Massumi, 1992, 34). Together the virtual and the actual are beyond the 
general and the particular and to draw this out I have worked with Deleuze’s own re 
working of Plato’s one and the multiple, singular and universal. Within the thesis I 
have rigorously worked with the virtual, drawing it out not in isolation, but in relation. I 
have shown that although all events require individuals to actualise them, enact or 
bring about the side of the dual cause which we refer to as actual, this actuality is 
always in relation to virtuality and that which is pre-individual. To substantiate this 
idea I have drawn on ideas taken from James Williams (2008a, 2008b) who notes 
that Deleuze’s philosophy is a structure of interlinked processes that only acquire 
determination in practical situations. In other words, the virtual is always already 
‘practical’, even though it cannot be reduced to that which occurs in the state of 
affairs, a spatio-temporally limited present.  
 
I have noted that the pre-individual is connected to Deleuze’s own, and other writers’ 
theories of affect and as such have contributed to contemporary discussions within 
theory and practice regarding this theoretical-methodological area. ‘The virtual’, as 
part of Deleuze’s ontology, is the process of becoming rather than the stasis of 
being. Yet importantly, the being of the virtual, as indicated a moment ago by 
drawing attention to the pre-individual, is not reducible to an individual’s 
psychological consciousness. As Robin Durie notes, the intimate relation between 
problems and solutions “foreshadows [Deleuze’s] account of the relation between 
the virtual and the actual” (2006). Following this idea I suggested that we can think of 
the relation between the virtual and the actual as one of mutual enfolding, an idea 
further evinced by James Williams (2008b) who makes clear that the virtual and the 
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actual cannot be thought separately and that attention to one, at the expense or 
derision of the other, produces the hierarchal or ‘aborescent’ (see Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a) models of thought that Deleuze challenges.  
 
The use of ‘of’ is a key indicator of the way, and the points at which, the thesis 
engages with virtuality, or incorporeality. This emerges from the way in which 
Massumi articulates the imprecision of clear and distinct lines drawn between body 
and mind. “Of it, but not it. Real, material, but incorporeal” (Massumi, 2002; 
5).Paraphrasing Deleuze, Massumi’s suggestion that “contemporary theories, far 
from being too abstract, are not abstract enough to grasp the real incorporeality of 
the concrete” (Massumi, 2002, 5) produced a curve in my own thinking about how I 
might engage with the materiality of ‘the anorexic body’. The virtual, or incorporeal, is 
central to the way in which the thesis puts both theory and data to work, and, in 
keeping with Williams’ idea mentioned above, acquires determination in practical 
situations. Here the ‘practical situations’ referred to include both  the ‘data’ 
presented, or cut apart (Barad, 2007) and the real and abstract conditions which 
gave rise to such ‘data’, during my on-line and off-line fieldwork. 
 
Also connected to virtuality, but producing an opportunity to introduce the thesis’ 
contribution to a discussion of space and time, are the notions of the state of affairs 
and the accident. As the thesis worked with empirical materials it has drawn attention 
to the way in which the accident can be considered in terms of the actual, as it is 
what occurs, and the event, as the inside of what occurs, can be considered in terms 
of the virtual. This apparent separation was noted as being no separation at all, for 
traces of one were always already in the other. They are separated not to bifurcate 
or border, or suggest that they are collapsible, but rather to highlight the mutual and 
processual connection between both the virtual and actual: both-and, not either-or.  
 
Continuing with the notion of both-and, and, either-or, is the significant place that 
paradoxes occupy within the thesis. Cued by Deleuze’s assertion that “[p]hilosophy 
is revealed not by good sense but by paradox” (Deleuze, 2004b, 286) I have 
methodologically advocated working with paradoxes, as opposed to contradictions, 
to allow me to prolong the problem long enough tie knots differently (Deleuze, 
2004b) I have also, through the paradox,  made connections between my own work 
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with the paradox and MacLure’s (2013a) work with the mad or rebel element in 
language, noting that “objectively, paradox displays the element which cannot be 
totalised within a common element” (Deleuze, 2004b, 286). I have also engaged with 
Alecia Youngblood Jackson’s work with the threshold, which as she notes:  
 
 “does not become a passageway until it is attached to other things 
different to itself. Thresholds contain both entries and exits; they are 
both/and” (2013, 116).  
 
In the third chapter of the thesis I drew out what was different about my engagement 
with paradoxes and conjunctive synthesis by suggesting that the interconnection of 
series and events enables a way in which to explore the moving structures which 
produce the conditions in which events come about and ‘where’ passageways and 
thresholds become important and relevant. 
 
Although they are noted above in relation to virtuality, the way in which the thesis 
works with the concepts of both accident and event contributes to the critique of 
representation and the development of non-representational theory (MacLure, 
2013b). What the thesis has made a case for is the onto-epistemological-ethical 
(Barad, 2007) ‘dangers’ of representing’ anorexia’, particularly as an abstracted 
diagnosis, weight or appearance. This is in keeping with the recent work of Warin 
(2010) who refused to give details about her participant’s weight and the British 
Eating Disorder Association publication (B-eat, 2010) which features accounts of 
people with a difficult relationship to feeding the body, and Ferreday’s (2012) 
engagement with ‘spectacular images of thinness’. Put differently, the thesis 
responds to both the particular representational problems posed for thinkers 
engaging with ‘anorexia’, but also prolongs this ‘problem’ in such a way as to 
illuminate problems of representation in social inquiry more generally.  
 
The implications of this dual engagement is that it does not isolate ‘the problem of 
representation’ to any particular group or entity, as this would perhaps suggest a 
‘lack’ in that group or entity. Instead my inquiry takes a step back to consider ‘the 
problem of representation’ beyond the general and particular. The particular 
contribution that the thesis offers through the mobilisation of accident and event is 
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that it opens up the possibilities for empirical work to take seriously both what occurs 
– the accident – and the inside of what occurs – the event. Put differently, the thesis 
has tried to make the case for engaging with the power of incorporeal and pre-
individual entities which cannot be ‘captured’ through a language of good and 
common sense, or standard propositional language. It has made the case for an 
empirical consideration of the intermingling and enfolding of sense and nonsense, 
which, I would suggest has produced a textuality which risks ‘not being understood’, 
a position Patti Lather refers to as an‘ethical imperative’ (Lather, 2007). 
 
To continue with the idea of daring not to be understood, the thesis has taken up and 
worked with a concept, connected to the event, which from my review has not as yet 
received sustained engagement. This concept is the proud verb. The way in which 
the thesis has taken up the proud verb is in keeping with its interest in movement 
and the interplay of bodies and language. The way in which the thesis has 
operationalised and explicated the proud verb has been in its attempts to express 
the interplay of actual bodies and virtual events, virtual bodies and actual events. It 
has attempted to draw out the importance of the abstract and infinitive form of the 
verb by focussing attention on the idea that it is both the property of no-one, but has 
an important relation to bodies, as they actualise events. Proud verbs, usually in the 
infinitive form, for instance, to eat/ to speak, that Deleuze conceptualises in Logic of 
Sense (2004a) carry events off into past-future events, hence they ‘belong’ to no 
one. However, the thesis has also attempted to indicate that the activity and potential 
of verbs play a role in the individuation process of humans and non-humans: their 
becomings.  
 
The thesis’ take up and re working of the proud verb has attempted to highlight the 
significance of materiality, and how language is implicated in, rather than contrary to, 
its multiple becomings. Although writers, including James Williams (2008a) note the 
significance of verbs, particularly infinitives, at the time of writing the thesis I was 
unaware of any other work which took up the particular way that Deleuze considers 
the pride of verbs in Logic of Sense (2004a). This concept has proved to be a 
valuable provocation to the thesis, enabling me to reconsider the politics of being 
named, an issue which has long been a concern for feminists. As Kramarae notes, 
“[f]eminists have consistently argued that those who have the power to name the 
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world are in a position to influence reality.”(cited in Moi; 1985, 158). From the proud 
verb, as it was plugged into my empirical materials, there was a resonance which 
made available to thought the possibility of the ashamed adjective.  
 
As noted in the first, second and fourth chapters of the thesis the ‘ashamed 
adjective’ is not simply a lazy bifurcation of pride and shame, it is instead a way of 
theorising the material-political-affective capacity of being –described. Humpty 
Dumpty, the elliptical conceptual persona Deleuze writes with, “forcefully 
distinguished between two sorts of words: They’ve a temper some of them – 
particularly the verb: they’re the proudest, adjectives you can do anything with, but 
not verbs” (Deleuze, 2004a, 30 -31. Emphasis added). Here Deleuze’s working of 
grammatical forms and materiality offered me a way in which to draw attention to the 
material implication of becoming-adjective. In other words, when powerful bodies, 
medical practitioners, parents or teachers, describe, through good and common 
sense and an institutionally powerful discourse, someone as ‘an anorexic’ the body 
they produce is one which anything can be done with. They can be told that they 
must enter into therapeutic and/ or re-feeding centres, they can lose their freedom to 
‘experiment’ with the eating order as they find suitable. This production of a body, 
which can be done to, can be seen to produce a desiring-machine that becomes-
proud, and does the choosing (of anorexia) as a lifestyle choice. Additionally, this 
foreclosure of experimentation was noted in the fourth chapter of the thesis as the 
proud threat which came from Joanne’s grandmother. Within this chapter I noted the 
role that gender plays both in the process of being named, or produced as an 
adjective, and experimentation suggesting that ‘one man’s autoimmune self-
immunisation could be a young girl’s entry to in-patient treatment’.  
 
As noted above, the proud verb does not relate to any one individual’s feelings of 
pride, but rather the pre-individual intensity of verbs. As has been explicated in the 
methodological engagements of the thesis, Deleuze’s philosophy is dismissive of 
factual autobiography and person-based psychology, but this is not to suggest that 
what individual bodies can do is not important. Within Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism what exceeds the particular and general individual is what becomes 
interesting and relevant. As “the traces of [shame and honour] [her] life bequeaths 
impersonally for others to express anew, in the multiple, ideal relations of ‘to shame’ 
Page 205 of 229 
 
and ‘to honour’” (Williams, 2008a, 151). To relate this back to the example I just 
provided, of Joanne being threatened with a recovery programme, what is at stake is 
beyond the actual event of Joanne’s own life, yet it is through her body, what it can 
do and be made to do, that we can consider the spatio-temporal limitations and 
possibilities of naming practices, including diagnosis. 
 
To pick up on the post-representational work that the thesis undertakes through the 
accident and event, this can also be noted through the way that the dogmatic image 
of thought was engaged with. Early on in the doctoral project I had tried to 
conceptualise ‘anorexia’ as a weighty signifier. In other words I wanted to draw 
attention to the way in which, as a signifier, ‘anorexia’ was full of other entities 
pertaining to class, race and gender. As I started to consider relationships to feeding 
the body I became critical of the limitations of the medical discourse in terms of its 
compulsion to represent, predict and organise bodies. Through plugging into 
Difference and Repetition (2004b) I was able to find a conceptual language that 
enabled me to figure the problem of ‘anorexia’ differently. I became aware that my 
concern with the ‘weightiness’ of ‘anorexia’ had been a concern with its iconic 
position in numerous discourses. Additionally, as I engaged with Logic of Sense 
(2004a) I became cautious about remaining at the level of propositional thought. 
Realising that signification, manifestation and denotation did too little to engage with 
the fourth element, which is sense. I was left with the feeling that I had to plug into 
different concepts. As such, the inquiry asked the question of ‘so what’ to the 
proposition that ‘anorexia is a weighty signifier’. The emergent response was that 
what was important and relevant to consider was not what something was, but how 
and why it became. To respond to these questions I became interested in the 
messianic power of ‘anorexia’, its open-ended promissory quality as an entity 
(Bennett, 2010, 32): Not powerful in and of itself, but in its relationship to other 
entities. 
 
By plugging into the possibility that ‘anorexia’ had an open ended promissory quality 
(Derrida, cited in Bennett, 2010) I was able to develop the Althusserian notion of 
interpellation away from any particular or general notion of a pre-existent or eternal 
Law. As such I was able to suggest that rather than turning, consciously or 
unconsciously, to the hail of the Law, the turn was not by the body or mind, but of 
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both: quasi causal. I noted that Derrida’s notion of messianicity set in motion the 
thinking feeling of the Deleuzian event which had become ‘the biting point’ of the 
thesis, and what I referred to in the fourth chapter as a politics of non-arrival, a “not 
yet arrived at health” (Mann O’Donnel; 2010, 163). Through the idea of a not-yet-
arrived-at-health I was able to destabilise the distinction between being anorexic and 
being well, being proper and being improper. In other words, I was able to draw 
attention the enfolding processes of health and illness, actualisation and counter 
actualisation. 
 
Within chapters four and five I contributed to contemporary thought on the concept of 
the experiment (Arsic, 2008, Tynan, 2010; Mann O’Donnel, 2010), which both 
Nietzsche, and through him, Deleuze, work with. Importantly I was able to add to this 
discussion by noting the role that non-human actants play in relationships to feeding 
the body, thereby producing a non-human account of ‘anorexia’ and the digestive 
assemblage (Bennett, 2010). Additionally, my engagement with the experiment 
enabled me to draw attention to the way in which even subtle and sophisticated 
explications of ‘anorexia’ (Arsic, 2008) can make assumptions with regard to agency. 
I noted that the subject, the anorexic, and the object, anorexia; the knower, the 
anorexic-experimenter, and the known, the anorexic-experiment, are positioned in a 
manner which pre supposes a human agent who has the capacity to ‘be in control’ of 
an experiment.  
 
As such, I noted that accounts which fail to move with the movements of 
experimentation do little to make apparent a “lack of fixed object-apparatus 
distinction” (Barad, 2007, 357). Following this, it has been the contention of the 
thesis that accounts which separate out subject and object, and do not engage 
seriously with the agentic capacities of non-human agents undermine the visceral 
knowledge of that which is being experimented on – the body-organism – the matter 
of matter. Connected to the above reservations the thesis has asserted regarding the 
separation of subject and object (Massumi, 2011), it has also attempted to show how 
and why these domineering onto-epistemologies emerged (Brennan, 2004, Deleuze, 
2004a, Barad, 2007), and suggested why these divisions are problematic in the 
context of relationships to feeding the body.  
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By engaging with middling activity and the interval the thesis supposes a more 
expansive space-time, one which refuses the boundaries of individualised, 
accidental, representational time: chronos alone. One of the ways this is 
operationalised within the thesis is within the post-human case study posited in 
chapter five. Here, rather than sketching out a particular past, represented through 
the actual events of a particular life, leading to one future, an account was produced 
which engaged with the interplay of problems and solutions.   
 
Retrospective overview of the thesis  
 
The thesis has attempted to show the working out and working through of conceptual 
aspects of the Deleuzian event. This activity has been stirred by a desire to 
productively disrupt good and common sense understandings of ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ 
and ‘Pro-Anorexia’ to create a space in which the actual is not severed from the 
virtual, its movements, processes and activities. Returning to the quote with which 
this chapter commences, although the thesis selected a problem which was clear 
and obscure, a problem which cannot have a final solution, the responses which 
emerged during inquiry are hopefully worthy in the sense that they are responsive to 
philosophical, ontological and epistemological ‘problems’ outside of the issues that 
were focussed on – whether or not ‘anorexia’ was a lifestyle choice or a mental 
illness.  
 
The empirical materials, or data, that the thesis has engaged with have highlighted 
the lived implications of separating out the actual from the virtual, the corporeal from 
the incorporeal. In working with these materials I have tried to make luminous the 
idea that reinvestments in actual, or proper ‘anorexia’, serve to re-produce the 
hierarchal, or aborescent logic of the Diagnostic statistical Manual. I have tried to 
draw attention to the power and weight of good and common sense by highlighting 
that even where medical expertise is apparently subverted by ‘experience based 
expertise’ (Conrad and Stults, 2010),  and ‘anorexia’ is posited as a ‘lifestyle choice’, 
bodies remained organised according to this powerful discourse. Not because of its 
inherent truth, but because of the ways in which it insidiously colonised potential 
understandings of the eating order and relationships to feeding the body. As such, It 
has been the contention of the thesis that good and common sense alone inevitably 
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undercut the revolutionary and resistant ambitions of the pro-anorexia or ‘pro-ana’ 
discourse, keeping their ambitions hostage to the dogmatic image of thought 
(Deleuze, 2004b), represented in ‘cultural freeze’ (Massumi, 2002).  
 
Here, the idea of ‘freeze frame’, has been developed through the notion of ‘the 
accident’. The accident, or what occurs, is manifest in what Deleuze refers to as ‘the 
state of affairs’, what conservative, as opposed to transcendental empiricism works 
with due to its amenability to vision and the way in which it can be availed to 
evidence ‘something in particular’. I have suggested that although that which is 
discernible through vision allows empirical boxes to be ticked, it misses the point, or 
the sense of the event. Or perhaps more precisely, it misses the sense of the event if 
it is not also engaged with in terms of the inside of what occurs – the event of sense. 
As I have previously cited Williams as saying, “events are much more than an actual 
thing ‘happening’ in a limited space and time” (2008, 31).  
 
In line with this work carried out with accident and event I have tried to show how a 
common sense focus on representation or appearance (of an emaciated body or 
numerical figures registered and represented on scales) informs a particular 
relationship to feeding the body. This line of thought has connections to earlier 
significant work on ‘eating disorders’, particularly Helen Gremillion who argues that:  
 
“psychiatry exercises power by labelling, organizing, and constructing 
anorexia as a reified and bounded condition that is removed from cultural 
ideologies and processes, as an illness entity which can be grasped and 
‘fixed’”(1992, 59, emphasis added). 
 
Within all of the previous chapters of the thesis there has been a concerted effort to 
work with the language of the event and not simply that of good and common sense. 
Put differently, there has been an attempt to engage with something other than 
denotation, manifestation and signification – our standard language. This has not 
simply been an exercise in aesthetics, it has also been a political act spirited by a 
desire to free relationships to feeding the body from a dogmatic image of thought, 
challenging ‘anorexia’ as mandate. As Massumi notes: 
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“[t]his imprisonment is less an immobility than a stereotyped progression 
since the order-word acts to carry a body from one pre-defined set of 
potential relations to another. Everyday language does not entirely 
straitjacket our potential but it does restrict us to the lowest level of our 
virtuality. It limits the dynamism of our becoming to the stolid ways of 
being deemed productive by an exploitative society. It takes us from one 
bland realm of possibility to another. It delivers us to power”. (Massumi, 
1992, 40 – 41). 
 
Throughout the thesis I have repeatedly made the case for disruption as an ongoing 
process, rather than a once and for all moment. This disruption has primarily 
concerned proper names and fixed identities. I have done this through a critique of 
good and common sense and by engaging with the productivity of paradoxes. In 
addition I have been critical of the medical discourse, particularly the power it has to 
describe, organise and limit embodied potential. However, it is important to note in 
this closing chapter that this critical engagement with good and common sense is not 
a totalised or dogmatic critique. Put differently, I have not presumed that the object of 
my critique, or the spaces where complex problems circulate, can always be referred 
to in the here and now of the state of affairs. The entities I have engaged with and 
the notion of ontology that I have mobilised have made it necessary to work at the 
cleavage of the actual and the virtual.  
 
What I have attempted to make available through a particular affective tonality and 
theoretical methodological writing is the importance of thinking problems as 
pertaining to corporeality and incorporeality, and as multiply connected. As Williams 
notes, all thought is strategic and  
 
“has a series of pre-suppositions with respect to desires, sensations, 
individual interests, group interests, and so on, Thought is therefore 
always an interaction with the problems raised by these desires and their 
limitless communication with other desires and events” (2008a,115). 
 
A desire to unfix good and common sense notions of what actual ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ 
is and who actual ‘Anorexics’ are - while never becoming forgetful of the lived and 
everyday experience of those with a difficult relationship to feeding the body, worked 
with and through me. In this sense, it was not my desire but rather a problem that 
was available to encounter. This task became possible by engaging with theories 
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pertaining to the event, affect, virtuality and incorporeality as they engendered a 
thinking-feeling that was abstract enough to get into, and under, the conceptual skin 
of what is presumed concrete about matter. (Massumi, 2002, 5). These theories 
were combined with ideas drawn from new, or feminist, materialisms and post-
humanism to engage with the visceral, vital, materiality of relationships to feeding the 
body. Together, these literatures worked towards the possibility of destroying 
‘Anorexia’ as a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze, 2004b), and refusing to take for 
granted pre-defined, or a priori, borders of materiality, causality, and agency. 
My engagement with eating and speaking has not been about posing well defined 
problems and creating pristine solutions. Following Deleuze I have tried to  
 
“[move] away from any type of thought that affirms that a problem has 
been resolved, and towards seeking ways of replaying problems better, 
criticising their fixing in an image of thought and creating new concepts at 
the cutting edge of the return of the problem” (Williams, 2008a, 113). 
 
Further to these points is the idea that re-theorising might also be thought as a 
question of doses rather than as some kind of ‘cure’ for socially and materially felt 
‘ills’. As Olkowski notes “we do not live in Wonderland” (2008, 120) and it is not the 
case that we would engender a healthier or happier society by doing away with good 
sense entirely. As Olkowski goes on to note “our actions have consequences” (ibid). 
Here, what I do think is worth further inquiry is how we conceive of these 
consequences and how we figure responsibility in relation to them. More pertinently, 
how do we engage with the paradoxical nature of consequences, or the 
consequential assemblages that are produced in our intra-actions with the world? 
How do the moving structures of gender, race, class and sexuality affect how we 
consider what is, and is not, consequential? Further still, how are the consequences 
of eating and speaking to be engaged with when we take seriously the porosity of 
matter and refuse the limitations of mealy mouths? Might we cease to take for 
granted the idea that clear and distinct bodily entrances, and their sonic 
representations, hold the key to qualitative inquiry?  
 
Returning to application, what might be the dosages we employ rather than the 
inoculation we might prescribe? Here, and in keeping with Olkowski’s article and the 
consequences of eating and speaking, how might practice and theory plug into one 
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another to loosen, or disjunct, the causal or conjoining flow of conjunctive synthesis? 
Both big and stupid; either real or unreal; either masculine or feminine etcetera, 
etcetera. How might the virtual and actual, the corporeal and incorporeal, become 
blended into inquiry without tipping in favour of one or the other. (Olkowski, 2008. 
110, Williams, 2008b).  
 
In other words, how might methodologies be developed in a manner which considers 
the materiality of language, its sonorous travels through depth and surface alongside 
the abstractness of matter, its limitless virtuality, singularity and appetite for 
creativity, without making the empiricist’s confusion between accident and event?  
 
Within the chapters of the thesis I have tried to make the case that the way in which 
medical discourses produce ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ is actually unhelpful to the more 
expansive problem of difficult relationships to feeding the body. I have often made 
reference to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, V) which is used by clinicians and researchers 
to diagnose and classify ‘mental disorders’. The DSM has been produced by 
hundreds of ‘international experts’ in all aspects of mental health and the fifth edition, 
as with preceding others, defines and classifies ‘mental disorders’. It attempts to 
produce concise and specific criteria intended to facilitate an objective assessment 
of symptom presentations in a variety of clinical settings - inpatient, outpatient, partial 
hospital, consultation-liaison, clinical, private practice, and primary care. In other 
words it attempts to make ‘mental illness’, such as ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ recognisable 
and predictable through a clear and distinct representation. 
 
The DSM-5 is the most definitive resource for the diagnosis and classification of 
mental disorders. Within the thesis, by plugging Barad (2007) into Deleuze (2004a) I 
have conceptualised the Diagnostic Statistical Manual as an apparatus of extensity 
which can only ever produce the same difference, or the similar, as opposed to the 
singular or intense of difference. I have argued that this reductive logic mobilises 
enmity towards those who are deemed as ‘false pretenders’ or wannarexics. 
Articulated differently, those who fail to have the same difference become multiply 
marginalised yet paradoxically inclined to desire the certitude the apparatus offers. 
The DSM, for the purposes of the thesis, is an empirical example of the way in which 
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the authentic and deserving body can be weighed, literally, against the guilty copy 
who has yet to prove they are ill enough to be recognised as having a difficult 
relationship to feeding the body. Yet, the DSM’s place within the state of affairs, the 
everyday and the clinical, is, to a certain extent, one of the ‘accidents’ which the 
project has engaged with. What has been of interest within preceding chapters is the 
way in which the good and common sense of this accidental artefact feed into 
incorporeal events and produce paradoxes which “reveal philosophy” (Deleuze, 
2004b, 286). Paradoxically the clear and distinct logic that would make ‘things’ 
recognisable and predictable, is implicated in producing new unknowable territories 
and rebel elements such as ‘wannarexia’. To quote once more a fragment of Logic of 
Sense (Deleuze, 2004a) which has been key to the thesis: 
 
“To the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite 
us in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was born to 
embody it.” It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in 
us; of becoming the quasi cause of what is produced within us, the 
Operator. […] The event […] manifests in us the neutral splendour which it 
possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre individual nature, beyond the 
general and the particular, the collective and the private” (Delueze, 2004, 
169).  
 
In the language detailed above (Deleuze, 2004, 169) my engagement with lived 
concepts was actualised. I was invited to turn away from good and common sense 
while becoming more compelled than ever to figure the politics of the work I wished 
to carry out.  The movements of the event were sensed as potent and significant in 
advance of their detours, mergers and crossings. Logic of Sense (Deleuze, 2004a) 
shifted my engagement with anorexia from that which occurs, the accident, to the 
potentialities of the inside of what occurs, the processes and activities of sense 
which exceed the visible and the individual. By thinking-feeling (Massumi, 2011) both 
the politics of the project, and the lived concepts, I had to look further; in unexpected 
and unpredictable places within the text. Discovering that the actualisation of the 
event is never the final point, as Deleuzian metaphysics are of becoming not being, 
eroded the strictures of ‘the problem’ as I had previously ‘known’ them. Instead of 
fixed states, clear and distinct states, we find that actualisations and counter-
actualisation, in repetition and difference, are “the freedom by which we develop and 
lead the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters of 
Page 213 of 229 
 
actualisations and causes (2004, 243). What this enabled me to suggest was that 
the representation of anorexia, as actualised, is not where social inquiry should 
either start or stop, and nor, for that matter, is ‘recovery’.  
 
As a concept counter-actualisation, which has been noted at various points within 
the thesis, enabled me to engage differently with the potential of the event. 
Encountering counter-actualisation triggered a visceral and cerebral practice of 
imagining expansive movement as opposed to limited ricochets between illness and 
health, choice and determinism. I would now like to draw on the quote presented a 
moment ago to draw out the way in which counter-actualisation impacted on my 
reading of temporality and practice. Importantly, I will try to expand on how counter-
actualisation, as with becoming, is never complete. As a process it is not something 
that we can think of as a marker, as something which is discernible according to 
denotative logic. In the fourth chapter of the thesis while I was discussing the notion 
of ‘anorexic elegance’ I noted that illness was an immanent process, not state, of 
health. I suggested that it was connected and moving along a mobius of strip of toxin 
and remedy. I would like here to map out a link between the mobius strip of health 
and illness and the twisted cylinder of actualisations and counter-actualisations, 
suggesting that both are forms of continuous critique and overcoming. Here ‘the 
conscious self’ is not the motor of critique and overcoming, but rather a part, as with 
affects, sensations, human and non-human matter, of the machine which has the 
capacity to do things differently. 
 
What this makes apparent is that no activity is truly the same in repetition. The 
‘same’ ascetic practices will not have the same affect for every-body, or even the 
same body over time (Bennett, 2010). Both ‘sides’ of the twisted cylinder are always 
already part of an entangled quasi-causal assemblage. An assemblage where 
agency is distributed and affects are unpredictable. No entity or affect stays the 
same and neither human agency nor desire can make it otherwise. As with 
revolution, neither health nor victory can be proclaimed or secured once and for all. It 
is less a question of how to prevent or cure and more a question of bringing about 
paradoxically creative, measured, and unpredictable activities which redouble, rather 
than repair, the cracks which a body’s stuttering and vibrating bring about. What was 
resistance is on its way towards numerous other sensations and affects, what will be 
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at one point be recognised as ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ was at some other point a lifestyle 
choice. But in-between both it was ready to be all sorts of ‘whats’ (Massumi, 2011).  
 
Having read the twenty first series of Logic of Sense (2004a) and encountered the 
phrase “[t]o the extent that events are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us 
in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.” (Deleuze, 
2004, 169) something of me became excitable. My capacity to be affected became 
voluminous. To suggest that ‘It spoke to me’ is not to separate the text, the words, as 
entities entirely distinct to the borders of ‘my own self’, but to allude to the non-
human capaciousness (Bennett, 2010) and materiality of words. Of all the 
assemblages within Logic of Sense this collection of words compelled me. However I 
did not find agreeable the way in which I felt compelled. What is important here is 
that I did not object to what the words ‘meant’, it was not a question of meaning, I 
objected to what was produced in the intra-action of my present-past-future and this 
mixture of words and sensations. 
 
There was an immediate excitement, a rushing, a leaping, and a desire to know the 
next strange and succulent concoction before I had actually read it. As I reconsider 
this rambunctious aspiration I sense both a desire for certainty, to know what I had 
always unknowingly known, and a desire to dash the brains of certainty. The meeting 
disrupted profoundly my sense of privacy, my sense of solidity and separateness. 
There was something horribly poignant and intoxicating about this invisible abstract 
entity waiting and having the allure to beckon and enfold. As I read it, materialising 
the shapes and sensations of the words, I was, in both directions at once, attracted 
and repelled. In one direction it spoke back to me what I thought I had always had a 
sense of, at the twitchy level of embodied materiality. In the other direction, the side 
that would dash the brains of certainty, the sense of destiny I felt was evoked 
frustrated my wanting something other, something unthinkable. Although this 
passage is situated at the mid-point of the volume it produced a sensory experience 
of encountering the first and last page simultaneously, going back and going 
forwards. I was enchanted, it had a promissory quality but I was not quite sure what 
sort of promise was being made. 
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As I turned the pages of the text to the following series Porcelaine and Volcano I 
wrote “there is heroism made of death and destruction, it is powerful and hails” A 
page and a half into the twenty second series and I drew a small arrow from the 
paratextual commentary “wrong impression – COUNTER-ACTUALISATION * -  
Starting point to reconsider ‘prevention’ and ‘recovery’”. James Williams gives 
counter actualisation as “playing out the event in the realm of sense in a different 
way” (2008a, 31). He notes that there have long been arguments within the 
philosophy of the event that decry the need to engage with anything other than a set 
of facts. The empirically observable, the accidents severed from sense, the actual 
separated from the virtual. Williams notes that this is not the Deleuzian event, for 
Deleuze there is a desire to turn towards “less concrete effects of changes in actual 
matters of fact” (2008, 32). He notes that if we focus solely on the actual event, and 
here I will insert the example of an emaciated body, we fail to encounter the sign of 
intensity and the logic of sense. “Deleuze is interested in a different and seemingly 
more abstract concreteness than purely material facts” (2008a, 33). Counter-
actualisation, as Williams articulates it, is “a reciprocally determining interaction 
between sense [which is resistant to fact-based and meaning-based analysis], and 
the actual side of events” (ibid.). 
 
In the fifth chapter of the thesis I developed a conceptual persona and wrote with a 
character from a favoured and feared childhood book. This allowed me to compose 
something other than angelic writing by speaking with a forked tongue. As the thesis 
draws to a close I would like to write with this bloody trouble-maker once again.  
 
As I started to forget that which I had never really known, the shape of ‘destiny’ 
began to disfigure, it started to intra –act with creativity. “To the extent that events 
are actualised in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: “My wound 
existed before me, I was born to embody it.” (Delueze, 2004, 169). Once I had truly 
begun to engage with multiplicity, not just think it, it was no longer possible to reduce 
this ‘wound’ to anything universal or particular. It was beyond both, engendering 
desire. To ‘embody’ the ‘wound’ is not to embody a proper name, such as ‘anorexia’, 
as had been one direction of my first reading. The ‘wound’ is visceral, it is material, 
but it is also singular. It is a sentiment, a sensibility that is beyond any one individual. 
And yet the individual becomes, is individuated, in their creative response to this 
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something which refuses fact-based, or meaning based analysis. Here, this creative 
response, to do differently, is what makes us worthy of the event. It is perhaps the 
difference between upon being called to dance, of either standing on the ground and 
performing a methodical set of operations with your feet or lying on your back, with 
the light behind you, to cast shadows across a semblance of others. 
 
Limitations of the Research 
 
Having produced the thesis, and been produced by it, I would like to spend a little 
time to consider what might be conceived as the limitations of the research. This will 
help me to suggest how I think further inquiries might be progressed in the future. 
 
Although the conceptual language of the event has enabled me to engage differently 
with the eating order and relationships to feeding the body, it might be suggested 
that this particular syntax is not accessible to readers who do not have a 
philosophical or theoretical background. However, I would defend the decision not to 
produce a less conceptual or philosophical account of the subject-object, particularly 
as this method allowed me to pose different problems to the ones a geometry set 
would facilitate (Deleuze, 2004b). I would also argue, given the orthodox power of 
the dogmatic image of thought, had the thesis been less conceptual or abstract it 
would have been less able to produce an account which did not take for granted a 
priori borders and boundaries. In other words, it would have produced ‘anorexia’ as 
recognisable and yet another recognisable account of anorexia. In turn I would 
suggest that it has been relevant and important to operate though a particular, 
perhaps difficult, textuality, to dislodge taken for granted ideas and cherished 
meanings. 
 
As noted earlier, counter-actualisation was a significant concept within the thesis’ 
engagement with Deleuzian ontology. It was connected to the issue of living 
differently (Dyke, 2013) and tacitly influenced what I found problematic with the fixed 
metaphysics of ‘being anorexic’, an assertion that remained un-problematic within 
social inquiries (Rich, 2006) which were concerned with, and uncritical of, the 
possibilities of identity politics. However, although I feel that the thesis lays the 
foundations for future work into the possibilities of counter-actualisation, it is noted 
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that there has perhaps been too little work carried out with this concept and empirical 
materials. 
 
The thesis has been critical of the good and common sense within the medical 
discourse and within branches of philosophy, for instance, Platonic and Cartesian 
thought. With regard to my engagement with the medical discourse my analysis and 
discussion have tended to focus on what I have conceptualised as an apparatus of 
extensity, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual. Although it was relevant and important 
to engage with the good sense of the medical discourse, in light of both my empirical 
materials and also the theories I have used, it is acknowledged that the medical 
discourse, as with the pro-ana discourse, is heterogeneous and productive of many 
interesting paradoxes. This leads me to next sub-heading of this final chapter, future 
areas of inquiry.  
 
Future Potential Areas of Inquiry 
 
In response to the first limitation noted above, I would like to spend time working with 
other Deleuzian scholars and practitioners who engage with people with difficult 
relationships to feeding the body to refine and re work how ideas, such as the quasi-
cause and incorporeality might be further developed to engage with policy and 
practice. As noted in the section above, the conceptual language of the event is 
paradoxically illuminating and obscure, and while this casts shadows of uncertainty, 
the way in which qualitative inquiry engages with its possibilities should not be 
obdurate. While it remains my contention that the important and relevant task was to 
produce a different account of difference, this does not limit future re-workings. On 
the contrary. The different kind of ground-work that the thesis actualises, a ground 
work which starts in the middle of things and is suspicious of benevolent and benign 
beginnings has engaged substantially with the interplay of the physical and the 
metaphysical, the pre-individual and mixtures of bodies. It has made the onto-
epistemological-ethical case for an unfamiliar abstraction. However, the event, which 
has been conceptually drawn upon and put to work, is never complete. Perhaps, to 
truly put theory and method to work there is necessarily further work to be done to 
counter-actualise the event of the thesis. Put differently, the thesis as event, cannot 
be allowed to remain fixed, it must become in different ways, for different audiences. 
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To not do so may engender the risk of leaving it to scratch its own ignominious 
sores. 
 
Further to the second limitation noted in the previous section, and continuing with the 
point made above, I would like my future inquiry to pick up, in the middle of things, 
where the small arrow began. Take time to work with the significance of counter-
actualisation. For instance, I would be interested to explore how it might be used 
further to fracture conventional inquiry’s hubristic, yet nervously responsibilitised 
(Rose, 1999) sense of always already knowing, or having to know. I would also be 
keen to engage in a more thoroughgoing inquiry into what counter actualisation and 
the body without organs may offer to rethink the notion of recovery. In terms of this 
latter point, it would be interesting to plug these ideas (Mazzei and Jackson, 2013) 
into the notions of experimentation and dosages (Arsic, 2008; Mann O’Donnell, 
2010, Tynan, 2010) and take these further by not just thinking of the ‘recovering’ or 
‘experimenting’ human subject, but also engaging with non-human actant’s to 
develop a theory of distributed agency (Bennett, 2010) which does not 
responsibilitise individuals for ‘their success’, ‘their failure’, or ‘their problems’. 
 
There is perhaps an opportunity to develop the notion of disjunctive and conjunctive 
relations in the context of practice. In keeping with Olkowski’s (2008) article and the 
consequences of eating and speaking, I would like to engage with how practice and 
theory might plug into one another to loosen, or disjunct, the causal or conjoining 
flow of conjuntive synthesis. For instance, both big and stupid, either real or unreal, 
either masculine or feminine etcetera, etcetera. Although much ink has already been 
spilt on the problems of bifurcation, as far as I am aware much less has been spent 
on the sedimentation of toxic conjunctions. To carry out this work it would be 
valuable to work with scholars and practitioners who, professionally and 
pedagogically, are in contact with young people. This could potentially be an 
interesting and practical project which would put abstract theory into concrete 
practice through various youth focussed activities and events. 
 
In light of the manner and methodology the thesis has engaged with the complexity 
and nuance of the pro-ana discourse, a future piece of empirical work which 
explored paradoxes within the medical discourse would be both illuminating and 
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apposite. Here I would be particularly interested in speaking with psychologists and 
general practitioners whose work touches on the issues of food and feeding. I would 
be particularly interested in engaging with them in regard to the notion of 
enchantment (Bennett, 2010), and how their own ‘proper names’ and corresponding 
identities, as Psychologist, Doctor, or Nurse, produce sense in the context of their 
work. Further to this, I would also like to develop a methodology or analytic practice 
with this group of practitioners which draws on Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum, 
the notion of the good and bad copy.  
 
Why Was it Important to Carry Out this Research? 
 
As the thesis draws to a close I would like to suggest why it was important to carry 
out this research. The tone of the doctoral project has accorded to the interplay of 
distinction and obscurity, and as such it has attempted to strike a chord within the 
symphony of the discordant idea. (Deleuze, 2004b). The eating order and 
relationships to feeding the body are more often than not considered to be human 
problems, and the cause, differing from model to model, is posited as internal to the 
subject, or external as an object. As such the work that I have carried out at the 
interval or fold of both-and has contributed a non-reductive post-human theorisation 
of what I noted as a dogmatic image of thought: ‘Anorexia’. The way that the thesis 
has engaged with ‘anorexia’, ‘pro-anorexia’, and ‘wannarexia’ on-line and off-line has 
been responsive to both the increase in pro-ana spaces (Optenet, 2008) and on-line 
activity and research more generally.  
 
The move towards new onto-epistemologies, and ethical ethics is incremental and 
although the thesis does not change the world, it does not leave it untouched either. 
It was important and relevant that the thesis engaged with ‘anorexia’, ‘pro-anorexia’ 
and ‘wannarexia’ as equally important subject-objects, rather than “distinct discursive 
objects” (Giles, 2006). By engaging in this way, and avoiding reinvesting in ‘real 
anorexia’ and ‘improper wannarexia’, I was able to engage with the promissory 
quality of ‘anorexia’ as different and distinct to difficult relationships to feeding the 
body. 
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As I have noted throughout the thesis, it has been important to engage spectacular 
(Ferreday, 2012) and accidental representation of the body, on-line and off-line, with 
post-representational ideas and theories. By working with the accident and event, it 
is my contention that the thesis makes an incremental nudge towards the possibility 
that future inquiries into consuming relationships will be less concerned with 
appearance and identity, and increasingly attentive to the differences and desires 
which leap from bodies and bump into moving structures.  
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